BRIEFING NOTE

by Kate Todd
September 2024

Summary

• The navies of Canada’s allies and adversaries have made and continue to make major investments to procure and develop maritime autonomous vessels and vehicles (MAVs).
• MAVs are assets that use varying degrees of artificial intelligence (AI) to operate without a full human crew. They are expected to revolutionize naval warfare, allowing their owners to maintain or gain strategic superiority in the increasingly competitive and dangerous international security environment. Canada’s navy must also procure MAVs to ensure that it can protect its people and interests in the face of emerging threats.
• As a nascent technology, MAVs are still prone to vulnerabilities including communication failures, susceptibility to cyber-attacks, technical malfunctions, operational risks, physical attacks, hijacking, and sabotage. However, with planning, these vulnerabilities can be mitigated to maximize the benefits of operating MAVs.
• The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is presently studying whether it should begin procuring MAVs, how many, what types, and for what roles. As part of this study, it should consider what internal changes it needs to make to be able to integrate MAVs into the fleet and how mitigate their vulnerabilities through investments in the advancement of communication, sensor, and AI technologies and bolstering cybersecurity and physical security measures.

Context

• MAVs have the potential to accomplish a wide variety of roles traditionally carried out by crewed naval platforms and are well-suited for dull, dangerous and dirty missions. In the near term, using today’s technology, MAVs will be capable of performing intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance in permissive environments, mine countermeasures, search and rescue, and scientific missions. By 2040, these platforms are expected to also be able to perform armed escort, air and missile defence, surface warfare, mine laying, anti-submarine warfare, and navigation operations.
• Despite their impressive current and future capabilities, MAV technology is still not completely reliable. Its vulnerabilities include:
  • Communication failures such as signal interference and underwater communication challenges that hinder real-time communication, command, and control of assets, increasing the risk of operational failures or loss of platforms.
    • Signal interference due to electromagnetic interference, signal jamming, or adverse environmental conditions can disrupt the communication systems MAVs rely on for navigation and control, potentially leading to loss of control or data.
    • Underwater environments create significant communication challenges for autonomous undersea vehicles. Factors such as salinity, pressure, and water temperature can interfere with communication systems, causing delays, data loss, or communication blackouts.
  • Increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity threats, such as hacking, malware, and software exploitation, that can target MAVs’ reliance on digital systems make them particularly susceptible to cyber-attacks that can compromise their systems, allowing for unauthorized control, data breaches or operational disruptions to occur.
  • Technical malfunctions such as system and sensor failures that can impair MAVs’ operational capabilities.
    • MAVs rely on onboard systems, including navigation, propulsion, and sensor technologies, to function. Hardware or software errors in these systems could result in operational failures or accidents.
    • MAVs' sensors are also critical to their safe operation. Sensor limitations can impair MAVs’ abilities to detect and respond to environmental changes or obstacles. For example, MAVs’ sensors may fail to detect contacts in heavy seas or limited visibility, prompting the navigation system to make unnecessary or dangerous manoeuvres.
    • To mitigate the impact of system or sensor failures, MAVs should be able to transition to a manual control mode where humans operate the asset.
  • Operational risks in complex or emergency scenarios.
    • Despite their ability to process large amounts of information, MAVs decision-making capabilities are still limited compared to human operators. Unexpected or complex situations may challenge their ability to respond effectively.
    • In the event of a system failure or emergency, MAVs may lack sufficient redundancy or contingency measures needed to continue safe operation.
  • Physical attacks, hijacking, or sabotage through direct means or by tampering with MAVs systems could compromise their operational integrity or safety.
    • Having a small crew aboard could deter potential attacks of this nature.

Implications for Canada

• Canada needs to procure MAVs to stay aligned with allies, counter adversaries, and address emerging threats. However, the RCN’s adoption of MAVs will come with challenges that must be effectively managed to optimize their operational potential.
• At present, the RCN is ill equipped to procure MAVs and counter their vulnerabilities. Although Canada is a leader in advanced technology, the RCN is a technological laggard. The RCN does not have infrastructure needed to integrate them into their fleet, let alone optimize their use.
• As a first step towards acquiring MAVs, the RCN must create the digital backbone necessary to integrate and operate MAVs. More robust data collection, storage, and processing capabilities must be developed. The RCN’s 2019 Digital Navy initiative has made some progress towards allowing the RCN to leverage such advanced technologies, but it has not done enough. The RCN’s technological infrastructure requires major investments and improvements in order to facilitate the adoption of MAVs. Only after doing so can the navy focus on optimizing their use.
• After developing a digital backbone, Canada will need to invest in – and should collaborate with NATO and Five Eyes allies and partners to research and develop – advanced communication, sensor, and AI technologies and cybersecurity and physical security measures needed to mitigate MAV’s vulnerabilities. Canada’s research and development efforts should reflect and compliment the priorities and investments being made by its closest allies, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia, who are also adopting MAV technology independently and through their trilateral security partnership AUKUS.
  • Advancements in communication, sensor, and AI technology can correct current limitations of MAVs, ensuring they are able to operate effectively in challenging environments. Such breakthroughs can be also applied more broadly in military and civilian settings, making them versatile and cost-effective investments.
  • The design and implementation of effective cybersecurity and physical security measures is also critical for the safe operation of MAVs. The RCN should utilize advanced encryption, intrusion detection systems, regular security assessments, and human crews aboard MAVs to enhance their operational integrity.
  • By working with other countries to mitigate these vulnerabilities, Canada can bolster its international partnerships, glean best practices, and speed up technological developments needed to effectively adopt and employ MAVs.