Image credit: MCpl Genevieve Lapointe, Canadian Forces Combat Camera, Canadian Armed Forces Photo
A joint publication with:
by Alexander Rudolph
July 2024
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- CAF Digital Transformation 2030 – Where Are They?
- The Risks of Pan-Failure
- Pan-Domain Command and Control – The Canadian CJADC2
- Making the Pan-Dream Work
- Beware Those Who Overlook the Scorpion’s Tail
- Conclusion
- End Notes
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
In June 2022, then-Minister of National Defence Anita Anand announced an almost $40 billion plan described as North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Modernization. However, on a closer reading, this plan is digital modernization in NORAD clothing. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is undergoing one of the most significant modernization efforts in its history, even larger than NORAD modernization once we understand that it is part of the CAF’s digital transformation. It is no coincidence that four of the five NORAD modernization investment areas either explicitly deal with modernizing command and control or existing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities through digital modernization or are heavily associated with such capabilities. These NORAD command and control (C2) and C4ISR improvements are informed by the United States’ multi-domain concepts, which directly impacts how the CAF is modernizing its capabilities and how it fights. These modernization efforts are part of the CAF’s efforts to adopt pan-domain operating concepts, which is used interchangeably with multi-domain.
To understand why the CAF is adopting pan-domain requires looking at how the United States is trying to achieve its multi-domain ambitions. The United States is developing Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control (CJADC2) as the principal means to conduct multi-domain operations. CJADC2 is described as a “once-in-a-generation” modernization of military command that aims to “connect sensors from all the military services… into a single network.” However, even this description of CJADC2 as simply “connecting the battlespace” into a unified network is reductive and only describes one-third of CJADC2. CJADC2 has three central pillars: (1) a unified cloud-based network, (2) which allows the use of data management and analytics on data collected from all assets and capabilities connected to the cloud network, (3) that is processed using artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML) to achieve information superiority to enable commanders to make quicker and more informed decisions. These require changes to organizational structures to allow commanders to make the best use of their capabilities, and forces wide reforms to personnel, such as professional development, recruitment, training, and policy. When fully realized, the speed and quality of information provided improve C2 and commanders' decision-making at such a rate that some refer to CJADC2 as a revolution in military affairs. These capabilities form the core of how the U.S. views operating in a multi-domain context and directly encourages allies to adopt similar approaches.
So why does this transformation of the U.S. military matter to Canada and why is CJADC2 implementation relevant for the Canadian military? The CAF rarely conducts military operations alone and most often fights alongside the United States, with whom Canada has the world’s only binational military command in NORAD. It is critical for the CAF to continue ensuring its ability to conduct operations with their American counterparts. Maintaining this critical defence relationship with the U.S. is one of the core reasons for the CAF adopting the pan-domain construct and currently developing pan-domain command and control (PDC2) as the Canadian version of CJADC2. Consequently, the CAF’s digital transformation efforts have implications beyond replacing legacy and analog processes with digital but is intrinsically connected to maintaining Canada’s defence relationship with the United States. This thus begs the question, how is the Government of Canada supporting the DND/CAF in conducting digital transformation and achieving pan-domain capability? Although the DND/CAF have fully bought into digital transformation and pan-domain pillars, there are barriers beyond the DND/CAF. Pan-domain/multi-domain concepts recognize the critical role that personnel and organizational structures have in ensuring the most effective application of CJADC2. Albeit seemingly being a small piece of the puzzle, looking into the CAF’s procurement of such capabilities allows us to investigate if the CAF is making the needed organizational changes required to fully transform. This paper will explain where the CAF is in its digital transformation, how it is building the CAF towards pan-domain capability, and the policy barriers preventing the CAF from modernizing.
CAF Digital Transformation 2030 – Where Are They?
Despite digital transformation efforts starting in 2019 with the Data Strategy, present institutional planning for DND/CAF digital transformation dates to December 2020. It was recognized that institutional and operational transformation are linked and must be undertaken simultaneously and immediately because “our adversaries are getting faster, and our allies are getting further ahead of us.” However, the DND would spend nearly all of 2021 developing the Digital Transformation Office (DTO) concept but not proceed or announce it until December 2022. Audits and evaluations of DND/CAF’s management of cyber and digital capabilities elaborate on many of these details. The assessment shows how a poor and ineffective digital governance model built by disparate and ad hoc digital transformation processes led to a forces-wide deficiency in digital capabilities. In particular, the Defence Information Management and Information Technology (IM/IT) Programme (2020), Cyber Forces (2021), and Using Data as a Strategic Asset (2023) share a common trait that shows discrepancies in authorities, responsibilities, and accountabilities (ARAs) as one of the primary reasons for ineffectiveness on these files. It is perhaps most telling that the recommendations in the Evaluation of Using Data as a Strategic Asset in the DND/CAF have little to do with the use of data and everything to do with governance structures and regimes. However, there are indications that the DND recognizes this and is responding with reorganizing the Digital Transformation Office and Chief Information Officer Group into the Digital Services Group (DSG).
Despite poor conditions for digitization throughout the DND/CAF, there is some cause for optimism in the future. The turning point for realignment towards digital transformation and pan-domain began in 2021 with the creation of the Chief of Combat Systems Integration (CCSI) and a new Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) and Vice Chief of the Defence Staff, who were eager to move digital transformation forward. The creation of the Chief of Combat Systems Integration (CCSI) in 2021 as a Level 2 advisor to the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff is an important milestone in establishing the much-needed role to mainstream digital transformation and pan-domain throughout the DND/CAF as the CAF Digital Champion. By January 2022, CDS General Wayne Eyre decided to proceed with a CAF digital transformation approach without the DND, in light of their slow pace. More than four years after Canada’s defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged, the CAF was proceeding with its own plans for digital transformation because the declining geopolitical and security situation dictated that the CAF could no longer wait for DND. Work on the CAF Digital Campaign Plan began almost immediately and was eventually released in June 2022.
The Digital Campaign Plan is a detailed plan on how to digitally transform the CAF by 2030 and is blunt in its assessment of where the CAF is presently. This is best highlighted in CDS General Wayne Eyre’s foreword, where he states: “There are many initiatives already underway across the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), but they are not yet coherent in the unity of thought, purpose, and action.” The Digital Campaign Plan adopts the Digital Maturity Model for the CAF, which supposes that the CAF is presently “Digitally Aware” but seeks to become digitally transformed and eventually reach a level where the CAF can continuously innovate. The strength of the Digital Campaign Plan lies in understanding that digital transformation is not just about the people or institution. Still, both must do so independently and together to build a digital culture in the DND/CAF. However, the Digital Campaign Plan also establishes a very ambitious timeline, with 2025 as the goal to become a digitally enabled organization and 2030 as the goal for a digitally transformed CAF. As will be shown, the primary barriers to achieving this will likely rest outside the CAF's control.
Fortunately, we do know the overall management plan to address this as laid out in the Evaluation of Using Data as a Strategic Asset in the DND/CAF. The management action plan details in the evaluation clarify the steps the DND and CAF are taking to begin a more centralized, CAF-wide approach to digital transformation in 2025 established in the Digital Campaign Plan. While the deliverables and overall plan presented will undoubtedly help support the more effective use of data across the DND/CAF, the plan is meant to improve IM/IT capabilities' use and management. Annex B of the evaluation outlines the management action plan to improve ARAs and governance to “establish joint governance between the DTO and CIO that will support the digital transformation and will align with the VCDS role in brokering CAF requirements for pan-DND/CAF enablement” by April 2025. This aligns with present plans to begin the greater push for digital transformation in 2025, and there are already indications that DND/CAF is working to achieve this target. Subsequently, during this time, CCSI has been developing a Digital Campaign Outcome-based Plan to be supported by a VCDS Implementation Directive that will provide CAF Level 1s with critical tasks to refine decision and governance systems.
Despite these positive signs, persistent issues with ARAs and a lack of DND/CAF-wide commitment to digital issues, as the various audits and evaluations noted date back to 2013, systemic issues date back further. Presently, as the DND/CAF begin to align towards achieving digital transformation by 2030, they risk making the same mistakes from a lack of DND/CAF-wide alignment on digital transformation. However, in a major positive step to better unify DND/CAF digital transformation, on 1 May 2024, DND announced that they are reorganizing the DTO and CIOG into the DSG. It made little organizational sense to have these two organizations separated in the first place when it would have been up to CIOG to implement digital transformation. Unifying these groups will likely help address the organizational difficulties addressed in the audits and evaluations and help prepare DSG to guide and “support the common vision for transformation” in 2025, based on the timeline established in the Digital Campaign Plan.
Although this is a positive step and should be commended, it does highlight the lack of long-term planning and continuity for innovation and development in services and capabilities. For example, the DTO was created in 2022 from reorganizing the ADM (Data, Innovation, Analytics) and the Directorate of Knowledge and Information Management, formerly under ADM(IM) and CIOG. Less than two years later, these groups are being rejoined into the DSG. Adding to this organizational game of chutes and ladders, DND’s new ADM(CIO) appointed in April 2023 had left DND by January 2024, months before the announcement of the DSG. However, this is not to say that the DND/CAF are going in the wrong direction, but it risks delaying the timeline to achieve digital transformation not from a lack of ability, but from a lack of institutional inertia where the organization is constantly distracted by change management as opposed to delivering on digital transformation. Nevertheless, the DND/CAF may still be well positioned to deliver on digital transformation with the DSG’s leadership team. The new head of the DSG and now CIO of DND, Ross Ermel, is a former Brigadier-General who was Director General of Capability and Structure Integration and has experience working elsewhere in the Canadian government. This diverse experience will be vital because the DND/CAF cannot achieve digital transformation alone; it requires a whole-of-government effort to provide the needed support, policy leadership, and changes to allow the DND/CAF to accomplish its digital transformation. To look at what needs to be done to accomplish the whole of DND/CAF-wide digital transformation would be too exhaustive and out of scope for this article, but looking at the pillars of pan-domain and PDC2 provides a strong case study to focus on how digital transformation contributes to the CAF’s warfighting ability.
The Risks of Pan-Failure
The United States military has made it clear that it views CJADC2 as a mutual effort with allies. CJADC2 was previously known as JADC2, but “Combined” was added as part of a more mature strategic and operational understanding that acknowledges that allies must be included in JADC2 concepts as a central part of U.S. strategy and way of warfighting. Although the CAF is rushing to maintain its interoperability with the United States, the emergence of CJADC2/JADC2 is not a sudden development. CJDAC2 could have its theoretical roots in U.S. military concepts of net-centric warfare from the 1990s. In the mid-2010s, advancements in technology and computing power contributed to significant advances in C4ISR capabilities, and the U.S. military saw the potential for synergistic effects across the capabilities. These concepts would eventually come to form CJDAC2.
As CJDAC2 as a C2 concept and doctrine was starting to be developed, what began as sporadic experimentation and innovation was now part of a fully realized strategy by 2022. The United States Department of Defense (DOD) developed lines of efforts which saw DOD and Joint Staff leading the overall concept, policy, and doctrinal aspects, whereas the individual services led their modernization efforts to stand up specific networks and multi-domain suited to their domain of operations. As CJADC2 concepts were further refined, the United States took a phased approach to building up the capabilities of the services, with successful tests and exercises in 2019, 2020, and 2022. These various tests and exercises were built around the CJADC2 pillars to test the technology and C2 regarding their use, emphasizing the ability “to collect, analyze, and share data in real-time to provide a fuller picture of the operating environment.” The success of these exercises in proving the applicability of CJADC2 in a real-time environment resulted in the launch of Project OLYMPUS.
Project OLYMPUS is an American effort to move CJADC2 from service-based lines of effort into an initial operating capability of CJADC2. Project OLYMPUS strings together various exercises and experiments the U.S. military already conducts and adds a layer of prototyping, risk reduction, and integration for CJADC2-specific C2 and capabilities toward achieving an initial operating capability.1 These efforts have increasingly included allies such as Canada as the exercises ensure interoperability of allies under CJADC2, but also as a way for allies to share best practices and develop a greater understanding of pan-domain operations. This has already shown so much success that on 21 February 2024, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks announced that CJADC2 had reached an initial operating capability. There are some indications that Project OLYMPUS will be a reiterative program and continue the process of refining CJADC2 over the next few years. The first phase is due to end in November 2024 and subsequently be evaluated by the U.S. military’s Combatant Commands in 2025.
If the CAF cannot effectively work with and alongside the U.S. military on CJADC2 during Project OLYMPUS, it risks the DoD deeming Canada and the CAF an ineffective partner. Indeed, there are already very real concerns about meeting these C4ISR and interoperability goals with the U.S. DND/CAF’s 2022-23 Departmental Results state that the CAF could only meet 95 per cent of its international, domestic, and Arctic operations objectives because of “impacts linked to C4ISR and related interoperability issues.” The DND/CAF have certainly taken notice of this potential risk as well, with DND/CAF’s 2024-25 Departmental Plans showing multiple projects focused on improving interoperability internationally and domestically. The number of unmet objectives due to C4ISR-related issues risks growing if the CAF cannot follow through on its own digital transformation. Project OLYMPUS assessments will force the United States military to determine if Canada is a reliable, trusted partner that can work with how the U.S. intends to fight in the future. This is why many in the CAF, particularly the CCSI, have stressed that the CAF must digitally modernize immediately. The potential harm this would have on Canada’s most valuable defence relationship is likely to be more than any change in U.S. political leadership.
Pan-Domain Command and Control – The Canadian CJADC2
Whereas the U.S. concepts of CJADC2 strategy are already being operationalized and have reached an initial operating capability, the CAF is still refining its equivalent Pan-Domain Command and Control (PDC2). The CAF is presently working to develop an initial PDC2 operating concept that is due to be out in mid-2024, which will be the basis for how the CAF will achieve pan-domain operations. Functionally, what PDC2 will do is lay out the blueprint for how the CAF will implement and use the three pillars of CJDAC2, including the need for organizational changes to make best use of C2 under PDC2. Despite lacking a PDC2 operating concept, the CAF cannot wait to begin operating in a pan-domain environment, something they already recognize. The CAF’s plans for adopting PDC2 would represent the biggest shift in how the CAF operates since the unification of the Canadian Forces by then-Minister of Defence Paul Hellyer in the 1960s. Adopting pan-domain concept will require changes to government, military policy and how the CAF trains, fights, and works with allies. Achieving this requires significant alignment between the government and CAF. But is this happening? The CAF is making great strides in prioritizing pan-domain and PDC2 to try to follow through on these plans despite an overall lack of commitment from the government that increasingly makes the CAF’s plans harder to achieve.
Making the Pan-Dream Work
There are many facets to pan-domain/multi-domain operations beyond the technological capabilities themselves that can be discussed, particularly the C2, organizational, and personnel requirements that make PDC2/CJDAC2 possible. However, as the CAF is still developing its PDC2 concept, gauging the initial steps in development and integration of the three pillars of PDC2/CJADC2 is one of the best ways to gauge the DND/CAF’s progress. Although the CAF decided to chart its own path to digital transformation, it is working with DND to centralize the overall digital transformation of the CAF by 2025 that includes synchronizing digital transformation across the DND/CAF through DSG, VCDS, CCSI, and Chief of Force Development. This approach is similar to how the DoD and Joint Chiefs of Staff managed the broader conceptual, policy, and doctrinal developments of CJADC2.
The reason that many mistake cloud-based computing and a unified network as the only capability behind CJADC2 and PDC2 is because of how foundational it is to the concept. Cloud computing is the foundation because it is the underlying architecture of the C2 of CJADC2 and PDC2 that ensures the availability of data to inform C2 in a timely manner. The CAF presently has access to cloud networking, but it is not sufficient, nor the type required for pan-domain operations. The CAF has access to cloud networking and cloud service providers (CSPs) through the Joint Defence Cloud Program and Shared Services Canada (SSC) up to Protected B level of classification, but currently lacks the cloud computing for data classified as “Secret” for its C2 and DND networks, colloquially referred to as “Secret cloud.” However, this is not for a lack of trying and more so because of government barriers and policies greatly delaying the CAF’s ability to procure secret cloud.
The DND/CAF’s project to procure CAF-wide secret cloud environment is the Information Technology Infrastructure in Support of Command and Control project (ITI in Sp of C2), but there are issues with this project. The first problem is that ITI in Sp of C2 initially did not mention cloud but sought technological solutions that did not presuppose cloud as the solution. This is despite the DND/CAF having been aware of cloud computing as the likely solution since at least 2019. Subsequent amendments provided greater clarity on cloud-related information sought by the government and increasingly showed how long cloud has been recognized as the solution. This would eventually culminate in the launch of an initial technical qualification (ITQ) in November 2023, which now fully acknowledges that the government is looking for suppliers who have the ability to provide “secure, hyperscale Cloud capability…”. This post appears to follow with updates to the Defence Capabilities Blueprint, which states that the Definition Phase was supposed to start in 2022/2023, but says this did not begin until 2024. This delay has yet to be reflected in the overall timeline. If all the subsequent procurement phases go well, and quickly, the implementation date of 2030/31 could remain, but there exist issues on policy outside of Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC).
The greatest complication in procuring a secret cloud for the DND/CAF is current Treasury Board of Canada policies on digital governance and data sovereignty. The Government of Canada’s overall digital and cyber policy is governed by the Policy on Service and Digital and the Directive on Service and Digital, which restricts what classifications of data can be in certain types of cloud environments. The policies dictate that Protected C, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret cannot be deployed to a public cloud, but must be deployed to a private cloud. This becomes significantly difficult for the DND/CAF when Protected C and classified data must be located in Canada or “within the premises of a Government of Canada department located abroad… identified and evaluated as a principal delivery option for all sensitive electronic information and data under government control…”. This greatly limits how secret clouds are deployed and used by the military, and makes it difficult for cloud service providers to provide what the DND/CAF requires.
The major issue derives from the significant expense of an entirely private cloud enterprise and the policy changes and risks associated with mitigating these costs. A secret private cloud would mean requiring dedicated IT infrastructure that would cost significantly more than the $250 to $499 million estimated budget for ITI in Sp of C2 and have an outsized impact on the DND/CAF’s overall budget. This is the cause for discussions about potential policy changes that would allow the DND/CAF to use commercial infrastructure for ITI in Sp of C2 or enter into an agreement with the U.S. to rely on the infrastructure for their $9 billion Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability. The tradeoffs for using commercial infrastructure or relying upon U.S. infrastructure come with their own respective risks which should not be taken lightly. If exceptions are allowed for commercial infrastructure use in public or partial-public cloud, this would potentially put encrypted secret data in infrastructure shared by the public and inherently increase the risk of data compromise. However, this risk can be substantially diminished with data-centric security (DCS) and zero-trust security, which can be improved even further with effective defensive cyber operations and cyber mission assurance.2 These concerns diminish if Canada finds a way to enter into an agreement with the U.S. to use their infrastructure. However, this raises concerns about data sovereignty, such as whether Canadian secret data would be safe if a U.S. court order were to be used to retrieve data that includes Canadian secret data. Unless Canada dramatically increases its defence budget beyond the NATO-agreed 2 per cent, there will need to be some form of policy change or carve out to allow greater flexibility for C2. This could be a mix of all the above, including commercial and shared use of U.S. or U.K. military infrastructure.
The DND, SSC, and Treasury Board have discussed this since at least 2022, but there is no indication of any change or exception for national security or defence reasons. The current anticipated timeline for ITI in SP of C2 delivery is for 2030/2031. Still, present delays in procurement and policy barriers at Treasury Board increase the likelihood this target will not be met. Fortunately, at some point between 2022 and 2023, DND realized that their timelines for procuring ITI in SP of C2 did not line up, which helps explain why the CAF is seeking a stop-gap capability with the U.S. and U.K. to ensure they have access to some secret cloud capabilities. What this means or will look like remains unclear, but we are starting to see some small developments. On 26 January 2024, DND announced that the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) successfully conducted a cloud-based command and control (CBC2) test as part of the U.S. Air Force’s Advanced Battle Management System. The announcement recognized that part of ongoing modernization related to this CBC2 test is part of broader Canadian NORAD modernization efforts. Still, we can thank the U.S. for procuring it, not the Government of Canada.
When talking about the core pillars of CJADC2/PDC2, the DND/CAF has likely spent the most time developing its data governance and management enterprise with the release of its Data Strategy in 2019. This is in part because good data management helps in operational and non-operational contexts beyond CJADC2/CDC2. In addition, good data management could be considered the prerequisite for Secret Cloud and CJADC2/PDC2 because the rapid, secure transfer and use of data in support of C2 is the very basis for CJADC2/PDC2. As a result, strong data management and governance using a data-centric security (DCS) approach is often considered necessary before a common Secret cloud is adopted. DCS is an approach to security that emphasizes data protection, particularly if other areas of a network or system are compromised. As a result, there are numerous reasons for this focus, but despite the time and development of the data enterprise, it has been plagued by the same issues that the whole of DND/CAF’s digital transformation faces.
In November 2023, the DND/CAF released its Evaluation of Using Data as a Strategic Asset, which provides an in-depth account of the issues DND/CAF data management has suffered. Although the scope of the report specifically addresses the use of data to support decision-making, the report's conclusions and recommendations indicate that the problems are systemic and likely to affect C2 and operations. The evaluation concludes that DND/CAF is not optimizing its investments in decision support systems across the organization due to a lack of enterprise-wide priorities and implementation mechanisms. This lack of alignment can be attributed to the CDS decision to move forward with digital transformation and give DND time to catch up to the CAF. The CAF's decision to move forward allowed progress to be made and begin digital transformation, though this evaluation shows that it likely contributed to a lack of resource optimization. Although the conclusion of the evaluation can be viewed as inherently negative due to the focus on DND/CAF failings, it highlights that there has been success in developing data management capabilities.
One such success was the widespread innovation of decision support systems across Level 1 leaders once analytics tools were provided. However, despite these successes, nearly half of the systems evaluated were developed “unofficially” and on the initiative of the Level 1 in question. While this should be encouraged and commended, this is part of a broader lack of oversight and governance over the DND/CAF digital transformation. Further, it also highlights the overall inconsistent manner in which digital transformation is being applied when the personal initiative of a Level 1 leader is required to innovate business and decision-making practices. In an almost paradoxical arrangement, the evaluation finds that DND/CAF’s lack of governance over the development of data management and analytics for decision support systems means they cannot monitor and track the progress and, thereby, have failed to develop their decision support systems. It should then be of no surprise that the evaluation finds that “data and information are not yet managed as a strategic enterprise asset,” which is the very reason why data is a pillar of CJADC2/PDC2. Although these findings are concerning, the evaluation does acknowledge that DND/CAF are underway with changes towards more centralized management by 2025 and are already in the process of addressing many of the issues identified in the evaluation and management action plan.
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning
The military’s interest in AI/ML predates the massive expansion of interest brought about by large language models and text-to-image models, and is already using some forms of it. Years of disparate experimentation and exploration that remain ongoing throughout the DND/CAF culminated in releasing an official AI Strategy in 2024. The strategy situates itself with the Data Strategy and Digital Campaign Plan as part of the broader DND/CAF digital transformation, which should indicate that DND/CAF does not view the use of AI/ML as a niche capability but rather as integral to achieving digital transformation by 2030 (and PDC2). This is further supported by the DND/CAF setting a target of 2030 for successfully implementing the strategy. The AI Strategy can thus be viewed as DND/CAF’s effort to leverage its experience with AI/ML as part of the digital transformation process. However, as the strategy identifies, the ability to use AI/ML relies upon well-managed data and “technical enablers.” Once again highlighting the importance of a cloud environment, they are very explicit about what technical enabler is required: “DND/CAF must also create the secure and interoperable digital infrastructure required to support the application layer, including investments in the cloud infrastructure and security required to scale AI.”
The AI Strategy has been well received by industry and analysts for its nuanced and grounded approach to AI/ML. Perhaps, having learned from its experience with data management, one of the guiding principles of the strategy is a need to embrace change, which specifically includes a line of effort for change management. Resistance to change and “institutional skepticism” are both cited as obstacles to overcome, which applies to DND/CAF’s digital transformation process as a whole and not just an impediment to AI/ML. However, it is also a fundamental recognition that present organizational structures reflect an out-of-date paradigm that does not treat data as a strategic resource. As data analytics and AI/ML are increasingly able to be leveraged, this can significantly support CAF Reconstitution by streamlining processes and increasing efficiencies to support greater productivity with fewer personnel. However, as much as data management and AI/ML can help with operational and non-operational contexts, the strategy correctly notes that AI/ML is a means and not an end. Just as with a military capability, how you use it matters, and the mere presence of AI/ML will not fix problems unless it is used in a deliberate and appropriate manner for the context in which it is sought. AI/ML is already being used in some areas of the CAF, such as in the Royal Canadian Navy with maintenance data analytics or the use of NORAD’s Pathfinder’s by the RCAF, the strategy correctly identifies there is unlikely to be significant success with AI/ML without widespread data management and use of Secret cloud.
Beware Those Who Overlook the Scorpion’s Tail
Amid the more recent Canadian debates around funding for DND/CAF, the “tooth to tail” trope has arisen in the House of Commons. Tooth-to-tail ratio is a colloquial term generally referring to the amount of non-combat personnel relative to those engaged in direct combat. This term was used to make the argument for cuts to DND/CAF under the Stephen Harper government, which motivated significant reductions in expenditures on IM/IT while outsourcing its management to SSC or third-parties. It was this kind of thinking that motivated the creation of SSC and caused government-wide problems due to its poor implementation. Although many of the initial issues with SSC have seemingly been addressed, many personnel have said that the early errors and mistakes would still have an impact on the CAF years later. In 2014, CAF briefing notes acquired by CBC News described SSC as having “significant inefficiency at every level,” which included service delivery, procurement, resource management, and delegation of authority. To make matters worse, this inefficiency was so severe that it became a risk to CAF operations which were unable to receive support during critical times that meant DND/CAF personnel had to step in for SSC. An Auditor General’s report in 2021 indicated that although SSC has made progress in developing good practices, it found that SSC consistently failed in its engagement with National Defence and failed to take into account DND/CAF’s technology needs in key procurement projects. If DND/CAF’s funding for digital modernization and other “tail”-related activities are cut or diverted, it would have a significant detrimental impact on DND/CAF’s ability to face 21st-century threats and would damage relations with our allies. As the CAF undertakes digital transformation, it requires DND’s and the Government of Canada’s support for more than just funding, but policy leadership and advocacy for what the CAF needs. Any change by the Government of Canada, be it cabinet or Parliament, which would alter how DND/CAF is digitally modernizing would severely delay the CAF’s digital transformation goal of 2030, which is already, as noted above, a very ambitious goal.
Conclusion
There is universal agreement that the DND/CAF is not the digital organization that it needs to be, and digital transformation is required for the DND/CAF to maintain relevancy. The CAF has sought to make up for lost time from delays and associated troubles with SSC, but a lack of strong, consistent support from DND and the Government of Canada has meant disparate and ad hoc progress. Although the CAF decision to push ahead with a CAF-focused plan has allowed it to make progress in initial steps of digital transformation, DND still must catch up in its organizational preparedness and refocus on resolving the policy issues for secret cloud. Although many of the strategies will emphasize digital transformation to modernize and improve the overall effectiveness of DND/CAF as an institution, its role and contribution to pan-domain operations and PDC2 cannot be understated. Fundamentally, whereas digital transformation can be viewed as the institutional mechanism to modernize DND/CAF, its ability to conduct pan-domain operations and implement PDC2 is the goal by which to measure its progress in digitally transforming. With 2030 as the goal for digital transformation for the DND/CAF, we can reasonably understand this as the objective for an initial operating capability for PDC2. However, with many procurement projects timelines include a closeout beyond 2030, it is difficult to see how DND/CAF can meet its digital transformation goals by this time or reach an initial operating capability for PDC2.
The increasing complexity of the threats the CAF must face or the situations they are called upon to assist with domestically means that the CAF is being called on to do more with less. Digital transformation and PDC2 provides the mechanism for the CAF to keep up with these threats and innovate at scale. The far-reaching benefits of digital transformation for the CAF cannot be overstated for the general administration and personnel advantages to support CAF Reconstitution, but the existential threat of a lack of digital transformation can and must be viewed as equivalent to that of failed reconstitution. DND has started to see that some of their timelines, especially the procurement of Secret Cloud, does not align with the CAF’s needs for digital transformation. The slow progress on digital transformation due to a lack of sustained commitment by successive governments for DND/CAF digital modernization has put the CAF into an increasingly precarious position. A lack of long-term strategic thinking, planning, and poor implementation of existing plans has meant that the CAF is being forced to make deals with allied militaries to borrow and share capabilities to not only ensure it can operate in a modern digital environment, but also to maintain crucial relationships with allied militaries. We will likely see the CAF maintain some level of interoperability in the short term. In January 2024, CCSI Major General Peter Dawe stated that a “win” in the next 12 months would be to have a limited instance of connectivity in a Five Eyes secret cloud. He further stated: “That’s probably number one, because if we don’t achieve that, the technological interoperability gap could become very difficult to overcome.” Beyond this, he also stated that a three-year outlook would be to build on this with DSG, and force generators and employers. This was said not long before ADM(CIO) Raj Thuppal left the position and months before the announcement of the DSG, so these wins the CAF requires may not come in the time the military needs.
Recommendations:
- The DND/CAF must prioritize digital transformation as a key enabler of CAF Reconstitution and pan-domain operations. Aligning digital transformation with CAF Reconstitution would provide a strong mandate to use digital transformation to improve force readiness and offset personnel shortages.
- The Government of Canada must prioritize resolving the policy barriers to procuring Secret Cloud and its eventual procurement as it is fundamental to ensuring the DND/CAF’s successful digital transformation and adoption of PDC2. The Government of Canada should consider making this a core issue to address in mandate letters.
- If defense procurement is viewed as broken, then the procurement of digital, information and communication technologies is acutely broken. The slow pace at which defense procurement moves means that in many, if not most cases, the capability may be outdated or already in need of updates or improvements on initial delivery.
- Amid the tightening of budgets, including an increased examination of defence spending, it is imperative that the government does not delay or stop DND/CAF’s digital transformation or work to achieve pan-domain. The resource and economic efficiencies that can be brought by digital transformation can exceed any initial investments. Any reduction in funding or change to digital transformation plans will have major detrimental effects on DND/CAF and Canada’s relationship with core allies.
- Maintain the DSG as the authority on digital management and transformation to ensure continuity and long-term planning of DND/CAF digital transformation. To better inform and manage this process to enable pan-domain and PDC2, CCSI should have its mandate expanded to include an advisory role to DSG.
- Leverage the Defence Procurement Review to work with Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada to update Industrial and Technical Benefits to allow credits for investments in Canadian organizations for open research. This will strengthen Canada’s strategic studies community of practice, which can better support defence innovation and public literacy of the DND/CAF.
End Notes
1 Service-based commitments to the overall Project OLYMPUS include the US Army’s Project Convergence, US Navy’s Project Overmatch, and often falls under the Advanced Battle Management System for the US Air Force.
2 The most common approach to DCS, and the one being taken under PDC2, is the zero-trust model. This model means that by default, all users are not trusted but must verify to access any level of data.
About the Author
Alexander Rudolph is a Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. Alex’s research explores grand strategy, conflict, and competition in cyberspace. Alex incorporates the sociology of hackers, information security, and open-source intelligence methods to research the strategic thought and doctrine of cyber conflict and how it informs the creation of military cyber force structures.
Alex completed his MA in Political Science at Carleton University, where he wrote his thesis on the Canadian Armed Forces’ development of offensive cyber operations under Canada’s 2017 defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged. As one of Canada’s leading researchers of Canadian Armed Forces cyber defence policy, Alex created Canadian Cyber in Context, the first open research publication dedicated to following updates and providing in-depth analysis of Canadian cyber defence.
Outside of his academic work, Alex is an American-Canadian ex-pat and regularly contributes to Canadian and international discussions on cyber conflict. Alex has over a decade of experience as a project manager, analyst, and policy advisor for non-profits in public education and government relations. He works as a policy analyst and consultant in Ottawa, Canada.
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