Image credit: PMO/Adam Scotti
A joint publication with:
by Ash Rossiter
September 2024
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Canada’s Place in the QT Race
- Opportunities for Canadian Defence
- Recommendations
- Conclusion
- End Notes
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
Great uncertainty pervades decisions about emerging defence technologies. Operating at the frontiers of science and technology, advanced states can never be sure their research and development (R&D) investments in unproven technologies will produce the hoped for returns. Quantum technology (QT) promises to revolutionize many areas of human life, from computing to finance to defence. Yet much of this emerging field of physics and engineering remains in its infancy—its potential is latent.
When we speak of quantum technologies we are referring to the application of quantum mechanics to a given field of technology.1 Quantum mechanics is the mathematics that describes and predicts the behaviour (actions and interactions) of atoms and the sub-atomic particles inside them. These small particles often behave quite differently to larger objects. The phenomenon of superposition, for example, describes how a single quantum particle can be said to be in two places at the same time. Also, when two subatomic particles become entangled (i.e., entanglement), they can remain connected even when physically separated by a large distance.2
A new generation of quantum technologies has emerged over the last fifteen years largely by exploiting the quantum effects of entanglement and superposition. There are now devices that can produce, manipulate and read out quantum states of matter.3 As this report goes on to detail, this relatively recent maturing of quantum technologies has the potential to greatly influence and disrupt the defence and security landscape in the near future.
Media and public policy discussions shower much attention on how quantum computing could radically disrupt cryptography. There are good reasons for this focus. Digital computers codebreaking a private key that protects an encrypted private communication, for example, could take longer than the lifetime of our universe. Hypothetically, a quantum computer could do this in minutes.4 The Department of National Defence’s (DND) recent defence policy update, Our North, Strong and Free, recognises that a breakthrough of this magnitude by an adversary “poses a serious threat to the security of data, encryption, and the internet itself.”5
Given our reliance on interconnected digital technologies, quantum computing has the potential to affect Canadians’ everyday life, the country’s economic health, and the functioning of our data-intensive military systems. QTs also have multiple applications across all warfare domains and not just for cybersecurity, as is commonly assumed.6
There is a growing appreciation that pursuing leadership in QT may be the most important techno-security race of the first half of the twenty-first century.7 If the expected benefits accrued from a leap forward in QT is a compelling reason to invest in the technology, so is the fear of falling behind. “Every country lives with the nightmare,” the late Henry Kissinger once observed, “that even if it puts forth its best efforts, its survival may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough on the part of its opponent.”8
Reflecting these high stakes, some governments, including Canada’s, have drafted national quantum strategies. Although the defence applications of QT remain largely theoretical, DND and the CAF are well on their way to thinking about how this broad technology field will impact their core missions. The DND/CAF’s 2021 Quantum S&T Strategy9 and last year’s Quantum 203010 make good headway in this regard. However, more urgency needs to be injected into the discussion and clearer pathways developed to bring QT out of the laboratory. Indeed, this takes on added importance with the DND/CAF modernization and recapitalization projects now underway. These will likely be shaped by developments in QT in the future. Anticipating QT’s possible trajectory and designing adaptable technical systems and organizational structures around this is essential.
Canada’s Place in the QT Race
Globally, QT and especially quantum computing has received a startling increase in government and commercial research funding in the past five years, leading some experts to claim that QT has a hype problem.11 Few in the field doubt the revolutionary potential of quantum technology, but there remain high technical hurdles to overcome.12 Significant advances in physics and materials science are needed, for example, to produce the kind of game-changing quantum computers that theoreticians believe are possible.
Overcoming these challenges and bringing QT out of the laboratory into the real world would confer huge first-mover advantages to whoever accomplishes this. Beijing shows every intention of wanting to win this techno-security race. Concerns in Western capitals range from China developing a quantum computer capable of cracking the most secure codes, to quantum advanced Chinese military and industrial capabilities that vastly outperform their own. Recent U.S. defence authorization acts, and modernizations priorities demonstrate the criticality to the U.S. Department of Defense of not falling behind its near-peer rival in QT.13
To call this a Sino-American competition is a mischaracterization. Others will and do have a significant role to play in the development arc of this technology. Canadian government investments in QT research over the last two decades have positioned the country as a major player. Indeed, the Government of Canada has invested more than $1 billion in quantum since 2012.14 Canada — via its National Research Council (NRC) and ecosystem of world-class centres of quantum expertise in universities and businesses — is now ranked amongst the world leaders in the generation of knowledge in the field. Released this year, Quantum 2030 (not to be confused with the DND/CAF document of the same name) is the government’s strategy for attempting to keep Canada in the top ranks of QT.
Canada is not only well placed to indigenously build upon its hard-won QT advantages; it can also leverage its privileged access to the defence, research and innovation sectors of its key allies. The ability to transition QT to higher technology readiness levels (TRL) will ultimately define how this global competition plays out. The risk to Canada is that other nations will be able to field a range of quantum-based technologies that give them capabilities that Canada is unable to either match or counter.
Opportunities for Canadian Defence
The national security implications of quantum-enabled codebreaking are frequently discussed.15 Less thinking is spent on how a broader range of QT applications provide opportunities for defence. We are not necessarily facing the prospect of a new breed of weapons being introduced. Rather, the quantum revolution is more likely to improve and sharpen modern existing military techniques than create new lines of performance.
Anticipating the opportunities offered by QT for Canadian defence, Our North, Strong and Free identifies the technology as one of the nine immediate priority areas for future-proofing Canada’s capabilities to defend North America.16 The 2023 DND/CAF implementation plan, Quantum 2030, gives further guidance on how Canadian defence can respond to developments in QT.17 It identifies broad areas of defence that QT will likely impact and is an effort to prepare its people to respond to future developments.18 Unlike its 2021 predecessor, Quantum S&T Strategy, Quantum 2030 identifies a series of projects to advance quantum technology. It is worth honing in on three prospective defence technology areas that will impact Canadian defence. These are computing, sensing, and communications.
Computing
Aside from undermining cryptography, quantum computers could bring about major advances in machine learning, spurring improved pattern recognition and machine-based target identification.19 This could radically accelerate the fielding by some nations of autonomous weapon systems, leading to increased calls for stronger arms control measures.20 Quantum computers could enhance simulations that demonstrate military deployments, possible strategies, and other scenarios.21 Furthermore, the multiplication of computing power enabled by quantum architectures could allow systems (crewed or uncrewed) to calculate geographical positioning without GPS. It could solve one of the main issues pertaining to uncrewed undersea vehicles, which need to rise to periscope level at regular intervals to confirm their precise location.22 Mastery of this technology could allow the CAF, for example, to maintain persistent surveillance of its northern waters.23
Sensing
Quantum sensors promise to reach unprecedented sensitivity and precision in sensing various quantities such as, inter alia, electric and magnetic fields, vibrations, motion, and temperature. Advances in quantum sensors could provide alternative positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) options,24 allowing CAF systems to operate in GPS-denied environments. Quantum-enabled systems can sense at levels unachievable by classical (and even AI-enhanced) systems.25 The successful development and deployment of a magnetometer based on a superconducting quantum interference device, or SQUID, for example, would revolutionize submarine detection.26 Though, such superconducting magnetometers are exquisitely sensitive, and their promise has hitherto been limited to the lab.
Projected advances in quantum sensing will radically increase the capacity to monitor, detect, track, and understand threats across Canada’s vast land mass, airspace and maritime areas, especially in remote environments like the Arctic.27 Working through the properties of entanglement, a quantum radar could generate billions of “entangled” photon pairs. In simple terms, one photon from each pair would be sent into the search area while the other was retained. “Signal” photons reflected back to the sensor would then be compared to their “idler” mates, revealing information about objects detected.28 Such a radar could detect stealthy aircraft and distinguish legitimate radar targets from decoys. Moreover, these radars would be largely immune to jamming and even detection by an adversary.
While quantum radars hold enormous hypothetical potential, recent research questions the feasibility of ground-based microwave quantum radar.29 The idea of space-based quantum-enabled light detection and ranging (LiDAR), however, looks more promising in the near term.30 While the pace of development in this field may frustrate some, harnessing this sensing revolution would ultimately allow Canada to play a more critical role in future NORAD modernization.
Communications
Advanced quantum computers will be able to break most of the currently used asymmetric cryptographical schemes. Quantum communications, which refers to quantum information exchange via a quantum network that uses optical fibre or free-space channels, could protect against this threat. Quantum communications using quantum key distribution (QKD) could protect sensitive encrypted communications against hostile interception and protect long-term held data from future quantum computer attacks. QKD allows the creation of encryption keys that are encoded and transmitted using qubits, making them more difficult to break. Indeed, qubits are incredibly sensitive; attempts to disrupt or even just observe them will force qubits to collapse. If an outside observer tries to intercept or monitor QKD protected communications, this will be detected by the message recipient.
Given the exponential increases in the data that must be acquired and analyzed to support timely decision-making in future operating environments, the CAF will rely ever more heavily upon a secure digital communication infrastructure.31
Recommendations
Canada, as Our North, Strong and Free sets out, is investing in the development of new capabilities to provide a military advantage on the North American continent.32 Efforts to transition QT out of the lab and into deployable defence capabilities will aid this mission. Conversely, falling behind others in the QT race would jeopardise Canadians’ security. DND should concentrate first and foremost on those QTs with the most immediate and significant impact on the CAF and its mission.
Furthermore, the DND/CAF should concentrate on maturing areas of quantum S&T that play up to Canadian expertise and strengths in the field. Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) — the federal leader in defence, safety and security S&T — is already pursuing a series of projects to advance the technology readiness level of four identified niche areas. By 2030, DRDC plans to have prototyped a quantum-enhanced radar and a quantum-enhanced light detection and ranging (LiDAR) system, as well as demonstrate a quantum algorithm that solves a defence and/or security problem with advantage over classical computing and, with partners, demonstrate a communications network capable of transmitting quantum information over long ranges and employing theoretically unhackable quantum protocols.33 Setting time horizons for advancing TRLs of identified niche QT areas is a sensible approach. However, while the aspirational pace for advancing these QT areas is ambitious, it may not be ambitious enough. Some quantum systems may emerge as an established fact of the global defence environment before DRDC has moved its selected QT projects beyond their prototype demonstration phase.
While government spending on R&D must rightly be directed toward some of the strongest quantum prospects, dark horse candidates for future breakthroughs should not be ignored.34 The trajectories of emerging technologies are hard to predict; there are typically more duds than successes. As ground-breaking technology can emerge from unexpected quarters, Canada should spread its QT bets with some high-risk, high-reward R&D investments. Given the increasing clarity of Canada’s strategic environment, choosing which investments should be guided by a threat-based rationale rather than a capabilities-based one.
Acquiring high-technology capabilities and their enablers more than ever relies on a nimble and responsive defence procurement system.35 Simply put, the pace of quantum technological change will demand faster decisions on procurement. Our North, Strong and Free has pledged procurement reform. Such reform should increase flexibility to allow for quicker contracting of targeted investments into advanced technology areas like quantum to help incubate QT. In addition, having the end-users of defence systems more involved at the prototyping stage could make the process from development to procurement and then to eventual integration more dynamic.
At present, DRDC is pursuing what it, as the S&T advisor to the defence team, has identified as promising technological niches to meet Canada’s emerging defence and security problems. Yet emerging technologies and the CAF’s operating environments have unpredictable futures. It will be important for DRDC, DND and CAF to keep redefining the defence focus areas for QT as the field matures.
Much of QT development will occur in the civilian space and by commercial entities. It is a classic dual-use technology. The Canadian quantum ecosystem remains recognized worldwide as being exceptional. Canada’s National Quantum Strategy’s investments should, wherever possible, be harmonized with DND QT priority areas. At the same time, defence dollars spent on QT are an investment in Canada’s advanced technology innovation economy.
Defence stands to benefit from technology spin outs from academia and industry. Canada currently has something called Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) to help fund innovation in the defence industry and academia. At present, IDEaS places too much of a bureaucratic burden, however, on funding applicants and offers insufficient rewards at the end of the process. This program has the potential to become a serious catalyst of QT innovation if payout for competitive winners was increased. Then the game would be worth the candle.
Whether there will be enough Canadians working in the QT sector will be an important factor shaping future outcomes.36 Talent shortage is only expected to worsen as demand for expertise increases over the next decade.37 Issuance of timely security clearances without diluting stringent requirements will be critical in this regard. Recruiting, training and retaining a sufficient number of highly qualified personnel will determine the success or failure of any efforts in leveraging QT for Canada’s defence. Many people in the QT space may not possess traditional qualities that are valued in military. The CAF may then need to introduce different career pathways and employment conditions to make the organization more attractive to those groups.
While Canada possesses a world-leading capacity for invention and innovation in the field, no country has exclusive access to the people required to advance state-of-the-art QTs. Canada must also seek to partner more effectively with its closest allies to leverage the scale and combined knowledge needed to match the scientific magnitude and urgency associated with QT. This will be key if Canada wants to adapt to rapid technological change faster than its adversaries and as fast as its allies. Canada already has exceptionally close technology-sharing with partners through membership of the Five Eyes (FVEY) and its bilateral defence arrangements with the United States. Nevertheless, Ottawa must ensure that it has a seat at the table if allies forge ahead together in defence-technology collaboration, as they seem to be doing in post-Phase 1 AUKUS. Canada might even leverage its existing and emerging QT excellence in areas such as space-based quantum communications technology for future AUKUS membership. If this does not pan out, Canada could take the lead and organize the creation of a new minilateral group based around advancing QT.
Conclusion
Defence and security in today’s rapidly changing world rests in good part on possessing a lead in advanced technologies. Canada and its allies have long held this advantage, but that advantage is slipping. Collectively with its allies, Canada can play a key role in arresting this decline in a field that will have profound implications for defence and national security — QT.
Emerging military technologies often receive the accolade “game-changer” before they have been put through their paces at the testing grounds, let alone before they are fielded. Although quantum networks for quantum key distribution are close to daily commercial use, most quantum applications are currently at a low TRL. The practicality and cost-effectiveness of QTs will determine whether particular quantum systems are manufactured and deployed. For all quantum technologies, the transition path out of the lab, into prototypes, and towards fieldable equipment remains a complex scientific and engineering problem. Quantum sensors, for example, demonstrate impressive achievements in a laboratory. However, their transition to practical deployment involves other aspects, such as their robustness, SWaP (size, weight and power) considerations and, of course, cost.38
The above realities will create a time lag between expectations about QT’s impact on defence and its technical readiness. This is natural.39 But this should not encourage complacency. DND must continue to make strenuous efforts to leverage Canada’s comparative advantages in QT by taking formal actions that ultimately lead to the procurement and deployment of QT-enabled systems. This requires a mission-oriented approach to designing and prototyping candidate systems. Quantum 2030 sets out a seven-year plan to bring quantum sensors to a high TRL.40 This is a welcome start. The vastness of Canada and growing strategic importance of the Arctic make this a sensible focus of quantum defence applications.
The Canadian quantum ecosystem is recognized worldwide as being exceptional. Not only will the continued investment in and successful exploitation of QT make Canada safer and more secure, but it will also ensure Ottawa’s access to allied world-class R&D across a range of key technology areas. Robust intellectual property security and secure information architecture sharing with allies will be vital to collaboratively harnessing QT.
End Notes
1 James A. Lewis and Georgia Wood, Quantum Technology: Applications and Implications (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, May 2023), https://www.csis.org/analysis/quantum-technology-applications-and-implications/
2 Emma Hankins, “What is Quantum technology and why should policymakers care about it?” Oxford Insights, 31 August 2023, https://oxfordinsights.com/insights/what-is-quantum-technology-and-why-should-policymakers-care-about-it/.
3 Jonathan P. Dowling and Gerard J. Milburn, “Quantum technology: the second quantum revolution,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 361(1809) (2003): 1655-1674.
4 Using a technique known as Shor’s Algorithm.
5 Canada, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence (Ottawa, ON: Department of National of Defence, 2024), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html, p. 9.
6 Michal Krelina, Quantum technology in future warfare: what is on the horizon? in: Future Warfare and Technology: Issues and Strategies (New Delhi: ORF and Global Policy Journal) 1, 2022, p. 107, https://www.orfonline.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/11/GP-ORF-Future-Warfare-and-Technology-01.pdf
7 Tai Ming Cheung and Thomas G. Mahnken, “The Great Race for Techno-Security Leadership,” War on the Rocks, 31 August 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/08/the-grand-race-for-techno-security-leadership/.
8 Henry Kissinger, “Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack,” Foreign Affairs, 38(3) (1960): 557-575.
9 DND/CAF, Quantum S&T Strategy: Preparing of Technological Disruptions in the Future Operating Environment (Ottawa, 2021).
10 Canada, Quantum 2030: The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Quantum Science and Technology Strategy Implementation Plan (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2023), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/overview-quantum-2030.html.
11 Sankar Das Sarma, “Quantum Computing Has a Hype Problem,” MIT Technology Review, 28 March 2022, https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/03/28/1048355/quantum-computing-has-a-hype-problem/.
12 Ash Rossiter, “Hyping Emerging Military Technology: Probing the Causes of Consequences of Excessive Expectations,” International Relations, published online 17 July 2023.
13 Modernization Priorities, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, U.S. Department of Defense, 28 August, 2020, Washington, D.C., https://www.cto.mil/modernization-priorities/.
14 See March 2023 news release by Innovation, Science and Economic Development (Canada), https://www.canada.ca/en/innovation-science-economic-development/news/2023/03/government-of-canada-investing-in-quantum-industry-canada-to-ensure-businesses-achieve-commercial-success.html.
15 Michal Krelina, “Quantum Technology for Military Applications,” EPJ Quantum Technology, 6 November 2021, https://epjquantumtechnology.springeropen.com/articles/10.1140/epjqt/s40507-021-00113- y#citeas.
16 Canada, Our North, Strong and Free, p. 35.
17 Canada, Quantum 2030: The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Quantum Science and Technology Strategy Implementation Plan (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2023), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/overview-quantum-2030.html.
18 Point made by Alexander Salt and Alex Wilner, “Emerging Technology and Canadian Defence,” Triple Helix, May 2024, https://www.cgai.ca/emerging_technology_and_canadian_defence_from_strong_secure_engaged_to_present.
19 Kelley M. Sayler, “Defense Primer: Quantum Technology,” Congressional Research Service, updated 25 October 2023, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11836.
20 Ash Rossiter and Peter Layton, Warfare in the Robotics Age (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner, 2024).
21 Ajey Lele, Quantum Technologies and Military Strategy (Springer, 2021).
22 Martino Travagnin, Cold Atom Interferometry for Inertial Navigation Sensors (Technology Assessment: Space and Defence Applications, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2020), p. 15, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2760/237221.
23 Russian UUVs such as the Klavesin 225 and the Shadow-2 have been expressly developed for Arctic projection. See David Hambling, “Why Russia Is Sending Robotic Submarines to the Arctic”, BBC, 21 November 2017, https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20171121-why-russia-is-sending-roboticsubmarines-to-the-arctic.
24 DND/CAF, Quantum S&T Strategy: Preparing of Technological Disruptions in the Future Operating Environment (Ottawa, 2021), p. 8.
25 DND/CAF, Quantum S&T Strategy: Preparing of Technological Disruptions in the Future Operating Environment (Ottawa, 2021), p. 8.
26 David Hambling, “China’s quantum submarine detector could seal South China Sea,” New Scientist, 22 August 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/article/2144721-chinas-quantum-submarine-detector-could-seal-south-china-sea/.
27 Sarah Jacobs Gamberini and Lawrence Rubin, “Quantum Sensing’s Potential Impacts on Strategic Deterrence and Modern Warfare,” Orbis 65(2) (2021): 354-368.
28 Chris Jay Hoofnagle and Simon Garfinkel, “Quantum Sensors—Unlike Quantum Computers—Are Already Here,” Defense One, 27 June 2022, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/quantum-sensorsunlike-quantum-computersare-already-here/368634/.
29 F. Daum, Quantum radar cost and practical issues, IEEE Aerosp. Electron. Syst. Mag. 35 (11) (2020) 8e20, https://doi.org/10.1109/maes.2020.2982755.
30 D.C. Koblick, S. Wilkinson, Space-based spooky radar orbit determination benefits at Earth-Moon Lagrange points, in: AMOS 2020, 2020, p. 13.
31 US DoD, Summary of the Joint All-Domain Command & Control Strategy, March 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Mar/17/2002958406/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-THE-JOINT-ALL-DOMAIN-COMMAND-AND-CONTROL-STRATEGY.PDF.
32 Our North, Strong and Free, p. 13.
33 Canada, Quantum 2030: The Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Quantum Science and Technology Strategy Implementation Plan (Ottawa, ON: Department of National Defence, 2023), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/overview-quantum-2030.html.
34 Ben Brubaker, “Versatile Neutral Atoms Emerge as an Intriguing Quantum Computing Platform,” Physics Today, 24 August 2022, https://pubs.aip.org/physicstoday/Online/4950/Versatile-neutral-atoms-emerge-as-anintriguing.
35 William Richardson, et al., “Toward Agile Procurement for National Defence: Matching the Pace of Technological Change,” Triple Helix, June 2020, https://www.cgai.ca/toward_agile_procurement_for_national_defence_matching_the_pace_of_technological_change.
36 C. Leddy, Q&A: The talent shortage in quantum computing, (MIT News, 2019).
37 Edward Parker, “Promoting Strong International Collaboration in Quantum Technology Research and Development,” RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1874-1.html.
38 Michal Krelina, “The Prospect of Quantum Technologies in Space for Defence and Security,” Space Policy, published online 15 June 2023.
39 Ash Rossiter, “High-energy Laser Weapons: Overpromising Readiness,” Parameters, 48(4) (2018), 35-46.
40 Canada, Quantum 2030.
About the Author
Dr. Ash Rossiter is Lead Researcher and Associate Professor in Defense and Security at Rabdan Academy in Abu Dhabi. He received his PhD from the University of Exeter in 2014 after earlier completing a MA in War Studies from King’s College London.
Ash has published widely on technology and international security, strategy, warfare, and comparative defense industries. His work has appeared in peer-reviewed journals such as Journal of Strategic Studies, International Relations, Intelligence & National Security, Defence Studies, Parameters, as well as many other outlets. He is author, along with Peter Layton, of Warfare in the Robotics Age, published in 2024 by Lynne Rienner.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.
In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.
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