Photo by: Corporal Braden Trudeau, Canadian Armed Forces photo
by Clare McKendry
September 2026
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Current State of North Pacific Ocean and Challenges
- Expanding Out of the Bilateral: Existing Agreements on Maritime Security
- Filling in the Gaps of the Other: A Canada-Japan-South Korea Led Framework
- Conclusion
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
On 7 July 2026, Operation North Pacific Guard, led by Canada’s Department of Fisheries and Oceans alongside the U.S., Japan and South Korea, completed a two-month long mission patrolling the waters of the North Pacific for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). Operation North Pacific, which first commenced in the 1990s, has changed significantly over the course of three decades, featuring more individual member nations, expanded forces and capabilities. Canada’s Coast Guard completed dozens of high seas inspections alongside representatives from the Japan’s Fisheries Agency and South Korea’s Coast Guard. The extent of IUU fishing detected in the North Pacific Ocean during this period is staggering, with authorities revealing up to 52 violations of international fishing requirements at sea and observing another 21 violations aerially. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides guidance to states to investigate and penalize vessels engaged in illegal activity. However, without a centralized maritime force or mechanism to enforce it on the high seas, IUU fishing, piracy and illicit trafficking will remain a pervasive problem for coastal states to tackle.
Operation North Pacific and similar operations, such as the Canadian-led Operation NEON (enforcing UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea) and HORIZON (representing the Indo-Pacific portion of what was formally part of Operation PROJECTION), are part of Canada’s broader policy initiatives and strategies including the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), Our North, Strong and Free (ONSAF), and the 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy, that emphasize the importance of the North Pacific Ocean. Regular and increasing participation in the semi-recently concluded Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise also demonstrates Canada’s commitments to defence goals laid out in the IPS, particularly those related to building allied interoperability across multiple domains. Despite these strides in policy and promises, Canada remains peripheral in the region’s broader security architecture, being excluded from longstanding alliances such as The Quad, AUKUS, multilateral security dialogues like the East Asia Summit, and holds only observer status at ADMM-Plus. Furthermore, the Eurocentric nature of Canada’s deployments, and recent increased emphasis on European defence, further constrains Ottawa’s ability to commit more resources to the security of the Pacific region.
Japan and South Korea are more deeply embedded in these security arrangements compared to Canada, with both maintaining robust partnerships with the U.S., Australia and other allied nations. Canada may yet become more involved in the North Pacific’s maritime security and defence through expanded cooperation with Japan and South Korea. This article examines a plethora of traditional and non-traditional security challenges in the North Pacific region and situates Canada’s involvement in addressing them. It begins by examining the current state of the North Pacific as an area of interest and strategic competition exacerbated by shifting power dynamics, an increased Russian and Chinese presence, and the total withdrawal of U.S. naval aircraft carriers in the region. Furthermore, this article explores existing bilateral agreements that Canada has with Japan and South Korea respectively and lays out the areas where cooperation could help address operational blind spots in each country’s approach to maritime defence and security.
The utility of formal alliances can be a hard sell especially when considering asymmetric interests among member states and differing levels of commitment. This article argues that Canada can contribute to broader Pacific maritime defence and security with Japan and South Korea through the establishment of a functional operational coordination mechanism featuring a permanent intelligence-sharing arrangement, logistics and support networks. In doing so, Ottawa paves its own path as a middle power to improve Canada’s credibility as a reliable and dependable partner in the North Pacific.
The Current State of North Pacific Ocean and Challenges
Bounded by the Bering Strait and the Arctic Ocean, the North Pacific Ocean is roughly 80 to 83 million square kilometres, stretching from Russia’s Far East to the U.S. and Canada’s west coast. This often-overlooked maritime domain has recently become a site of increasing great power rivalry as the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia have—in many respects—increased their military cooperation through joint exercises in the North Pacific. This region is also plagued by a series of territorial and maritime disputes including those over the Kuril Islands between Russia and Japan; the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that are claimed by Japan, Taiwan and the PRC; and unresolved maritime boundary issues between the U.S. and Canada regarding the Beaufort Sea. Russian President Vladimir Putin, seemingly eager to reignite diplomatic tensions where possible, visited the Kuril Islands in August 2026 for the first time since assuming office in 2000. Just days later, Russia’s Pacific Fleet conducted a series of missile tests near the disputed islands, further angering Japan.
Similarly, Chinese icebreakers continue to take annual expeditions under the banner of scientific research to the Arctic—ultimately passing through the North Pacific Ocean to get there—with a total of 16 trips now completed. The PRC has declared itself as a “near-Arctic state” in its first ever Arctic Policy white paper released in January 2018. Most recently, Canada and U.S. shadowed two Chinese research ships operating outside of both countries’ exclusive economic zones. While the PRC’s research activities in the Arctic, and by extension in the North Pacific Ocean, have occurred on a seasonal basis over the past decade; prolonged operations for weeks on end have sparked concern regarding the true nature and activities of these apparent scientific expeditions.
Contributing to this barrage of traditional security issues, the power vacuums created by the declining presence of U.S. power in the region have also left allied Indo-Pacific countries in a state of bewilderment. In August 2026, President Donald Trump ordered the last aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific to lend even more support to U.S. forces in the war on Iran. With no specific return date in sight, this could have the unintended effect of emboldening the PRC or Russia to take further action to test the resolve of neighbouring countries to respond.
A week later, five days into the annual Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise, President Trump announced a directive vis-à-vis the social media platform Truth Social that the U.S. would “substantially reduce” the exercise claiming that they, “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile to a Country [North Korea] that… has been unthreatening and respectful.” This decision came as a shock to Seoul in which did not receive advance notice, but it reinforced the importance of the relationship as South Korean President Lee Jae Myung stated that, “national security will be further strengthened when the alliance is solid.” Yet, the announcement did not affect Pyongyang’s position on the existing geopolitical tensions as they launched an approximately 10-short range ballistic missiles into the waters to the east. The redirection of U.S. naval assets from the area does not just have implications for the maritime zones immediately surrounding the peninsula, but the strategic and operational impact is clear in the North Pacific as it requires increased burden and cooperation on other allies—both within and outside of the region—to maintain maritime surveillance and presence.
There are also non-traditional security issues that test the limits of maritime law enforcement. Chief among these threats is the aforementioned IUU fishing, a problem which is particularly acute in the North Pacific as it relates to salmon in the region. The United Nations estimates that IUU fishing generates $10-23 billion USD ($13.77-31.68 billion CAD) annually worldwide. Pacific salmon is not only a commodity for human consumption, but also plays a critical role in sustaining marine ecosystems, and therefore illegal and unsustainable fishing practices cause significant environmental damage. The so-called Great Pacific Garbage Patch, a dense accumulation of debris, plastic and pollution the size of the state of Texas floating halfway between Hawaii and California is also another issue states are struggling to deal with. Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime are rampant in the North Pacific, along with the need to protect critical undersea communications infrastructure that is responsible for the transfer of 95 per cent of data traffic from state and non-state actors. While accidents such as mistakenly dropped anchors are likely to occur, deliberateness has been called into question for many of these incidents elsewhere especially when it involves known hostile actors.
Expanding Out of the Bilateral: Existing Agreements on Maritime Security
Canada has made several efforts to increase its bilateral engagement through a series of agreements and operations with Japan and South Korea respectively. Both take part in Operation NEON, HORIZON and RIMPAC by either contributing some- or a major deployment of personnel, military hardware towards these operations. For Tokyo, the North Pacific presents another theatre of which it needs to counter regional threats and security challenges posed by heightened military cooperation between the PRC and Russia. While Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Forces (JMSDF) and the Coast Guard (JCG) have institutionalized substantial maritime expertise through niches in continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) by deploying remotely piloted aircraft systems, it faces severe personnel deficits owing to the broader demographic crisis impacting the country. Ottawa and Tokyo have also agreed to utilize each other’s military equipment, supplies and logistical support during operations and exercises as per the 2019 Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA). Another indicator of Japan’s desire to deepen its relationship with Ottawa on maritime issues is Tokyo’s expressed willingness to fully participate in Operation NANOOK as Canada’s premier Arctic training and sovereignty operation.
Seoul’s perennial concern revolving around the need to defend the Korean Peninsula against North Korean threats and aggression that has limited its ability to project and deploy resources and forces to the North Pacific. The two countries have recently expanded their relations vis-à-vis the 2025 Canada-ROK Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership. In advancing shared values and priorities on maritime security, the general framework of the Agreement is to commence new, and promote existing defence and security dialogues on policy, research and development, materiel, acquisition, regular staff-to-staff talks between the Navy, Army, Airforce and Space commands. Moreover, at the Canada-ROK Foreign and Defence (2+2) Ministerial Meeting in February of 2026, both countries governments deepened their relations by signing the Agreement on Protection of Military and Defence Classified Information that enables joint exchange of sensitive data and operational information. Both countries continue to partake in naval port visits the KSS-II recently visited Victoria, British Columbia. South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean bid for the contract to build over a dozen new submarines as part of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. However, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced that the contract will go to Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems for the Type 212CD, a decision that would bring Ottawa “closer to Europe.”
Yet, there are challenges that Canada faces in sticking with bilateral arrangements and multilateral deployments in the North Pacific when it lacks inclusion into alliances or formal institutional backing. There is no clear roadmap or path to connect these operational activities and agreements together to address the current fragmented nature of the North Pacific Ocean. Moreover, Carney’s doubling down on the special relationship Canada has with Europe based on a shared history, democratic values and concrete economic and security integration. By increasingly framing Canada’s identity to being the “most European of non-European countries” and going all-in on defence and security partnerships with Europe, Ottawa risks alienating and shutting the door on fruitful relationships with Indo-Pacific allies. The next section details the gaps in which Canada, Japan and South Korea have in their maritime security and defence capabilities and how a trilateral framework may help each to overcome their shortcomings.
Filling in the Gaps of the Other: A Canada-Japan-South Korea Led Framework
While Canada continues to take steps in the right direction by deepening its operational engagement and bilateral relationships with Japan and South Korea, why stop there? Each of these countries possesses distinct strengths and weaknesses in the realm of maritime defence and security as this author has previously argued. While efforts to modernize Canada’s operational readiness, fleet maintenance, security and infrastructure are ongoing, it is still generally viewed as having a positive influence globally given its preference for non-escalation. Arctic governance, environmental stewardship and strong coast guard-led enforcement are just a few of Canada’s long perceived strengths combined with a specializing in satellite-based surveillance (SAR) and MDA expertise with the sovereign-developed Dark Vessel Detection (DVD) system.
Japan has the advantage of being a leader in continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), dense coastal monitoring networks and relevant experience in dealing with grey-zone activities and hybrid threats it faces from the PRC, Russia and North Korea. While South Korea also has experience in responding to these types of below-the-threshold aggression and threats from the same actors as well. Where it has the advantage over Canada and Japan is that Seoul is renowned for its world-class shipbuilding industry, advanced naval capabilities and rapid deployment of naval assets to intercept vessels and conduct inspections. While these countries can continue to operate independently in these areas, they would be doing so in a way that strategic rivals and competitors can more easily exploit.
By integrating specialized capabilities and assets into a framework for improved operational coordination and information sharing, Ottawa, Tokyo, and Seoul inherently benefit from working together to address these gaps through gaining expertise and access to the strengths of the other two. Institutionalizing a trilateral framework to tackle maritime defence and security issues with Canada is beneficial to Japan and South Korea for a few reasons. The first is greater predictability through partnership with another middle power partner. While the U.S. continues to hold three-way multidomain military exercises with Japan and South Korean forces through Freedom Edge 26, the reduction of air and naval assets from participating in these exercises creates a level of operational anxiety for Tokyo and Seoul.
The ebb and flow of U.S. commitments and redirection of military assets elsewhere have pushed these two countries to pursue arrangements with other European partners and Indo-Pacific countries—and in Japan’s case—through The Quad demonstrates a desire for multilateral cooperation to maintain regional deterrence. On the North Pacific front, Canada offers Japan and South Korea its internationally recognized world-class DVD system that complements their respective strengths and helps to offset limitations with their personnel constraints. In integrating specialized Canadian technological security and known experience in monitoring massive swaths of sea, Tokyo and Seoul are better equipped to address IUU fishing among other emerging developments in open ocean areas. Such a framework offers Japan and South Korea with an expanded arsenal of tools and information to combat grey-zone maritime threats without entering into more formal and rigid security alliances. Moreover, sharing technology and maritime intelligence to curb illicit behaviour at sea is readily defensible and a function of the legal compliance and enforcement of UNCLOS. Framing such cooperation in these terms may also help mitigate criticism that these arrangements constitute unnecessary foreign entanglements or provocative actions in the region.
The primary concern is how to make it happen, as specialization across these areas does not automatically translate into a unifying operational architecture that binds them together and determines how they would ultimately function. For one, a trilateral security framework would require Canada, Japan and South Korea to determine what information could be shared with each other across their systems. One potential option is to initiate talks between Ottawa, Tokyo and Seoul to create a legal framework in which they institutionalize data-sharing. This could be accomplished through a dedicated permanent intelligence data centre or cell that tracks developments in the North Pacific.
Such an arrangement may also have benefits for Canada to increase the level of joint operations and exercises in the Arctic as both Japan and South Korea have significant stakes in commercial shipping through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route. By increasing their cold-weather capabilities, Canada can also increase its own visibility and presence in the polar- and circumpolar region and signal to both domestic and international audiences that it is taking Arctic defence seriously.
Another option could emulate that of the Canada-Philippines Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) to standardize logistics access that would further the goals outlined in the 2019 ACSA by expanding the scope to South Korea as well. Lastly, such a framework would be meaningless without a unifying strategy document to deal with the range of security threats in the North Pacific Ocean like IUU fishing and grey-zone operations. This strategy would establish a starting point for this framework to work together to combat such issues.
This article maintains that Canada, Japan and South Korea should institutionalize trilateral cooperation around maritime domain awareness and below-threshold maritime-security challenges, building upon existing operational cooperation such as North Pacific Guard. Once established, the framework could progressively support greater information sharing, interoperability and cooperation on higher-end defence challenges. While formalized alliances may demonstrate a more solidified commitment to regional defence and security, Canada can engage the North Pacific region in a targeted manner that avoids the diplomatic costs of a formal security arrangement. Given the delicate state of Canada’s foreign economic prospects, a below-the-threshold approach would be easier to manage while balancing regional security concerns with ongoing trade diversification imperatives.
Conclusion
By pursuing a working trilateral operational coordination mechanism among Canada, Japan, and South Korea, these countries can overcome blind spots in each other’s capabilities, but also increase the level of scientific cooperation, joint research initiatives and environmental stewardship. Rather, it puts Canada more in charge of its own destiny by diversifying relationships with partners around the world. By embracing the Pacific coast and not just doubling down on Euro-Atlantic relationships and alliances, Canada can better support the objectives in the IPS, ONSAF and its Arctic Foreign Policy that does not have to come at the expense of its European relationships especially when efforts to expand them in an unprecedented milestones are already underway as per the Canada-EU Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Agreement. In bringing these three countries together under the umbrella of a trilateral maritime defence and security framework, middle powers can put their best foot forward in trying to maintain and uphold the rules-based international order during a time when states are pulling back from longstanding commitments and presence in regions such as the North Pacific.
About the Author
Clare Helene McKendry is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and a Research Fellow with the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) Institute. She is the recipient of the 2026 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) Scholarship and a former Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defence and Security Research (INDSR) in Taipei, Taiwan. Her dissertation focuses on the evolution of Taiwan’s policy in the South China Sea disputes. With a focus on the Indo-Pacific as an emerging professional in international affairs and defense policy, she writes extensively on China’s use of maritime infrastructure as a grey-zone tactic, autocratic regimes' use of shadow fleets, and cross-Strait relations. Elsewhere, she has published with the Canadian Network for Research on Security, Extremism, and Society (CANSES) on researcher safety and research trauma recommendations for universities, supervisors, and researchers.
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