Photo by Defence Imagery
by Alina Stailovska
April 2026
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Historical and Strategic Logic of Russian Expansionism
- What’s Next?
- The Historical Foundations of Russia’s Arctic Claims
- Contemporary Trends in Russia’s Arctic Assertiveness
- Russia’s Arctic Militarization
- Implications for Canada
- Conclusions and Lessons Learned
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
Canada’s Arctic Foreign Policy identifies Russia as the primary strategic challenge in the region. Moscow’s territorial claims, military buildup and confrontational rhetoric have transformed the Arctic from a zone of potential cooperation into an arena of geopolitical competition. As Canada’s policy notes, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has reshaped the broader security environment, with direct spillover effects for Arctic stability. Understanding Russia’s long-term strategic behaviour is therefore essential for assessing future risks to Canadian sovereignty and regional security.
This article argues that Russia’s actions in the Arctic are not isolated or reactive to contemporary events but reflect a consistent historical pattern of expansion supported by political coercion, economic pressure, militarization and ideological justification. For example, Russia’s behaviour in Ukraine, reflects the same strategic logic — gradual encroaching influence, legal and rhetorical claims, and eventual military consolidation — can also be observed in Russia’s Arctic posture. If left insufficiently deterred, similar methods may be employed to advance Moscow’s interests in the Canadian High North.
The article is structured around three core ideas. First, it outlines the historical and strategic foundations of Russian expansionism, highlighting recurring patterns in Moscow’s foreign policy, where Russia’s behaviour toward Ukraine illustrates how these methods operate in practice. Second, it analyzes Russia’s legal claims, military modernization and growing presence in the Arctic. Finally, it assesses the implications for Canada and proposes lessons for strengthening Canadian Arctic security and deterrence.
The Historical and Strategic Logic of Russian Expansionism
Russia’s aggressive foreign policy did not emerge in a vacuum; it is rooted in deep historical traditions and supported by a strong ideological foundation. From Russia’s perspective, this rule applies globally, whether in Europe or in the Arctic. It is impossible to understand or explain the logic of Russia’s contemporary actions and predict without examining its historical trajectory.
One of the clearest examples of Russia’s expansionist logic is the Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The partitioning process spanned 23 years (between 1772 and 1795) and unfolded in three phases, during which Russia systematically weakened the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth by exploiting its internal vulnerabilities — political strife, religious, national and linguistic tensions, economic hardship, military and administrative weakness, and resistance to reform. As a result, the commonwealth vanished from the political map of the world for 123 years and the territory was divided among other states, including Russia.
Similar dynamics played out elsewhere in Europe in the 18th century, and Russia has continued this model of expansion into the modern era. The same logic is clearly visible in the Ukrainian case. For centuries, Russia has viewed Ukraine as part of its natural sphere of influence, exercising control through political pressure and military force. After the collapse of the Russian Empire following World War I, Ukraine declared independence, but Russia refused to recognize its sovereignty and soon reasserted control under the new political form of the USSR.
After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the Russian Federation has systematically attacked Ukraine’s independence. This means that the current full-scale war is only a stage in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, rather than an isolated incident. This 35-year conflict has multiple overlapping phases. Since 1991, Russian foreign policy evolved from a strategic coercion and influence expansion phase, during which it had created economic dependencies and used them as a lever of political pressure to interfere in domestic and foreign policy, to a hybrid war phase in 2014 and ultimately to the conventional military invasion phase in February 2022. Each phase was accompanied by trade wars, propaganda campaigns, public declarations that emphasize the right to protect Russian interests and, at the same time, Russia continued to undergo increasing militarization.
What's Next
Having suffered significant military and economic damage as a result of its current war in Ukraine, Russia may seek a pause to rebuild its capabilities and prepare for future operations. A peace agreement could help reduce Western vigilance, ease sanctions and break international isolation, while low-intensity or hybrid warfare continues. Alternatively, Russia may redirect its resources to another region — the Arctic. Regardless, Russia’s future foreign policy actions will likely involve a mix of political, economic, military and ideological means.
Through economic means, Russia has pursued multiple strategies to weaken Ukraine and advance its own geopolitical goals. Russia has sought to degrade Ukraine by targeting its economy and critical infrastructure, obstructing foreign trade, and fostering corruption in key sectors. At the same time, it has attempted to evade international sanctions through political deals and bilateral agreements with sympathetic governments, including potential cooperation in the energy and mining sectors in the Arctic.
As with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the past, Russia is using political means to create internal problems to weaken Ukraine from within. It is doing this by inciting intolerance among social, political and national groups. Russia funds and supports proxy activists and non-government organizations (NGOs) that inflame ethnic, linguistic and religious tensions on the ground.
Russia’s military means is the result of decades of systematic preparation, sustained militarization and a coherent state strategy underpinned by a strong ideological foundation. This has enabled relative self-sufficiency in the war effort in Ukraine, including domestic financing and weapons production, with defence spending reaching an estimated 6-7% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2024. Correspondingly, it is necessary to highlight the fact that Russia is increasing military tension in different regions, to distract the attention and resources of countries away from Ukraine, foster destabilization among its adversaries, as well as realize its regional ambitions in the Arctic.
In addition to the three strategic approaches, Russia systematically uses an ideological foundation to justify military intervention. This effort has included engagement with the academic community, official government statements and large-scale propaganda targeting the general population, employing these instruments both domestically and externally.
Considering Russia’s territorial claims across much of its borders and Canada’s status as a second-order neighbour with disputed Arctic territories, Canada needs to have a strong interest in closely understanding Russia’s internal and foreign policies.
The Historical Foundations of Russia’s Arctic Claims
Over the past 25 years, Russia has also made multiple attempts to extend its territorial claims in the Arctic towards Canada. In 2001, the Russian Federation submitted a claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the Lomonosov Ridge, which Canada has also claimed since 2019. Control over the Lomonosov Ridge would strengthen political influence in the Arctic, enhance control over emerging trade routes, and provide access to additional natural resources. For these reasons, Canadian decision-makers should pay close attention to continued Russian activity in the Arctic.
Following the First World War, the Soviet Union officially asserted territorial rights in the Arctic in 1926. Soviet sovereignty was proclaimed over all lands and islands not belonging to other states, stretching northward from the Soviet coastline to the North Pole. It is important to note that this claim initially applied only to land and islands, not to waters and sea ice.
Over time, however, Soviet ambitions in the Arctic expanded. By the 1950-1960s, the USSR began asserting control over maritime areas and navigation routes. Particularly significant were declarations that certain Arctic seas constituted historic internal waters and strong responses to foreign vessels attempting to transit the Northern Sea Route.
In the 1980s, the USSR issued decrees establishing straight baselines along its Arctic coastline. As a result, several straits and waters previously considered international straits or high seas were reclassified as Soviet ‘internal waters.’
From the mid-1980s through the early 2000s, Soviet and later Russian rhetoric regarding the Arctic became noticeably softer. During this period, Russia was undergoing significant political and economic crises, which temporarily paused its assertive Arctic agenda.
However, in the early 2000s Russia began reverting in both rhetoric and action to a more active Arctic posture. In 2007, for example, a Russian expedition planted a national flag on the seabed near the Lomonosov Ridge. Though officially framed as a scientific mission, the act — and the subsequent rhetoric — clearly signaled a strategic assertion of sovereignty and claims to resources. Arthur Chilingarov, leader of the expedition and Vice Speaker of the Duma, declared that “the Arctic was and will remain Russian.” Moreover, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the Arctic’s strategic importance to Russia, stating that Moscow must anchor its claims there based on scientific data and international law. That year marked the beginning of a new era of Arctic competition, when symbolic acts (like planting a flag) became tools for buttressing later legal and political claims.
Contemporary Trends in Russia’s Arctic Assertiveness
By 2010, President Putin was declaring the Arctic a region of strategic Russian interest and essential to its national security and defence, while also stating that Russia remained open to dialogue on Arctic issues. During this period, Russia had implicitly hoped that other Arctic states would accept its expansion claims. However, after 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the rhetoric of the Russian leadership on Arctic policy began to shift and became increasingly military-oriented. For instance, Russia’s 2014 military doctrine recognizes the Arctic as a zone of special interest. In that same year, in a defence policy meeting, Putin declared: “We are systematically restoring military infrastructure in the Arctic.”
In 2016, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asserted that ensuring the security of the Northern Sea Route could not be achieved without revitalizing military infrastructure. Meanwhile, Admiral Vladimir Korolev, Commander of the Russian Navy, publicly reported to President Putin that Russia’s naval grouping in the Arctic and world oceans had grown to 100 ships or more — calling this force buildup “unprecedented.” Then, in 2018, in his address to the Federal Assembly, Putin stated that Russia was strengthening its Arctic military infrastructure to protect its interests in the strategically vital region.
In 2023, Putin consistently framed the Arctic as a strategic priority linking energy resources, logistics, and national security, while emphasizing the need to strengthen Russia’s military and economic presence in the region. While in 2024, Putin stated that Russia’s territory would grow via the Arctic, where the main reserves of the country’s resources are located. And Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that Russia is fully prepared to defend its interests in the Arctic politically, militarily and in military technical terms.
A highly illustrative moment came with Putin’s speech at the 2025 International Arctic Forum in Moscow where he asserted that Russia will not permit any encroachments upon its sovereignty and will defend its interests in the Arctic. He also stated that Russia’s objectives in the Arctic region must be of historical scale, planned over decades and centuries. Against a backdrop of increasing militarization of Russia’s Arctic territories, Putin seeks to blame NATO countries for treating the High North as potential staging grounds for conflict, while claiming Russia has never posed a threat in the Arctic. At the same time, he also declared that the number of Russian military personnel in the Arctic zone will increase.
Combined, this rhetoric presents a justification and legitimation of Russia’s growing military presence in the Arctic, as well as shifting blame to others. A similar pattern was observable in the Ukrainian conflict, where the Ukrainian side was accused of fabricated provocations — claims used by Russia to justify its military invasion.
This Russian strategy is reflected in Russia’s submissions, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. These applications illustrate Russia’s steadily expanding territorial claims in the Arctic region.
Russia first submitted a claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2001, proposing an extension of its existing 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean. The initial submission was adopted by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in 2002. In 2015, Russia submitted a revision to include part of the Eurasian Basin and the Central American Basin consisting of the Makarov Basin and Complex of Central Arctic Submarine Elevations, which includes the Lomonosov Ridge, Podvodnikov Basin, Mendeleev-Alpha Rise, Mendeleev and Chukchi Basins, and Chukchi Plateau. In 2021 Russia submitted two Addenda to its 2015 submission to extend its territories to Gakkel Ridge, Nansen and Amundsen Basins, the Amerasian Basin’s part of the Lomonosov Ridge, the Alpha Ridge, the Mendeleev Rise, the Makarov Basin, the Canadian Basin, as well as the Amundsen Basin as a part of the Eurasian Basin. Then in 2023 Russia submitted additional revisions to its 2015 submission to include surrounding shelf and ridge lines.
Russia's Arctic Militarization
Russia’s militarization activity in the Arctic has remained consistent. While it has occasionally paused or put projects on standby, for nearly a century Russia has built and continues to maintain military bases and a naval fleet in the region, ensuring a substantial and enduring presence.
The USSR’s (and later Russia’s) military infrastructure in the Arctic began forming in the 1930s when the central agency for Arctic development was established which began the process of laying out aviation routes, expanding polar aviation and creating the Northern Fleet. By the 1940s, fortifications, air bases and air defence points were established along the northern coastline. In the 1950s to 1960s the Arctic served as a Cold War bastion. The region was the shortest route for aircraft and missiles between the USSR and the United States, hence massive build‑outs of airfields, radar installations and air defence infrastructure along the Arctic perimeter, nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya, and for the first time the operation of a nuclear submarine in an Arctic environment. The peak of militarization occurred during the 1960s to 1980s. At that time, by various estimates, the USSR had approximately 200 airfields and seaplane stations north of 60° latitude, about 29 airfields suitable for long‑range strategic bombers located between Kamchatka, the Kola Peninsula, Chukotka and the Central Arctic. There were five bases for nuclear submarines, radar and early warning systems along the entire northern coast, and underground bunkers in Novaya Zemlya and Taymyr.
In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to the decline and degradation of Arctic infrastructure. Most of the military bases were closed or mothballed, and many radar installations and air defence infrastructures were dismantled. However, after nearly 20 years of relative inactivity, Russia has returned to militarizing the Arctic.
From 2014, following the adoption of a new military doctrine, the gradual restoration and modernization of military infrastructure began. In that same year the Northern Strategic Command (Ob’yedinennoe Strategicheskoe Komandovanie “Sever”) was created, with a mission of controlling Russian Arctic territory. Military bases, airfields and air defence systems were restored on a large scale. In 2015, it was reported that the deployment and equipping of 6 Arctic military bases had been completed: Kotelny Island, Alexandra, Sredny, the settlement of Rogachevo, Cape Schmidt and Wrangel Island. According to a report by The Simons Foundation, Russia had about 32 continuously attended military sites in the Arctic region in total.
All 6 bases are included among the 32 continuously attended sites, but not all 32 sites are full-scale bases. Arctic military bases are large, multi-functional military installations. They are equipped to accommodate troops, vehicles, and heavy equipment, and may include facilities for logistics, ammunition storage, and command centers. These bases are intended for long-term presence and operations in the Arctic. Examples include the Pechora base and the Flagman base.
Russian Military sites, in contrast, represent a broader category of Arctic facilities. They are not necessarily large bases and can include airfields, observation posts, radar stations, or storage facilities that are continuously staffed, although personnel numbers are typically smaller than at a full-scale base. These sites are used for territorial control, monitoring, and logistical support. Examples include small radar stations, airfields in remote locations, and minor outposts on islands.
The commander of the Northern Fleet has stated that each Russian Arctic base is capable of operating autonomously without resupply for 12 to 18 months. As for Russia’s Arctic icebreaker fleet, by early 2024 it consisted of 41 vessels: 7 nuclear and 34 diesel electric. The International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) similarly reports that Russia has “around 40 icebreakers, some of them nuclear.” Most of them are outdated, having been built primarily in the 1970s and 1980s, but the Russian government is seeking to replace them with new vessels under a new state project. By 2030, the plan is to have a flotilla of nuclear-powered icebreakers built to ensure year-round navigation along the Northern Sea Route. Some of the icebreakers are planned to combine the capabilities of a tugboat, icebreaker and patrol vessel and will be armed with Klub-K missile systems and A-190 naval guns.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia has reopened approximately 50 formerly closed Soviet era military posts including refurbishing 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue stations. Russian special forces units are also part of an Arctic Brigade and have been deployed to the region for exercises and training.
In 2020, Putin approved the Decree on the Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic through 2035, which pledged an increase in traffic along the Northern Sea Route as well as the prevention of military actions against the Russian Federation in the Arctic.
Since 2014, Russian military exercises have been characterized as having increased operational tempo, scale and testing of nuclear weapons. Emphasis is placed on short warning time and strategic and tactical mobility. For example, during the Ocean Shield Exercise 2019 Russia trained its bastion defence capabilities, and while exercising in the Baltic Sea, the Northern Fleet entered the Northern Sea and engaged in live-fire demonstrations in the Norwegian Sea. These efforts demonstrate a clear forward line of defence to secure the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom-Norway (GIUK-N) gap and block the English Channel. The purpose of these exercises is to display Russia’s ability to project power beyond its Arctic waters and assert maritime control. The value of the above example lies in the fact that a similar pattern of Russian operations was observed in 2018 in the case of Ukraine when Russia seized control of the Kerch Strait — a narrow maritime artery connecting the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov — effectively closing off access to the Sea of Azov. Since 2014, Russia has conducted more than seven large-scale military exercises, each involving between 8,000 and 30,000 troops, incorporated newly designed Arctic military equipment, engaged Russia’s strategic nuclear forces (such as nuclear-powered submarines), launched two nuclear warheads in the Barents Sea, and several other ballistic missiles.
Thus, one can observe a consistent behavioural pattern with Russian policy: territorial claims are first articulated in rhetorical and legal terms — via official statements, legislation and unilateral interpretations of international law — and then reinforced through the deployment of military assets. A clear example is the militarization of the Northern Sea Route: after Russia declared it ‘internal waters,’ a substantial number of military assets were deployed along the route, primarily on both flanks of the NSR.
Given that Russia has already outlined territorial claims in the Arctic that overlap with zones also claimed by Canada and several other states, one can infer that behind the diplomatic and legal rhetoric lies an eventual escalation toward strengthening military presence. The realization of this scenario depends primarily on Russia’s available resources and political will — it is, in essence, a matter of priorities and time.
Implications for Canada
The situation in the Arctic is made more complex for Canada by the erosion of the legitimacy of international law and the institutions that have underpinned regional relations since the Second World War — undermined, in part, by the war in Ukraine. At the same time, many countries, including those in the Global South, are calling for a revision of the rules of international engagement. Even the United States, which has long acted as a global security guarantor, appears reluctant to uphold existing norms, instead offering Russia deals under which Moscow retains the territory it seized in Ukraine, providing a potent incentive for Russia to seize further territory elsewhere without bearing negative consequences.
Moreover, Canada’s vulnerability in the Arctic is compounded by the fact that it lies outside the zone of responsibility of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This means that the defence of Canada’s Arctic territories falls primarily to the Canadian military with entities such as Joint Task Force North and the Arctic and Offshore Patrol Vessels — and only secondarily through cooperation under the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).
On one hand, Canada’s military infrastructure in the Arctic is currently not as strong as Russia’s. Canada will have to rely on US assistance, a country with which relations are tense due to President Donald Trump’s trade disputes and inflammatory rhetoric. Moreover, the United States and Canada have long disagreed on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, and this issue could become more acute under the Trump administration.
On the other hand, this situation gives Canada decision-making autonomy but also imposes a requirement to invest in its own infrastructure, forces, intelligence, radar, logistics and presence (such as sovereignty patrols and permanent operations).
Furthermore, Canada’s Arctic security challenges are compounded by China’s engagement, which uses the Russian Federation as a proxy in its conflict with the United States and in pursuit of its Arctic interests. The Northern Sea Route represents a strategic interest for China as a critical alternative route for trade with the European Union. Thanks to reductions in transit time by nearly 1.5 times compared with the traditional route through the Suez Canal, the NSR allows China to optimize logistics, reduce costs and enhance the resilience of its foreign trade corridors. Given tense relations between China and many Western countries, including the United States and Canada, Beijing’s access to Arctic maritime routes is substantially constrained. Under these conditions, Russia remains China’s only real partner capable of providing transit access to the NSR and equipped to ensure its navigational safety and support.
Moreover, by observing the Russian-Ukrainian war and the behaviour of other states in that conflict, China is learning the new boundaries of what is possible — in other words, understanding what it might attempt, what it must avoid, and how far territorial ambition can be asserted under the current geopolitical climate.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
Firstly, the threat posed by the Russian Federation in the Arctic — as in Europe — is long term and structural. Historical patterns suggest that Russia rarely abandons strategic objectives and almost never relinquishes territories it claims as its own. The ongoing militarization of the Arctic by Moscow underscores this trajectory.
At this stage, Russia has already delineated its territorial claims in the Arctic through the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. However, there is no certainty that these claims will remain limited in scope. On the contrary, they may well expand further as Russia continues to test geopolitical boundaries and assess the level of pushback from other Arctic actors.
Moreover, the increasing attacks of Russian drones on European cities confirm the belief that Russia does not plan to stop. It is likely only a matter of time and available resources before Moscow seeks to deepen its territorial presence in the Arctic.
Secondly, underestimating the Russian Federation as an adversary is a strategic mistake. Despite possessing fewer resources than Western countries, Russia has significant compensatory advantages: strategic persistence; a systemic approach; and the ability to concentrate limited resources to achieve long-term objectives. As an authoritarian state, it can also make decisions rapidly, without being constrained by internal democratic processes, unlike countries with open political systems.
Moreover, Russia can afford to disregard factors such as public opinion, electoral accountability, international law and environmental standards. It is willing to absorb substantial and prolonged economic costs in pursuit of political and geopolitical goals — as evidenced by its war against Ukraine and the large-scale militarization of the Arctic. These costs are largely externalized on to society, without the need for political justification or transparency.
Canada, as a democratic and rule-based state, cannot act in the same manner. However, precisely for this reason, it must take these characteristics of Russian behaviour into account and begin developing effective deterrence and adaptation mechanisms now in order to respond to future challenges.
Thirdly, a state’s security is directly proportional to its ability to control key aspects of its strategic environment. The more effectively a state can manage its economy, defence industry, technological development and military capabilities, the greater its strategic autonomy — and, consequently, its security.
The war in Ukraine offers a compelling example. Lacking a fully independent arms production capacity, Ukraine has become reliant on military assistance from Western partners. This dependence has, at times, allowed external actors to influence not only the pace but also the nature of Ukraine’s military operations. Such a situation inherently limits the country’s sovereignty and its ability to act with full strategic freedom.
In matters of national security, self-reliance must be the foundation. Allies can provide critical support, but they should be seen as complementary — not primary — guarantors of sovereignty. As the Ukrainian case illustrates, a capable and well-equipped military remains the most reliable safeguard of national security and territorial integrity.
Fourthly, a state must develop and maintain its defence capabilities at a level sufficient to create conditions under which potential adversaries would not risk initiating aggression. One of the enabling factors behind Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine was the perception — and, to some extent, the reality — of Ukraine’s military weakness at the time. Insufficient defence capabilities created a strategic vulnerability that Russia was willing to exploit.
If this model is projected on to the Arctic context, a clear implication emerges: Canada must ensure that it is strong enough militarily and strategically to deter any potential hostile actions from Russia. Effective deterrence in the Arctic, as elsewhere, depends not only on alliances and diplomatic tools but also on credible national defence capacities that signal that there would be a high cost for any form of aggression.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including (in partnership with the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy), trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
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