Image credit: Corporal Connor Bennett
A joint publication with:
by Kate E. Todd
January 2025
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Canada’s Fleet Structure and CONOPs
- The Case for Change
- Changes the RCN Needs to Make to Remain Relevant
- Conclusion
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
In recent years, the international security environment has become increasingly dangerous and complex, as threats posed by state and non-state actors have proliferated. To adapt to these new threats, the United States Navy (USN), Royal Navy (RN), and Royal Australian Navy (RAN) have begun to change the design of their naval fleets and the way they use them. These states have aspirations of creating high-low fleet mixes, adopting distributed concepts of operations (CONOPs), and procuring maritime autonomous systems, rather than relying on traditional platforms and naval task groups centered on protecting high value assets. This piece argues that the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) should also consider how adopting a high-low fleet mix, distributed CONOPs, and autonomous systems could improve its survivability and lethality in potential combat scenarios.
Canada’s Fleet Structure and CONOPs
Canada is a maritime nation with a large exclusive economic zone that depends on the maintenance of the rules-based international order (RBIO) to preserve its sovereign rights, access to international maritime trade routes, and transoceanic lines of communication via undersea telecommunications cables. Canada’s navy promotes the stability of the RBIO within its territory and abroad through deterrence and, if necessary, the application of force. For this, the RCN requires a multipurpose fleet to defend Canadian lands and waters, operate with allies, and meaningfully contribute to collective defence agreements and international operations. Currently, the RCN’s present fleet and CONOPs is ill suited to defend the RBIO, should adversaries successfully challenge or undermine it. For example, the RCN’s frigates and maritime coastal defence vessels would respectively struggle or be unable to counter large volleys of missiles and drone attacks from threat actors like the Houthi rebels in Yemen, who have been targeting commercial ships in the Red Sea and denying them access to major maritime shipping routes since October 2023.
Since the end of the Cold War, the RCN has had a platform-centric force structure, aiming to have one multipurpose naval task group (NTG) of up to four manned combatants and one support ship on the East and West coast of Canada. These groups are designed to have concurrent command and control, above-water warfare, anti-surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and replenishment capabilities. The CONOPs for NTGs is to concentrate and use these assets to encircle and defend high value units against inferior and near-peer adversaries. However, Canada’s adversaries have become more dangerous in recent years, acquiring technology that meets or surpasses that of the RCN. For example, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy now has a much larger and more modern naval fleet than the RCN; and the aforementioned Houthi rebels have more and better drones than the Canadian Armed Forces, who are still awaiting delivery of their first combat drone assets. These new asymmetric and potentially overwhelming threats challenge the relevance and effectiveness of Canada’s existing fleet and NTG CONOPs.
Despite the changes occurring in the international security environment, the RCN’s fleet structure and CONOPs have not changed since their development in the 1990s. As per Canada’s 2017 defence strategy Strong, Secure, Engaged, Canada’s naval assets are primarily deployed as part of NTGs. The fleet consists of four Harry DeWolf class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, 12 Halifax class multipurpose patrol frigates, 12 Kingston class Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels, and four Victoria class submarines, along with various training and maintenance vessels. Canada’s 2024 defence policy, Our North, Strong and Free, acknowledges that Canada needs to invest more in defence capabilities to counter current and emerging threats. It outlines the Government of Canada’s broad commitment to updating the RCN’s fleet and continuing to work with partners to defend Canadian interests, but does not discuss what this update or future cooperation will look like.
Canada’s National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS), published in 2010, is the country’s most current plan to eliminate the boom-and-bust cycle of vessel procurement in Canada and produce a steady supply of capable ships for the RCN. The NSS aims to renew the RCN’s fleet through the planned procurement of two Canadian Joint Support Ships by 2027, six Harry DeWolf class Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels by 2027, and 15 River class Canadian Surface Combatants by the mid-2030s. While waiting for the arrival of these vessels, much of the RCN’s fleet has neared the end of its expected lifespan and obsolescence. The RCN’s more up-to-date 2016 strategy, Leadmark 2050, expanded on the commitments made in the NSS, calling for the Navy to procure additional platforms including uncrewed assets and submarines to replace the Victoria class. In 2023 and 2024, the government announced its intention to procure 12 new coastal defence vessels and 12 new submarines. Neither of these announcements have included a timeline for when the assets will be acquired or have been included as part of in the federal government’s budget. No announcements have been made about the RCN procuring uncrewed vessels. However, until the RCN receives new vessels to replace its aging and deteriorating fleet, it will struggle to fulfill its mandate as well as Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, as well as its NATO, force posture, and readiness commitments.
As of May 2024, the RCN’s naval planners are conducting a fleet mix study to determine what other types and number of platforms the RCN could acquire in the coming decades. The Commander of the RCN, Admiral Angus Topshee, has indicated his interest in acquiring optionally crewed large surface vessels, but no official announcements have been made about which capabilities the RCN hopes to procure or how new vessels will be employed.
The Case for Change
According to the former Chief of Defence Staff, General Wayne Eyre, the international security environment is more complex and dangerous now than any time since the end of the Cold War, if not the Second World War. Conflict and open warfare have erupted in most continents, including Europe and the Middle East. Canada has responded by supporting allies, such as Ukraine, by donating military equipment and providing operational support. Tensions are also running high between great powers, including the United States, China, and Russia, especially in the wake of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine and China’s aggressive claims to the South China Sea and Taiwan. This great power competition has affected Canada’s security, whose deep defence alliance with and proximity to the United States has made it a target of foreign surveillance activities such as China sending spy balloons into Canadian airspace in January and February of 2023 and Russian bombers buzzing Canadian airspace in the Arctic. Other state and non-state actors are also challenging the RBIO such as Iran, who is supporting Russia in Ukraine, as well as terrorist groups like the Houthis, Hamas, and Hezbollah, who have attacked civilians targets in the Middle East using barrages of inexpensive but lethal munitions including attack drones.
Canada and its allies now have to contend with adversaries that are using new military weapons, including hypersonic missiles and drones, challenging the ability of conventional military forces to detect and react to threats fast enough to protect themselves on the battlefield. In addition to these new technologies, there has been a proliferation of submarines across the world, particularly in Asia. Submarines allow adversaries and potential adversaries to control access to and within maritime areas. Without updated technology and tactics of its own, Canada’s navy faces a serious challenge.
In the Arctic Archipelago, international actors are already challenging Canada’s sovereignty and the RBIO. As ice sea and permafrost in the region melt due to climate change, international interest in natural resources and emerging shipping routes in the Arctic has grown. Since the late 2010s, China has become active in the region, sending research vessels into Canadian waters and claiming they have a right to access and traverse the Arctic due to the region’s supposed global environmental and economic significance. To protect its sovereignty in the Arctic against international actors, Canada needs to have a navy that can monitor the region and defend it, if need be.
In combination, these changes in the international security environment make having a capable and combat ready RCN even more necessary. Canada’s allies, the United States Navy, Royal Navy, and Royal Australian Navy, have taken steps to expand their naval fleets including through the procurement and development of maritime autonomous systems, shift towards a high-low fleet mix, and adopt distributed CONOPs aimed at combatting peer and near-peer adversaries such as China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. A high-low fleet mix is one where navies focus on having more low cost assets whose capabilities can combine to deliver desired effects, rather than a few high-cost and extremely capable platforms. Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) is a corresponding network-centric fleet-level CONOPs that guides how such naval forces conduct operations, particularly in combat scenarios. It calls for navies to distribute their capabilities across many assets operating in dispersed theatres with long range sensors, communication technology, and weaponry. The adoption of high-low fleet mixes and DMO benefits the navies of allies by reducing the cost of attrition and risks to sailors lives during conflict and increasing the size, capability, and complexity of a fleet’s force, thereby increasing its overall lethality and survivability against adversaries.
These allies also entered a separate trilateral security partnership in 2021, named AUKUS, that centers around enabling their militaries to successfully combat future threats and maintain a technological edge over adversaries. Through this partnership, the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are working together to codevelop and procure nuclear submarines as well as advanced technologies including autonomous vessels and vehicles. They are also cooperating to share and learn from each other’s innovations in military operations, processes, and organizational structures. Although AUKUS members have not published documents listing what these innovations are, the navies of these countries have begun to adopt very similar strategies, platforms, and CONOPs.
The USN, RN, and RAN’s strategic documents all formally recognize the need to move away from a fleet structure that relies on capital assets and the NTG CONCOPs. The USN’s 2018 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 2.0 and Navigation Plan 2022 discuss the USN’s efforts to rapidly expand its fleet, invest in smaller and autonomous platforms, employ a DMO CONOPs, and create the technological infrastructure needed to connect naval assets as distributed nodes of part of a larger artificial intelligence and machine learning enabled network of systems. Although the USN has not released an unclassified description of what DMO entail, key features appear to be: dispersing naval assets over a large area of operations, making it harder for adversaries to detect and target platforms and deny access to contested areas while ensuring assets can support one another in detecting and targeting adversaries; spreading naval sensors and weapons across a larger array of platforms to reduce the portion of the USN’s capabilities that would be lost if any one naval asset is destroyed; greater use of uncrewed platforms as well as longer-ranged weapons in support of the previous features; and utilizing communication and networking technologies to coordinate a widely dispersed battle force that can withstand attacks. The RN’s 2022 Maritime Operating Concept also focuses on the need to develop a larger and more versatile fleet rather than one that is platform-based and role-specific. Like in the U.S., this networked, distributed, and more affordable fleet of interchangeable and interdependent assets is meant to increase the survivability and maximize and extend the lethality of the fleet. The Australian government’s 2024 assessment of its surface fleet, Enhanced Lethality, and RAN’s RAS-AI STRATEGY 2040 Warfare Innovation echo this call to avoid concentrating capabilities in a limited number of naval platforms and highlight the government’s plan to expand the RAN’s surface fleet, distributing its capabilities across a variety of platforms. However, these documents provide few specifics about how this ongoing transition away from a platform-based fleet and towards a horizontal force structure is and will continue to occur. Canada should closely monitor the success of these initiatives and consider implementing similar ones to ensure the RCN is effective against threats in the current and future security environment.
By expanding its fleet and transitioning to a high-low fleet mix and DMO, Canada could also modernize its approach to naval warfare, improving the RCN’s versatility, survivability, and lethality. Employing a high-low fleet mix and DMO would enhance the RCN’s operational reach and capabilities while reducing the likelihood and impact of losing assets in combat. It would also reduce the RCN’s dependence on high-cost capital platforms, offering the RCN a cost-effective force with fewer maintenance and procurement challenges. Another benefit of this shift is that it would align the RCN’s naval strategy with that of the USN, RN, and RAN, strengthening interoperability, bolstering joint mission effectiveness, and allowing the RCN to benefit from allies’ strategic developments. Yet, investments to expand the RCN’s fleet would be costly for the federal government in an already tight fiscal environment. The shift to a high-low fleet mix and DMO would also necessitate a revision of the RCN’s overall strategy, naval doctrine, training programs, and internal organizations to incorporate new platforms, tactics, and technologies. Despite the cost and effort, this overhaul is necessary to ensure that the RCN can meet its mandate in the years to come.
Changes the RCN Needs to Make to Remain Relevant
To meet its mandate in the challenging new international security environment, investments in the RCN’s fleet need to go beyond the NSS. Canada’s submarines, frigates, and coastal defence vessels will reach their planned end of life and need to be retired within the next decade. The RCN’s Orca class training vessels will also require replacement by 2040. If no further investments are made and the NSS delivers platforms on schedule, the two Joint Support Ships, six Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels, and 15 Canadian Surface Combatants that are currently being acquired will constitute the entirety of Canada’s naval fleet. When split by coast, the RCN would be hard pressed to put together one NTG let alone pursue DMO. This would increase the risk and cost of losing assets, inhibit the RCN from contributing to international operations, and further reduce the RCN’s capabilities. If this happens, Canada’s reputation as a reliable defence partner will be irrevocably tarnished. As such, these risks, costs, and reductions cannot be viewed as an acceptable policy option by the Government of Canada.
To modestly expand its fleet, fulfill the government’s commitments, and remain relevant, Canada needs to follow through with replacing the RCN’s Victoria class submarines and Kingston class coastal defence vessels and continue procuring new naval platforms. Due to the urgent need for these replacements, the RCN should procure off-the-shelf platforms that are interoperable with allies. Beyond these replacements, Canada should focus on procuring a variety of optionally crewed maritime autonomous vessels and vehicles including large and medium surface vessels and undersea vehicles to maintain and improve the RCN capabilities.
Maritime autonomous vessels and vehicles utilize artificial intelligence to function without the need of a crews but can be designed to house a small compliment of sailors to oversee their operation and act as a backstop in case of emergency. The benefit of these optionally crewed vessels and vehicles are that they increase decision making speeds, the possible duration of deployments, and the lethality and survivability of assets while reducing costs and risks associated with procuring, crewing, and maintaining platforms. Although these assets are prone to certain vulnerabilities, such as communication, sensor, and system malfunctions and cyber security risks, the RCN should begin investing in autonomous platforms now and work to perfect their software later to enable the fleet is able to adapt to emerging threats as soon as possible.
The exact number and variety of platforms that should be procured is open to interpretation. To maintain two high-readiness NTGs, the RCN requires 12 to 16 surface combatants, two support ships, and four submarines on each coast. In addition to these 36 to 44 platforms, the RCN must be able to patrol and defend its coasts and operate in littoral waters. Traditionally, this role has been filled by 12 smaller constabulary maritime coastal defence vessels. By 2027, the RCN is expected to have an additional six coastal vessels capable of operating in Arctic waters in up to first-year ice. This expanded coastal capability should be maintained to effectively monitor and defend against threats in Canadian waters and internationally. To train sailors, the RCN also relies on eight Orca class training vessels. These vessels should be replaced by 2040 to ensure that force development continues without delay.
Taking these needs into consideration, at a minimum the RCN should plan to have a fleet of 24 to 32 destroyers or frigates, four support ships, eight submarines, 18 coastal defence vessels, and eight training vessels. Procurement programs should be created to acquire two more Joint Support Ships and eight training vessels. The acquisition of new submarines and coastal vessels should also be formalized. To operationalize DMO and a high-low fleet mix, the RCN would need expand their fleet even more.
By comparison, if Canada was to follow the lead of the USN whose plan is to expand its fleet from roughly 300 platforms to 350 crewed and 150 uncrewed assets, the RCN fleet would need to consist of 73 to 82 crewed and 31 to 35 uncrewed platforms – for a total of up to 117 assets. This would provide the RCN with a truly high-low fleet mix and allow them to fully utilize DMO. However, this fleet expansion would be unrealistic due to crewing, cost, and institutional capacity constraints. Instead, the RCN could consider increasing the size of its fleet by a less substantial number, like a total of 80 vessels, by the 2050s and solely procure optionally crewed platforms. By doing so, the RCN could still conduct operations beyond NTGs and reap the benefits of a high-low fleet mix and developments in autonomous vessel and vehicle technology.
Increasing the size the RCN’s fleet will come with a large price tag but is necessary to protect Canada and Canadian interests. The cost of platform procurement is notoriously expensive and difficult to estimate. For example, the Canadian Surface Combatant project was originally slated to cost $26 billion but is on track to run the Canadian government approximately $90 billion. If the procurement of optionally crewed platforms was to cost a similar amount, the Government of Canada would need to pay approximately $120 billion to expand its fleet from the established minimum of 62 to 80 assets.
Despite the sticker shock, these investments could save the RCN money in the long run. Firstly, adopting DMO and a high-low fleet mix would reduce the risk of Canada losing costly platforms or the lives of sailors aboard them. Secondly, by employing optionally crewed assets, the RCN could also save money on crewing and logistical support for platforms. Lastly, the expansion of the RCN’s fleet would bolster Canada’s ability to protect its territory, trade, and alliances, which are priceless.
Conclusion
Canada must follow its closest allies and get to work to expand its naval fleet, including the procurement of optionally crewed platforms, and adopt a high-low fleet mix and DMO to address developments in the international security environment. Current investments will not allow the RCN to meet its objectives or deploy NTGs, let alone DMO. If announced procurement initiatives are successful and new submarines and coastal defence vessels are acquired, the RCN will be able to maintain two NTGs as well as littoral operations. As such, the RCN’s fleet design will center around the employment of NTGs for at least the next two decades. Beyond that, the Government of Canada should invest in increasing the size of and modernizing the RCN’s fleet so it can employ CONOPs designed to combat Canada’s 21st century adversaries. Without change, the RCN’s current and planned fleet and CONOPs is unlikely to be capable of facing near-peer and peer adversaries. A new approach is needed if Canada wants the RCN to be able to do its job.
About the Author
Katherine (Kate) E. Todd is a Sub-Lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Navy Reserves, a Senior Fellow at Arctic360, and a Fellow at the North American and Arctic Defence Security Network. She is also a member of the Canadian Naval Review’s Editorial Board and Canadian Maritime Security Network’s Advisory Board and regularly publishes works on Canadian defence issues.
In 2024, Kate graduated with a Master of Public Policy from the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, where she focused her studies on Arctic defence, infrastructure and economic development, and Indigenous rights.
During this degree, she was awarded the Women in Defence and Security – CGAI Fellowship, a SSHRC scholarship, and Department of National Defence Mobilizing Insights in National Security and Defence Studies scholarship.
She also presented at the 2024 Couchiching Conference, Mackenzie Institute’s 2024 Canadian Arctic Conference, Canadian Defence Association Institute’s 2024 Graduate Student Conference, the North American and Arctic Defence Security Network's 2023 and 2024 Emerging Leaders Week Conferences, and Emerging Ideas Series panel discussion, was a Senior Editor at the NATO Association of Canada, Research Assistant at the University of Toronto, completed a summer internship as a Policy Analyst at Canada's Department of National Defence, and was recognized as one of The Peak’s 2024 Top 35 Under 40 Emerging Leaders in politics and government.
In 2022, Kate graduated with high distinction from the University of Toronto with a Bachelor of Arts with honours specializing in political science and minoring in public law, was awarded the University of Toronto's prestigious John H. Moss Scholarship that recognizes one undergraduate student per year across all three University of Toronto campuses for their academic achievement and community leadership, hosted a podcast called Voice Above where she’s interviewed expert guests about current affairs including the Governor General of Canada, and was a Junior Research Fellow at the NATO Association of Canada.
Kate’s research interests include:
- economic, energy, Arctic, maritime, and national security and defence;
- critical infrastructure, economic, and northern development;
- Indigenous rights and affairs and sustainability; and,
- intra and intergovernmental affairs in Canada.
You can connect with Kate at [email protected] or https://www.linkedin.com/in/kate-e-todd/.
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