Harper’s underwhelming ‘secret’ foreign policy plan
by Daryl Copeland
November 23, 2012
The leak of a draft Canadian foreign policy plan, first reported nationally on November 19, was treated breathlessly by the media and hyped as a major story.
In contrast, the event has generated something of a yawn from members of the commentariat.
That lacklustre response reflects what we know of the apparently insipid content of the paper. The need to embrace trade and economic opportunities in emerging markets, while continuing with efforts to advance Canadian interests in the United States, is hardly the stuff of revelation.
So, too, with the paper’s suggestion that we manage carefully the pursuit of Canadian objectives in countries where fundamental values may not align.
Still, the appearance of this document, the status of which remains uncertain, is not completely without significance. The lack of consultations during its preparation suggests serious problems of governance , not least an over-reliance on secrecy and control. Moreover, the issues that are not covered in the plan may be more significant than those that are.
Unlike the comprehensive, five-volume International Policy Statement released by the Martin government in 2005, the leaked policy paper does not appear to be product of a wide-ranging, strategic review.
That is unfortunate, because the fundamental structural changes now sweeping the globe have generated a new set of threats and challenges, many of which are characterized by the presence of a significant scientific and technological component.
These perils are not flagged in the plan, and for the most part are not well understood.
In that respect, the initiation at this juncture of a national conversation on grand strategy could scarcely be more timely.
What would such an exercise involve? Much more than stating the obvious and repeating old platitudes.
Grand strategy is all about devising a master plan which sets out where a country wants to go in the world, and how it intends to get there. A detailed estimation of national capabilities is matched by an equally searching consideration of vulnerabilities, obstacles and constraints.
Grand strategy seeks to draw together and unify all elements of national power and influence — political, economic, cultural, diplomatic and military. The 2005 enterprise, whatever its failings, did attempt to achieve that goal.
Grand strategy takes the form of a clear statement of fundamental interests and values. This core is supported by an estimation of capacity and potential and an articulation of the policies and plans required to advance strategic objectives.
By providing both visionary intellectual guidance and an interpretive operational framework, grand strategy reconciles long-term ends with available means, and sets out a world view which illuminates both risks and possibilities.
Grand strategy is especially useful during times of heightened danger and instability (like now, for example), when it serves as a beacon to help policy-makers chart the way forward.
In a turbulent operating environment, and especially in moments of uncertainty or doubt, that beacon should be glowing in the mind’s eye, inspiring purposeful decisions and directed action.
The secret plan does not have those attributes, or deliver that kind of advice. It underwhelms.
How to move forward from here? By launching a larger, more open discussion and debate. By tapping into the energy, creativity and imagination in Canadian universities, think tanks, businesses and NGOs.
Under those more inclusive circumstances, it just might be possible to reconnect with the wellsprings of innovation and inspiration which once animated an activist Canadian foreign policy.
Canada is a country known (until recently) for in its enlightened, progressive, compassionate approach to international policy. Terms such as peacekeeping, human security and the responsibility to protect — however removed from the current political discourse — still bear an unmistakably Canadian stamp.
The land mine ban treaty and the International Criminal Court exist in part because of Canadian initiatives. Even if issues of blood diamonds and child soldiers no longer occupy a central place on the multilateral agenda, they constitute part of the legacy of engaged Canadian internationalism.
That brand is gone. What will replace it?
Unless the secret plan is made fully public, we will not know whether Canada’s future diplomatic priorities — beyond the soothing bromides of prosperity and security — are clearly identified. What we’ve seen does not suggest the existence of an agreed assessment of where or how Canada might fit into an emerging big picture.
Nor does it take sufficient account of the serial mishandling of relations with most Asian countries, or the retreat from Africa, or the unfulfilled commitment to build stronger ties to Latin America. It is just these sorts of vulnerabilities and constraints that grand strategy is intended to address.
Finally, DFAIT authored the foreign policy plan. Does the paper pre-suppose any kind of vision of the foreign ministry functioning as a whole-of-government central agency equipped to ensure international policy coherence and to manage all aspects globalization? I doubt it.
For these reasons and more, I believe that the orchestration of a grand strategy should be established as one of DFAIT’s core tasks.
By focusing on grand strategy and globalization management, the foreign ministry could realize its strongest comparative advantages and begin to add real value as a network node.
This may seem like a very tall order, especially for a department struggling with significant cuts and which does not appear to enjoy the complete confidence, trust and respect of its political masters. Yet until the department is provided with the political clearance and the tools it needs to operate effectively at a more elevated level of analysis, improved performance is unlikely.
Daryl Copeland, a former Canadian diplomat, is an educator, analyst, consultant and the author of Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International Relations. He is a senior fellow at the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, and holds teaching appointments at Ottawa, East Anglia (UK – London Academy of Diplomacy) and Otago (NZ) Universities. For more information and commentary, visit his website, and read the book’s introduction.