A Trilateral Maritime Security Framework Between Canada-ROK-Japan in the North Pacific

Photo Credit: MS Alexandre Heagle Canadian Armed Forces Imagery Technician

BRIEFING NOTE

by Clare McKendry
July 2026

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Table of Contents


Summary

  • The North Pacific region is recognized in the 2022 Indo-Pacific Strategy and 2024 Arctic Foreign Policy as part of Canada’s neighbourhood. Both documents identify Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) as viable partners to increase maritime security cooperation given their shared values and commitments to the rules-based international order, unique set of capabilities and differing levels of inclusion in formal alliances and intelligence apparatuses.
  • Despite this, Canada remains on the sidelines and struggles to maintain the perception as a reliable partner in the Indo-Pacific and by extension the North Pacific having been excluded from some of the leading alliances such as AUKUS, The Quad, and multilateral security dialogues such as the East Asia Summit. Meanwhile, both Japan and the ROK are more deeply integrated into the regional security architecture and maintain a persistent forward naval presence. 
  • A trilateral maritime security framework among Canada, Japan and the ROK would greatly improve Ottawa’s credibility as a reliable defence partner and actor in the North Pacific. It would also strengthen the role of regional middle powers in reinforcing international maritime law and create a foundation for institutionalized security collaboration among all three states. 

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Context

  • Canada’s involvement in the North Pacific’s security architecture remains peripheral, with expert analyses highlighting its longstanding commitments to Euro-Atlantic defence and overextension of the CAF. These efforts are represented through Operation NEON, which enforces UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea; Operation HORIZON, which represents the annual deployment of Canadian military assets to the Indo-Pacific; regular participation in the Rim of the Pacific exercise; and bilateral maritime cooperation with Japan and the ROK. However, that these relationships operate independently of each other limits coordination in maritime domain awareness, consistent naval presence and experience in Northern environments.   
  • On a bilateral level, Ottawa has signed recent agreements with Tokyo and Seoul relevant to maritime security. Japan’s cooperation with Canada on this front is more operational in nature having signed the 2019 Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement to utilize each other’s military equipment, supplies and logistical supports during operations and exercises, core participation in Operation NEON, HORIZON and RIMPAC as the central mechanisms of engagement with Canada. In March 2026, both countries signed the Canada-Japan Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Roadmap seeking to deepen scientific cooperation and joint research in the North Pacific Ocean.
  • Canada’s engagements with the ROK encompass participation in NEON and HORIZON, but also includes the 2025 Canada-ROK Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership (SDCP) that seeks to advance shared values and priorities on maritime security through joint exercises and interoperability in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. At the Canada-ROK Foreign and Defence (2+2) Ministerial Meeting in February 2026, both governments signed the Agreement on Protection of Military and Defence Classified Information enabling the exchange of sensitive defence information including reports, surveillance data and operational information. The two countries continue to discuss contracts to build new submarines and the deployment of Hanwha’s KSS-II in Victoria, British Columbia. This is a significant indicator of the willingness to expand the relationship further.
  • There is also Operation North Pacific Guard that, as of August 2025, conducted an unprecedented four nation patrol featuring representatives from the three countries alongside the U.S. covering a 17,700-km area of the North Pacific Ocean to enhance maritime coordination, targeted enforcement of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing by conducting dozens of high seas inspections with the Canadian Coast Guard. 
  • These agreements and operational activities, while strategically important, lack a clear roadmap for expanding minilateral or multilateral maritime security cooperation and sustaining a naval presence in the North Pacific. The result is a fragmented regional engagement landscape.

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Areas for Canada-Japan-ROK Cooperation

  • The fragmentation of capabilities for detecting, tracking, and rapidly responding to potential incursions or grey-zone activity in the North Pacific limits the effectiveness of any integrated regional response mechanism.
  • Canada brings several strengths to this area: its reputation as a non-escalatory security partner, longstanding experience in Arctic governance that is applicable to the North Pacific, coast guard-led enforcement capabilities now included under the umbrella of National Defence, and expertise in satellite-based surveillance and maritime domain awareness—the ability to track, assess and understand activity at sea—including through the sovereign-developed  Dark Vessel Detection system. However, Canada is widely viewed as lacking a consistent presence and integration in North Pacific maritime security affairs.
  • Japan’s strengths are in continuous intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, dense coastal networks, and experience in responding to grey-zone activities in and around its waters but struggles to account for wide-area captures and relies on its partners for other areas of ocean intelligence and surveillance.
  • The ROK is world-renowned for its shipbuilding industry, advanced naval capabilities and rapid deployment of naval assets to intercept vessels and conduct inspections. Yet, Seoul is also concerned defending against threats in and around the Korean Peninsula as it relates to North Korean aggression.
  • Despite these parallel strengths, a gap exists within each country’s ability to make up for its weaknesses when there is no institutionalized mechanism to link the specialization asymmetries that would otherwise promote a coordinated approach to monitoring and responding to developments in the region. 

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Implications for Canada

  • A Canada-Japan-ROK maritime security partnership can overcome blind spots in each other’s capabilities in the North Pacific but also encompass other important maritime-related fields including scientific cooperation, joint research and stewardship.
  • Expanding Canada’s defence and maritime security footprint alongside these two partners in the North Pacific has several strategic benefits:
    • Support the objectives laid out in the Indo-Pacific Strategy and Arctic Strategy to counter illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing and deepen military engagement with Japan and the ROK.
    • Converting niche capabilities such as the Dark Vessel Detection program, strengths in Arctic and cold-weather operations and coast guard-led maritime enforcement models into valued contributions within a trilateral framework that enhances Canada’s security credibility and capability in the Pacific region more broadly.
    • Gains expertise from Japan and the ROK on continuous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance coverage, knowledge on grey-zone activities, deterrence postures and naval enforcement that deepens Canada’s understanding of these challenges.
    • In the long-term, could improve Canada’s visibility and access to regional intelligence and formal alliance networks, defence and security dialogues, and overall perceptions as a reliable partner in this domain.
  • Canadian defence practitioners must also be aware of the political sensitivities that underline Japan-ROK cooperation including the former’s colonial past and ongoing historical disputes and carefully navigate them.

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About the Author

Clare McKendry is a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Waterloo in the Department of Political Science and holds a Master of Arts and Bachelor of Arts in the same discipline from the University of Guelph. Her dissertation focuses on the evolution of Taiwan’s policy and claims in the South China Sea disputes. With a focus on the Indo-Pacific as an emerging professional in international affairs and defense policy, she primarily writes about China’s use of maritime infrastructure as a grey-zone tactic, autocratic regimes use of shadow fleets, and Cross-Strait relations. She is a current Research Fellow with the Canadian Maritime Security Network (CMSN), Secure Futures Lab, and is a 2026-2027 recipient of the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) Scholarship. Clare has also published with IJ: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis and the Canadian Network for Research on Security, Extremism and Society.

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  • Tori Novelli
    published this page in Briefing Notes 2026-07-02 17:21:18 -0400
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