Images credit: Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
by LGen (Ret’d) Stuart Beare
Table of Contents
- Executive Summary
- Championing the Joint Force: a Job for the Public and our Political Leaders – Not Just Military Professionals Alone
- About the Author
Canada’s security interests and the mission of our Armed Forces – to defend Canada, defend North America and promote peace and security abroad – largely remains unchanged and timeless. The nature of the security environment, however, has not – nor will it be in the years to come.
An effective and relevant Canadian Armed Forces will continue to require capable, well-equipped and operationally ready maritime, air and land forces, which are largely raised and trained within our Army, Navy and Air Force. But in order for defence to remain relevant and effective in an era of increased instability, volatility and unpredictability, our Armed Forces need an increased understanding of what is going on and preparedness for what is to come. This is the business of our military’s Joint Force – those that include and that go beyond the tactical units that the services provide. Joint organizations and networks generate intelligence, provide understanding and lead the partnering, planning, force-posturing and practicing that is essential to anticipating, preparing for and conducting operations, particularly in a world of unrelenting complexity.
A decade after former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier’s extraordinary initiatives to transform our Armed Forces from a service-centric, machine-age force to one focused on the business of operations, which thinks and acts as Canadian Forces (joint) first, we see evidence of real progress in the approach to joint operations. There is also an improved appreciation of our military’s joint functions and capabilities. Unlike the political and public calls for strong services and the modernization of their major platforms, however, this progress has been realized largely through efforts internal to the Armed Forces themselves. The initiative has been without political leadership and external policy top-cover, rendering it vulnerable and reversible.
This paper describes the functions of the Joint Force, advocates for the capabilities required to enable partnerships, enhance understanding and advance mission preparedness, and calls for unified leadership of the joint domain and over our military’s joint culture. Our traditional international partners have travelled this road. They too see that clarity on joint functions, joint capability, joint domain leadership and stewardship over joint culture are vital to the military’s relevance and operational effectiveness. This is also critical to its agility and flexibility in the years to come. Their progress is the result of internal professional transformation, as well as the requirement by political leaders and modern defence policy to make this so. Here in Canada, the forming of a new government this autumn calls for a new look at defence policy, providing an opportunity to invite that same political leadership and influence.
Joint functions, joint capabilities and clear joint leadership are vital to our military’s relevance to, and effectiveness in, our national defence and operations. A Joint Force and the joint domain, like a strong and capable Army, Navy and Air Force, need to be led, resourced and fully engaged before planes fly, ships sail and troops deploy. Joint-ness requires external understanding and proponents, and, within the Forces, a clearly identifiable champion. In Canada, however, these range from ambiguous to absent.
Championing the Joint Force: a Job for the Public and our Political Leaders – Not Just Military Professionals Alone
When the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence make the agenda, it is usually a consequence of what is going on and what should be done in the face of the crises of the day, or it results from debates on policy for the future. Issues range from internal challenges like the Deschamps Report on sexual misconduct to failures and underperformance in government programs to procure the major equipment and material so essential to the Army, Navy and Air Force. They also include the real limits in government investment affecting the training and operational readiness of our troops, and the external challenges in national and international security that we see playing out globally – most recently with the Syrian refugee crisis at the fore.
There are, as well, calls for government to step back from the alligators closest to the boat in order to look longer term. This can mean, for example, updating and reframing our understanding of national security interests and objectives, modernizing defence strategy and increasing the proportion of our national wealth invested in our future security and defence. We do need to see current challenges and future trends through the lens of what else is coming and where we need to get to, versus where we are today and what to do next. Canada needs to take a pull-to-the-future versus a push-from-the-past approach to advancing our national security and defence interests – and resource and shape the future of our Canadian Armed Forces accordingly.
Much lies between these ends of the spectrum of public and political interest and debate. This includes an incredibly important and inadequately championed range of activities and capabilities that the public, government and National Defence need to understand and advance if we are to remain effectively served by the Canadian Armed Forces today and well-defended in the future. The political understanding of and focus on our military predominantly involves its services (the Army, Navy and Air Force.) Yet only by acting as a joint and integrated force (with functions, capabilities and leadership inclusive of and beyond those of the services) can the Canadian Armed Forces deliver results today, along with the agility and flexibility to remain effective in the future.
The joint domain and our military’s Joint Force have enjoyed some attention, resourcing and new leadership in the recent past. Real progress has been made within the military profession to act as a joint and integrated “team of teams”. That progress, however, has been due almost singularly to efforts internal to the Canadian Armed Forces, as they adapt to the extraordinary experiences of the last decade and a half and to initiatives by uniformed leadership to promote more joint-ness and integration among those who serve. Clear public understanding of the Canadian Armed Forces as a joint and integrated team that requires joint capability and leadership – and political leadership to drive this understanding into enduring joint functions, capability, capacity and behaviour – remain largely absent.
Public and political interest in events of the day remains important. Calls for national security and defence strategy review must persist. Advocacy for resources and modern platforms for our three services must remain strong. But if the Armed Forces are to continue to modernize and advance their effectiveness in the defence of Canada, while enabling those who serve to serve well, then public understanding and political leadership over our military’s joint functions, joint capabilities and joint leadership must advance as well.
This paper is focused on advocacy for strategic leadership for the very real Joint – beyond the singular elements of Army, Navy and Air Forces – functions, capabilities, resources, leadership and culture required of an effective, relevant and modern Canadian Armed Forces. Unlike the individual services, understanding of Canadian Armed Forces joint functions, capabilities, resource requirements and leadership is elusive. It is hard to come by a clear vision that describes the Armed Forces (beyond that written internally) as a joint and integrated team. Direction to guide the joint domain is largely absent in policy and it has no single champion in the defence program. These factors render the progress that has been made reversible, makes joint capabilities and resources vulnerable and leaves the cultural journey within the Armed Forces tenuous.
The potential for a future defence policy review and the formulation of a modern defence strategy – as well as the engagement of an increasingly joint-experienced Canadian Armed Forces leadership under General Jonathan Vance’s leadership – offer the opportunity to take these on. By requiring, directing and resourcing the Canadian Armed Forces to act as a joint and integrated Force, the government can realize the full potential and benefit of its investment in defence, while ensuring that Canada is positioned and prepared to deal with a volatile and unpredictable future.
Ask a sailor, soldier, airman or woman what they do for a living and they might reply: “I sail … I drive tanks … I fly.” When asked why, the answer may involve this simply expressed (but demanding) mission: To defend Canada and North America, and to promote peace and security abroad. Sailing, flying and deploying on the land are all essential elements that translate the words of security and defence into action and results. On their own, however, they do not and cannot set conditions for success, nor fully get the job done. There are essential joint functions and capabilities – inclusive of and beyond those that our Army, Navy and Air Force provide – that the Forces need to bring to bear before, during and after any particular operational action. This is the case today as well as in the future security environment, certainly before ships sail, planes fly and troops march. Let’s look at the joint functions first.
For those who lived it in uniform, the Cold War era was characterized by the acronym “SALY” – meaning “same as last year.” SALY perished in the era following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and no one expects it to re-emerge anytime soon. Instability and volatility are on the rise. Recent examples proliferate, from the Russian-led and proxy conflict on NATO’s eastern flank to ISIS, to state and non-state cyberwarfare, to the collapse of order in the Middle East and North Africa, to proliferation, to the contest over maritime spaces, to the competition in control of outer space, to climate change and natural disasters. From the civil war in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s to the emergence of ISIS and Russian aggression today, few, if any, of these challenges were anticipated. While the defence mission endured, the nature of the security environment has not. It will become increasingly challenged and unpredictable.
Increases in instability, volatility and unpredictability need to be matched by an increased effort in understanding what is going on and what is coming, and in enhanced preparedness for what may come next. First-class and operationally ready forces from the Army, Navy and Air Force are included in this preparedness. The real work in understanding and preparedness is led and performed not by the services themselves, but by the joint and integrated forces (which include significant elements of the services) of the Armed Forces.
Canada’s security and defence interests are challenged in all domains – at sea, in the air, on the land, in space and in cyberwarfare as well as in the information (influence) domain. Understanding what is happening, what’s coming and what is at stake requires the Forces to have the capability and capacity to observe, analyze and report within and across all of these domains – using technology-based and human sensors – along with partners. This is a team effort for government, across ministries and security partners at home, as well as across military and security force alliances and partnerships abroad. Networking, collecting and analyzing information, formulating shared understanding horizontally and integrating that understanding from national to tactical levels is a full-time undertaking for the Joint Force. It requires processes, people in the right places with the right partners, sensors, technology and leadership. Understanding what happens before, during and after conflict and crisis is a key function of the Joint Force to government and its partners. It is particularly vital to those deployed or about to deploy into harm’s way.
The Armed Forces rarely undertake missions by themselves. Domestic operations are in support of provincial or federal partners. NORAD is a bi-national partnership for continental defence. International peace and security operations range in combinations of alliance, coalition and Canadian whole-of-government efforts. Partnerships are essential to understanding not just the threat and risk environment but also the assessment, capabilities and intentions of security and defence partners at home and abroad. Partnerships establish – in advance of any particular action – conditions for mission success. These include plans, postured forces, positioned equipment, materiel and supplies, lines of communication, host-nation agreements, supply chains and practicing (“exercising” in military parlance) these plans together.
Strategic and operational planning allows partners to anticipate where crisis or contingencies may arise, to establish the information-exchange agreements and architectures to focus understanding, as well as to identify indicators and warnings. It allows partners to inform strategic choices about force posturing and operational readiness; to establish provisions for host-nation over-flight, access, basing and support; and to provision and position supplies and secure air, maritime and land-lift capacities. Planning allows teams to then practice – testing assumptions, confirming posture and readiness choices, validating logistics and supply and the full range of operational support. Practicing is essential to creating the person-to-person trust and relationships within and beyond the Forces so essential to mission success. It also brings agility and resilience to withstand shocks, exploit opportunities and persist in the face of real challenges.
Partnering, planning, posturing forces and practicing represent mission preparedness – a key operational capability in its own right. Understanding and preparedness are the business of the Joint Force and Joint Leadership, and they require joint capabilities with the people, time, equipment and financial resources to match. Key among these are human capacity and communications networks (meaning headquarters) that link people across the Forces and its services, as well as with civilian and international partners. Also critical are information collection sensors and intelligence networks, which are layered from the national to tactical levels, as well as horizontally across agencies and with trusted international partners. Operations in space ensure communications, navigation, earth observation and control of space assets, while the preservation of our cyber networks (with the capacity to deny our adversaries theirs) is also critical. The military calls this C4ISR, or “Command, Control, Computers, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance.” Responsibility for C4ISR is split between the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command, Assistant Deputy Minister Information Management and the Service Chiefs, with only limited co-ordination.
Finally, the Joint Force plans, co-ordinates and provides the operational support essential to deploying to and conducting operations. Joint Operational Support forces prepare home-front and in-theatre conditions for force deployment, reception and integration. They deliver mission support from personnel to finance, supply, maintenance, health services, engineering and force protection. In short, they provide the full gamut of vital support functions, without which an operationally engaged force cannot succeed or survive.
C4ISR, space and cyber networks and operational support capacities are all Joint Force responsibilities and joint capabilities. These capabilities must be fully engaged before operations occur, and they are in full demand once committed. These, and the people and structures required to operate them, are not overhead.
A government committed to the effective defence of Canada, and to a relevant, effective and agile Armed Forces, must necessarily be committed to a modern Joint Force. Such a force would be expected to deliver the full suite of joint functions, enabled by the full suite of joint capabilities and operating under unifying joint leadership. Absent these, strategic understanding of the security environment will remain elusive. The range of choices available to government action – and the speed and effectiveness of response – will be dramatically constrained. The risks faced by troops deployed in harm’s way would be much less robustly mitigated.
In 2005, then CDS General Rick Hillier launched a Canadian Forces transformation. It sought to move the Forces from a service-centric, machine-age, Cold War baseline to focus on understanding, being capable in and being relevant to the security and defence challenges of the day, as well as those to come. His transformation principles were: to be loyal to Canada and the Canadian Forces first; to operate via command-centred decision making; to assign clear responsibilities and authorities for commanders; to act as an operationally focused force; to promote leadership emphasizing mission command; and to pursue institutional alignment across the forces and with the Department of National Defence. Noting a strong bias for a service-based professional foundation, General Hillier stimulated the thinking and behaviour of the Canadian Forces to act as a Joint Force in the first instance. He took steps to advance that understanding and to establish its leadership internally, within the profession. He was incredibly successful in dislodging the profession from a decade and a half of post-Cold War inertia and in firing up the imagination and creative leadership of what had been a less than united General and Flag Officer cohort. He created the organizational capacity and clear authority for the conduct of all operations at home and abroad, establishing three Operational Commands and Special Operations Forces Command (Joint Commands), while assuring them operational support. In addition, he was masterful in connecting Canadians with their fellow citizens in uniform.
At the beginning of the transformation effort, General Hillier garnered significant enthusiasm and enjoyed substantial buy-in from military leaders. However, the methods used to drive the transformation eventually led to an atmosphere of competition (in vision and resources) between the Canadian Armed Forces and the bureaucracy, between the services and the new Joint Command structures, even between some of the service chiefs and the CDS himself.  The creation of the Operational Commands and the language of transformation advanced some joint functions, joint capability, joint leadership and joint culture – but did so without political leadership, written policy, strategy and resource assurance. General Hillier rightly described transformation as a journey and not an end-state. However, calls for clarity about the vision and direction for the future were left unanswered. Following his departure, the journey to an enduring operationally focused, Canadian Forces-first joint culture was left without a clearly identifiable steward.
In 2011, Lieutenant General Andrew Leslie and the Canadian Forces Transformation Team tabled a Report on Canadian Forces Transformation offering 43 recommendations for consideration in transformation round two. Whereas General Hillier’s effort had targeted the professional understanding and then the transformed operational engagement and effectiveness of the Forces (professional hearts and minds, as it were), the round-two efforts focused on resources and efficiency – less transformation and more organizational modernization. Successive government-led resource reductions necessitated a clear look at resources. The report, however, provided little that would either challenge or advance General Hillier’s transformation principles.
Nevertheless, one of the report’s recommendations led in 2012 to the integration of command over Canadian Armed Forces operations under a single commander, within a new Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). The integration of three operational commands into one, and the unification of the defence operational mission – to defend Canada and North America while supporting peace and security abroad – within that command, has had some unifying effect in Canadian Forces culture and behaviour, and in key relationships with operational partners.
The Transformation Team report, however, left the question of clear authority for and leadership over the Joint Force capabilities set (C4ISR, space, cyber and operational support) ambiguous. A singular Joint Operations Commander exists, but who is the joint capability and culture “Bubba” remains unclear. Achieving a Canadian Forces-first and joint culture is challenged by persistent competition for scarce resources between services and the evolving Joint Command and Joint capability efforts. Within Canadian Armed Forces leadership and the professional military education system, little has improved in terms of identifying leadership and methods to purposefully advance joint culture throughout the Forces. While pieces of the joint agenda have advanced, joint-ness and leadership over the joint domain have yet to become firmly entrenched within and beyond the military profession.
It took a failure in Vietnam and an act of Congress to compel the long road to lasting joint culture, capability and behaviour within the United States military. Twenty-nine years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, unified and geographic joint commands persist. Their responsibilities, functions and capabilities to assure understanding, persistent partnering and mission preparedness – as well as the assurance of joint and integrated action in operations – are entrenched. The organizational and cultural journey to this end was long and is not necessarily over, but it remains embedded and well-led politically, in policy as well as within the U.S. military profession itself.
Closer in size and structure to the Canadian experience, the United Kingdom Armed Forces responded to lessons from the Falklands War and the demands of the Balkan crises by establishing a Joint Operational Commander and the Permanent Joint Headquarters in the mid-1990s. While this unified the command of operations, it was only in 2012, with the political direction resulting from the 2011 Levene Report on Defence Reform, that the UK established Joint Forces Command. Including the Permanent Joint Headquarters, it leads and oversees the entirety of the Joint Force policy, doctrine, professional education, training, structure, capabilities and operations for the British military. The report noted that: “We do not, however, believe that clarification in this way (the role of the services in supporting joint efforts) will be enough. The future character of conflict will increase yet further the demand for integrated capability and joint enablers. There is evidence that joint enabling capabilities do not receive the priority they merit in the single service force structure. We therefore believe there is a strong case for developing a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to deliver output focussed capabilities and capitalise on potential synergies to deliver enhanced joint operational effect.” Even with substantial resource reduction since 2010, the UK has invested in joint functions, capability, structure and leadership to drive integration and joint behaviour across the Force. It has advanced an enhanced joint culture under a clearly identified and empowered joint leader.
Australia split the middle with the establishment of Australian Defence Force Joint Operations Command (AUS JOC) in 2004, while appointing a three-star commander in 2008. Commander AUS JOC leads all Australian operations, has the authority to direct preparedness functions and is partnered with the office of the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to ensure the informed guidance, design and ultimate provision of joint capabilities to the Force. As in the U.S., UK and Canada, services continue to lead in the development and generation of their tactical forces and capabilities. They provide significant command and control, intelligence and operational support capacities to this commander. Responsibilities for mission preparedness, the conduct of operations and the delivery of operational support are his. This joint operations capability and cultural reform effort was founded, like those in the U.S. and UK, on significant political engagement, clarity in defence policy and resource-backed strategy.
Notwithstanding their differences, all three of these familiar partners observed that strong services remain essential to defence, but that these on their own are unable to achieve real effectiveness in the defence mission. They recognized that where functions could and should be common, service-centred solutions introduce inefficiencies and reduce the effectiveness of the overall force. Their journeys toward joint-ness were challenging, mandated politically, directed in strategy, programmed in structure and resources as well as led comprehensively through clarity in command, education, assignment and experience. Hard work remains for these militaries (as it does within the Canadian Armed Forces).
Our Armed Forces have delivered some real progress in terms of their organic efforts to advance operational understanding, to nurture the partnering, planning, posturing and practicing functions of mission preparedness and to reinforce joint capability, leadership and culture. This progress, however, isn’t sufficient to fully meet the demands of today and the challenges to come. Neither is it founded and grounded in government-led policy, strategy or the programs that apportion resources. It is consequently reversible. Nor is progress within Canadian Armed Forces joint culture necessarily enduring if the question of who is really in charge (shy of the CDS him/herself) continues to be debated within the force.
Government has expended significant effort to rebrand the Canadian Armed Forces as the sum of its key parts, our justifiably well-recognized services: the Army, Navy and Air Force. Whether seen as celebrating and perpetuating our military’s heritage or returning to the past, this rebranding does nothing to advance the joint agenda. Nor does it advance the political and public understanding that Canada’s men and women in uniform are proud to serve in their services but are ultimately capable of success in their mission by virtue of being a joint and integrated “team of teams” that live within the Canadian Armed Forces. Declarations of pride in the men and women of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces in operations are welcome, but they fail to acknowledge the vital work of the Joint Force, as well as some 20,000 members of the Forces who do not serve within environmental commands.
Within the Canadian Armed Forces, leadership over advancing the mission preparedness agenda and the sum of joint operations, joint capability and joint culture is left in the hands of the CDS. With all of the other responsibilities and demands on his/her plate, it is clear that some essential elements of this joint agenda will continue to wait before they are fully addressed.
Effectiveness in defending Canada is assured before crises occur through enhanced understanding, effective partnerships and mission preparedness activities that enable planning, posturing and practicing with those partners. Understanding, partnering, preparedness and ultimate success in operations rely absolutely on Joint Command and on the full range of joint capabilities that are brought to bear before, during and after any specific operations. Joint Command, joint capabilities and joint culture allow defence to be an effective contributor to government understanding of the current and future security environment, to be valued and ultimately assure the Forces’ ability to get to, endure, survive and succeed when committed to action.
It is clear who within the Canadian Armed Forces leads in the development and generation of land, maritime and air operational capabilities. But it is less clear who is the ultimate authority over these same things in the joint domain. Policy, strategy and the defence program are long in sustaining and developing a strong Army, Navy and Air Force. Policy, strategy and program – as well as organizational practice and behaviour – are less clear about these in the vital joint operations functions, capabilities and leadership that Canada requires. Canadian Armed Forces leadership over these joint elements and driving forward a professional joint culture remains ambiguous.
A new government embarking on its mandate will now turn to take a strategic look at defence strategy and procurement, as well as dealing with the crises of the day. This is an opportunity to take stock of and entrench the tenets of mission preparedness, to encode preparedness functions in policy and strategy, to reconsider the joint capability investment and oversight in the defence program and to identify clear military leadership over the joint agenda – including our military’s joint culture. Political enthusiasm for strong services is needed, and a commitment to recapitalizing major capabilities is absolutely essential. We need the same for the Joint Force and the joint domain.
Organic efforts by the Canadian Armed Forces on their own have had varying degrees of success in moving the ball down the field. The sum of political leadership, joint focused policy and program, as well as clearly identified joint professional leadership, are required to entrench – and further advance – that progress. Today’s cohort of strategic military leaders understands this, and is well-placed to offer sound advice on how to get there.
Stuart Beare is a thirty-six year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Canadian Army and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery. Retiring at the rank of Lieutenant-General in 2014, he has commanded at every level: Battery, Regiment, Brigade, Land Force Area, Land Force Doctrine and Training System, Expeditionary Forces Command and lastly Canadian Joint Operations Command. He led the Canadian Forces efforts in land warfare and training during the height of our combat operations in Afghanistan, and then led Joint Force and Joint Capability Development as Chief of Force Development. He commanded troops in major domestic operations here at home and overseas, including Canada’s last rotation in Cyprus (’93), twice in Bosnia, including a year as Commander Multi-National Brigade NW (’03-04), and in NATO Training Mission Afghanistan, where he led and worked alongside scores of partners in guiding the expansion, modernization and professionalization of Afghanistan’s Ministry of Interior and five national police forces (’10-11). He has a BEng from CMR and RMC (’83), and is a graduate of multiple Command and Staff programs, including the Technical Staff Course run by the UK’s Royal Military College of Science and Cranfield University. He loves soldiering and working with the soldiers, sailors and airmen and women who serve in uniform. His family, like so many others, serves and has served – and he is a fervent champion of those who enable us to serve. He remains engaged with his former profession and partners as a Fellow with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, and as a working group member within the University of Ottawa’s Centre for International Studies-led 2015 Ottawa Forum. Oh, and this year he became a licensed pilot – much to the dismay of his old friends and partners in NORAD!
 Paul H. Chapman, J.L. Granatstein, Grig. Gen Don McNamara, Hugh Segal: “A Roadmap to a Stronger Military,” The National Post, 28 September 2015.
 Amongst these is “The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015,” by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.
 Canadian Forces Joint Publication 01 “Canadian Military Doctrine,” defines Joint as an adjective that connotes activities, operations, organizations in which elements of at least two services participate. Time, technology, and experience have led to a more organic understanding of joint to mean the integration of service capabilities within a joint framework of capabilities that come from within and beyond the services – command and control and communications systems, intelligence, surveillance, space, cyber, information operations, and operational support and sustainment.
 Canadian Armed Forces are assigned three (what have been enduring) missions within “the Canada First Defence Strategy” of 2008: Defend Canada – by delivering excellence at home, Defend North America – by being a strong and reliable defence partner, Contribute to international peace and security – by projecting leadership abroad.
 “The Strategic Outlook for Canada 2015,” by Ferry de Kerckhove and the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, p. 4 to 7. “The Future Security Environment 2013-2040,” Department of National Defence, Chief of Force Development, p. 127.
 The Auditor General of Canada defines readiness as: a measure of the ability of a Canadian unit to undertake an approved task. Readiness includes several aspects, including personnel, training and equipment. “Report of the Standing Committee on National Defence, December 2012”.
 Preparedness is not an official term withian Canadian Armed Forces lexicon, nor does it enjoy shared understanding within and outside of the military. The Article written by Paul Johnston, Chris Madsen, Paul Mitchell, and Steven Moritsugu “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command,” Canadian Military Journal Volume 14, No. 4, goes a long way to describing it and offering a platform for its further development and entrenchment in military, defence, and broader security sector behaviour.
 Devin Conley and Dr. Eric Ouellet, “The Canadian Forces and Military Transformation – An Elusive Quest for Efficiency”, the Canadian Army Journal 14.1.
 Philippe Lagasse, “A Mixed Legacy: General Hillier and Canadian Defence, 2005-2008.” Paper presented at the Canadian Political Science Association 2009 Conference, Carleton University, 27 May 2009.
 ibid., Conley and Ouellet, and Lieutenant-General (Ret’d) Michael Jeffery, “Inside Canadian Forces Transformation,” Canadian Military Journal 2010, Volume 10, Number 2.
 Martin Shadwick, “The Report on Transformation 2011,” The Canadian Military Journal 2011, Volume 10, No. 1.
 National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Backgrounder on Canadian Forces Transformation: New Operational Command and Control Structure, May 11, 2012.
 Johnston, Madsen, Mitchell, Moritsugu, “A Canadian Approach to the Operational Level of Command”.
 James R Locher III, “Has it Worked – the Goldwater Nichols Reform Act?,” Naval War College Review, 2001, Vol LIV, No. 4.
 PJHQ History, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk.
 The Levene Report on Defence Reform - an independent report into the structure and management of the Ministry of Defence, June 2011, p. 45.
 ADF command – general, http://nautilus.org/publications/books/australian-forces-abroad/security-general/adf-command-general/.