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The Future of Canadian Defence Involvement in the Indo-Pacific
Insights from RIMPAC 2024

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Image credit: Aviator Conor R.G. Munn, Canadian Armed Forces Imagery Technician

POLICY PERSPECTIVE

A joint publication with

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by Alexander Salt
January 2025

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Table of Contents


Introduction

From June 27 to August 1, 2024, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), the world’s largest maritime military exercise. RIMPAC, held every two years since its inception in 1971, is organized and led by the United States Navy’s Pacific Fleet. Canada, alongside Australia, is one of the other founding members. At RIMPAC 2024, the CAF joined 29 other countries for the exercise, which involved 25,000 military personnel, over 40 surface vessels, and three submarines, making this one of the most significant defence activities for the CAF this year. Some of the additional participants at this year’s RIMPAC included Belgium, Brazil, Brunei, Chile, Columbia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Republic of Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tonga, and the United Kingdom.  The author joined a small group of strategic stakeholders who were invited by the Department of National Defence to observe a portion of the RIMPAC exercise to gain a deeper understanding of the role of Canada in the Indo-Pacific. This article offers some reflections on this year’s RIMPAC exercise, as well as what it means for the future of the CAF in the wider Indo-Pacific region and the shape of the regional challenges still to come.

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The Indo-Pacific Context

In 2022, the Trudeau government released Canada’s Strategy for the Indo-Pacific Canada’s first regional specific strategy. Canada has historically viewed itself as a North Atlantic country when conceptualizing foreign and defence policy, so the formal release of a strategy purposefully designed to shift some of that attention to the Pacific and Indian Oceans is a noteworthy step. The Indo-Pacific Strategy wisely declares that the region will be of major importance to Canada’s national interest, and identifies emerging threats to Canada, including the reemergence of Great Power competition with the rise of China as well as hostile regional actors such as North Korea. The strategy pledges investments in military capabilities and commits the CAF to a broad spectrum of tasks, including things like forward naval presence operations, freedom of navigation deployments and building interoperability with longstanding and new local partners.

Canada has been following the lead of the U.S. and other allies who have been gradually reorientating their strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific. In 2011, President Barack Obama announced that the U.S. would undergo a “Pivot to Asia”, in an attempt to prioritize resource allocation away from Europe and the Middle East in U.S. foreign and defence policy. While action on that Pivot has been mixed, gradual progress has unfolded, which was later entrenched with the release of the U.S. government’s own Pacific strategy in 2022, which highlighted the importance of military interoperability with Pacific allies including Canada, noting that, “[a]cross the region, the United States will work with allies and partners to deepen our interoperability and develop and deploy advanced warfighting capabilities as we support them in defending their citizens and their sovereign interests.” Some of these efforts have included the establishment of new defence relationships, including, notably, the AUKUS partnership, joining the U.S. with Australia and the United Kingdom in a partnership centred on technological sharing and regional cooperation.

While Canada is currently in discussion to potentially collaborate with AUKUS on technological development projects, it may never become a full member. Therefore, its most important security relationship in the region is based around Five Eyes (FVEY), an intelligence alliance between Canada, the U.S., Australia, United Kingdom, and New Zealand. While FVEY is centred first and foremost on intelligence sharing and cooperation, it has considerable potential for growth into more conventional defence matters as its members can have streamlined approaches to command and control due to security classification standardization. Indeed, FVEY members are essentially in position to drive much of the operational activity involving Canada across the region, as well as helping to foster technological development and integration across its members. Canada will need to continue to partner with these allies if it hopes to achieve its national-security goals in the Indo-Pacific. Deepening cooperation with the FVEY will allow Canada to learn more innovative approaches in areas like defence procurement as well as research and development of emerging technologies. We have seen from the early stages of AUKUS Pillar 2 how some members have been rapidly accelerating the development of the next generation of advanced weapons systems such as hypersonic missiles.  By enhancing cooperative approaches to defence modernization, Canada can upgrade its emerging capabilities, share knowledge and resources, and avoid redundant efforts.

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RIMPAC and Indo-Pacific Operations

In 2024, RIMPAC consisted of four phases, each designed to facilitate collaboration among the participating militaries. The exercise began with a Harbour Phase, where the various militaries built stronger working relationships and looked to establish command and control (C2) processes to overcome preexisting differences in procedures and equipment. Next was the Force Integration Training Phase, focused on practical C2 training, air and maritime engagement opportunities, and humanitarian assistance simulations. The third phase, known as the Tactical Phase, involved applying C2 practices in tactical engagements, including kinetic firing of munitions and a simulated amphibious assault. Lastly, the final phase emphasized analyzing the lessons learned during the previous phases.

RIMPAC is designed to enhance the ability of participating forces to conduct pan-domain operations. The exercise offers a wide range of opportunities, from the rare experience of live-fire exercises, such as sinking a hostile vessel, to overseeing amphibious landings and engaging in tactical operations like Anti-Submarine Warfare, as well as non-kinetic activities such as humanitarian missions. By participating in RIMPAC, Canada has gained invaluable experience in operational-level coalition leadership alongside some of the world’s most powerful allied navies in the Indo-Pacific. The exercise helps the CAF move toward achieving interoperability and interchangeability with key allies like the U.S. and other members of FVEY, while also providing experience working with less traditional partners like the Philippines. Additionally, RIMPAC offered ample opportunities for technological experimentation, allowing Canada to test new equipment and connected tactics alongside its allies.

Canada's contributions to RIMPAC 2024 includes over 700 personnel, consisting of sailors, soldiers, and aviators. This year, the focus was primarily on the RCN and RCAF, as the Army was largely engaged with Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia, supporting NATO’s conventional deterrence efforts. The RCN deployed HMCS Vancouver, a frigate; HMCS Max Bernays, an Arctic and Offshore Patrol Ship; and the support vessel MV Asterix. The RCAF contributed a Maritime CH-148 Cyclone helicopter and two CP-140 Aurora aircraft. Additionally, other elements of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) that participated included Medical Response Teams and members of the Maritime Warfare Centre.

CAF officers held key leadership roles in the command structure of RIMPAC. Notably, a Canadian officer served as the Combined Force Maritime Component Commander, leading the maritime element of the exercise, while another Canadian served as Deputy Commander of the Combined Air Operations Center, making them second in command of all air operations. Canadians held these leadership positions due to Canada’s long-standing involvement as a founding member of RIMPAC.

Beyond RIMPAC, the CAF has undertaken different operations in support of its emerging Indo-Pacific strategy. The most prominent of which is the CAF’s forward-presence mission, Operation HORIZON, which is focused on supporting allies and maintaining freedom of navigation in the wider Indo-Pacific and includes a passage through the Taiwan Strait. Operation HORIZON involves elements of the RCN, including a high-profile deployment of three warships, it also involves RCAF and Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) elements. The CAF is also participating in Operation NEON, a multinational effort to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea, aimed at curbing its nuclear program. Since 2018, Canada has periodically deployed military resources as part of Operation NEON, including ships and aircraft, to monitor and prevent North Korean maritime sanctions evasion, with the mission extended through April 2026.

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Firsthand Insights from RIMPAC 2024

The Canadian stakeholders who were invited to RIMPAC were privileged to visit the USS Carl Vinson, a Nimitz Class carrier at sea. Experiencing the power of U.S. carrier operations in person was nothing short of awe-inspiring. The sheer scale and capability of these forces are unparalleled, and it served as an immediate reminder of the limitations of scale for U.S. allies. A carrier is essentially a small floating city of steel housing thousands of personnel. Being on board demonstrates quite clearly the necessity of the industrial supply chain required to not only build naval vessels, but also sustain and maintain them during their operational lifetimes. The next generation of fighter aircraft were on full display during the carrier flight operations onboard the carrier. Visiting stakeholders were able to feel the heat of the F-35’s engine as they took off from the flight deck. Observing our allies already utilizing such advanced equipment underscored the importance of expediating their acquisition to enable for more rapid technological experimentation, modernized training and seamless operational deployments alongside allies. Procuring modern platforms as quickly as possible will help ensure the CAF’s relevancy in the Indo-Pacific during the coming decades. However, no other military power, including the other members of FVEY, can replicate the scale and capabilities of the U.S. Navy – nor should we attempt to do so. Overall, by recognizing the limitations of the CAF, Canada can better position itself as a valuable operational partner, secure our national interests, and ensure a sustainable presence in the wider Indo-Pacific.

Stakeholders were also given the opportunity to observe and tour the new P8A-Poseidon Multi Mission Aircraft, as well as the older CP-140 Aurora which is currently in service with the RCAF. The newer Poseidon aircraft presented a striking demonstration of the progress in automation and digital networking technology, in comparison to the aging Aurora which has been in service since 1980. Among the newer capabilities that the Poseidon possesses are advanced computer systems as well as an enhanced automated sonar buoy deployment system. This newer technology allows the Poseidon to operate with a smaller crew component compared to the Aurora, thus placing a lesser burden on personnel demands. Touring the aircraft demonstrated quite clearly that the gap between cutting-edge technology and older legacy systems is growing larger, underscoring the necessity for continuous modernization within the CAF. The Poseidon’s advanced systems not only improve mission efficiency but also enhance its interoperability with key allies, making it a crucial asset for future operations. Overall, this technological disparity highlights the need for Canada to continue to invest in and adopt new capabilities to remain effective in a rapidly evolving operational environment

One of the key takeaways from RIMPAC 2024 was the importance of interoperability, not just with the U.S., but with a broader range of partners from the Indo-Pacific, including South Korea and Japan. RIMPAC helped show multilateral operations remain a much greater challenge for several participants. For instance, some countries at RIMPAC seemed to operate more seamlessly with the U.S. on a bilateral level due to prior defence relationships but struggled when it came to multilateral engagements involving newer partners. Additionally, working with less technologically advanced states highlighted the considerable technical challenges that can hinder effective operational interoperability. A core element of successful future interoperability will be achieving robust and reliable digital connectivity including managing a growing influx of electronic data, while also addressing the various procedural and human element issues between newer coalition members.

RIMPAC has provided the CAF and its allies a wealth of lessons learned, particularly when it comes to emerging technologies. As technology rapidly evolves, so too must our strategies for integrating new tools and systems into modern military operations. The ability to process and disseminate information efficiently in a multilateral setting is crucial, especially as the number of data points and the digital complexity of such missions increase, which underscores the need to adapt and change preexisting methods.  Each country undertook their own lessons learned efforts during the exercise, some of which included the testing of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles during combat medical emergencies. It is essential that the CAF continue to technologically experiment as much as possible in realistic military exercise settings, as first hand operational experience is essential for military innovation to unfold.

A further broader lesson is that Canada is not alone in its defence modernization efforts, especially among those looking to contribute more to the Indo-Pacific. This year’s RIMPAC saw multiple European militaries participate to varying degree, however the limited scope and capabilities of some raised questions about their ability for any major sustained contribution to the region. Other countries were also needing to undergo major technological acquisitions for their armed forces. Against this setting, Canada is not as uniquely behind as it is often perceived in its efforts to upgrade its military. This realization should encourage Canadians to shift our perspective from self-criticism to recognizing the opportunities for future influence. By focusing on existing strengths paired with targeted areas for improvement such as intelligence sharing, Canada can make a substantial impact in regional security efforts.

Lastly, RIMPAC underscored the evolving and expansive nature of the character of threat in the Indo-Pacific, with China being the central focus. The scale and complexity of the challenges posed by China require a new level of technological innovation, strategic approaches, and financial investment. In particular, modernizing maritime air defence capabilities had clearly emerged as a substantial concern among many of the participating militaries at RIMPAC. This necessitates investments in newer advanced technology to counter these threats effectively. Ultimately, everything in the region runs through the lens of this threat, and it is imperative that Canada and its allies develop new means of military and diplomatic cooperation to address the challenges posed by China, as well as other adversaries.

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The Future of Canada and the Indo-Pacific

Canada’s RIMPAC participation has illuminated multiple areas of concern as Canada continues to expand its focus across the Indo-Pacific. Looking ahead, one of the most pressing issues is the need to accelerate the procurement process for defence material to ensure that vital equipment and platforms are delivered in a timely manner. As Canada navigates ongoing fiscal constraints and potential changes in government, ensuring that crucial projects like new submarines, the F-35, P8A Poseidon, and the Canadian Surface Combatants (CSC) proceed smoothly will be vital for maintaining the CAF’s operational capabilities. If successfully procured, the RCN and RCAF will have guaranteed their operational relevancy in the region by possessing cutting edge equipment for the foreseeable future, however, much work needs to be achieved in the meantime to allow that to come to pass. Canada urgently requires all of those platforms for today’s missions let alone tomorrow’s challenges. As such, Canada must explore every possible means of accelerating the acquisition of those platforms. The core question in relation to this is how can the CAF manage the gap between current needs and future acquisitions? Central to this challenge will be maintaining legacy equipment as part of the connected battlespace, which will require innovative approaches to keep it relevant and effective in modern operations. New technologies that can be integrated into older equipment that are quicker to acquire than the construction time of new large platforms will likely be essential in keeping the legacy equipment as relevant to the Indo-Pacific for as long as possible.

However, there also remains critical questions about how the CAF will approach operations in the region into the near future.  For example, significant uncertainty remains regarding the Canadian Army’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Does it have the right equipment, doctrine and operational methods to effectively contribute to this increasingly important theater? This question must be addressed to ensure the Army’s relevance alongside the RCN and RCAF. A further question relates to CANSOFCOM’s role in the Indo-Pacific? CANSOFCOM is certainly well-positioned to take advantage of new emerging technologies such as unmanned systems to act as a force multiplier and enhance their ability to shape the region in a variety of roles, including security force assistantship and counter-terrorism operations. The recent defence policy update, Our North, Strong and Free, announced the establishment of a new Cyber Command; this is another component of the CAF that will likely be able to utilize technology to expand Canada’s presence in the shorter term as it waits for the procurement of larger platforms to finalize in the coming decades.

Canada should also identify which new partners it aims to focus on when building military interoperability capabilities. South Korea and Japan are two of the most logical states to start with, given their democratic values and high-tech industrial sectors. The CAF should also consider continuing to work with a select group of smaller military powers as it has recently done with the Philippines, since it can allow Canada to engage new actors in the region in meaningful ways while demonstrating to the U.S. that Canada can be a useful partner beyond supplying equipment. 

The most important Canadian alliance in the Indo-Pacific will continue to be the FVEY, whose potential evolution into a more military-oriented command structure raises further questions about how the CAF’s equipment and doctrine integrates with other allies. While there is no doubt that advanced technology and digital systems—such as advanced sensors and integrated platforms—are crucial to future operations, Canada must continue to ensure that its contributions to FVEY are technologically advanced and aligned with the needs of its allies in order to achieve broader interoperability goals.

 As part of this process, the Canadian government could publicize more openly some of the interesting technological innovation that is being undertaken by the CAF and partners such as Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC). Other allies, such as the U.S. place much more emphasis and enthusiasm with publicly promoting their own defence research efforts which includes the work of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Organizations like DRDC are already doing important work in defence technological innovation, but their efforts are often underpublicized. By promoting DRDC's initiatives more actively, particularly within allied-to-allied contexts, Canada could significantly bolster its position as a key technological player, which in turn would help lessen the notion that Canada is not maintaining its share of the burden when it comes to defence contributions.

Finally, it is essential that Canada’s defence policy reflects its identity as a Pacific nation. Despite being a member of the Indo-Pacific community, Canadian leadership in the region is often overlooked. Building toward a stronger military presence and deeper engagement in the Indo-Pacific must be a core objective for Canadian defence policy in the years to come. By addressing procurement, fostering innovation, and expanding its alliance contributions, Canada can position itself as a more prominent partner in this increasingly vital area of global security.

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About the Author

Dr. Alexander Salt is Triple Helix’s Post-Doctoral Fellow. He has a PhD from the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies and an MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba. His doctoral dissertation explored the extent to which the U.S. military’s battlefield experience influenced post-war organizational innovation. His research has been awarded the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s Joseph-Armand Bombardier Doctoral Award, as well as a General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Memorial Dissertation Fellowship. He has published research relating to international security and defence policy with Strategic Studies Quarterly, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, and The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society. Previously, he was a Visiting Political Science Instructor with Macalester College and has also held positions with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, as well as the Consulate General of Canada in Dallas, Texas, and the Consulate General of Canada in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

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