Photo by: Dillan Payne

POLICY PERSPECTIVE

by Michelle Leslie

September 2026

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Table of Contents

• Introduction
• The Strategic Case for Nuclear
• Canada’s Current Position
• A Framework for Canada’s Nuclear Export Strategy: Four Pillars, One Coordinating Structure
• The Human Factor
• Uranium and Fuel Services
• Supply Chain
• Execution: Canada’s Opportunity to be Export-Savvy
• Policy Changes: Driving the Export Opportunity
• Financing: Risk, Social License and Stacking Instruments
• The Nuclear Export Financing and Commercial Framework: Four Requirements
• Looking Ahead 
• About the Author
• Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Introduction

Nuclear power is in the middle of the largest investment cycle it has experienced in a generation. Annual investment in new reactors and life extensions has increased almost 50% since 2020 to roughly US$65 billion a year and could approach $120 billion by 2030 if announced pledges hold. Today, 80 reactors are under construction worldwide; the highest number since 1990. At COP28, more than 20 countries signed a declaration to triple global nuclear capacity by 2050, the first time nuclear had been formally endorsed at a UN climate summit. That scale of deployment is increasingly turning domestic construction programs into export platforms, and Canada is positioned to participate in this competition for exports.

Canada enters this moment with advantages few countries can match. It produces roughly 24% of the world’s uranium, with about 90% exported. Ontario Power Generation’s (OPG) BWRX-300 project at Darlington is positioned to become the first commercial Small Modular Reactor (SMR) in a G7 country. Bruce Power’s Unit 3 refurbishment was completed seven months ahead of schedule and $150 million under budget. In May 2026, Ontario advanced the proposed 4,800 MW Bruce C project, which an Ontario Chamber of Commerce report estimated could add up to $238 billion to Canada’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and support about 18,900 net-new jobs annually during construction. Early planning is also underway for OPG’s Wesleyville site, where assessments indicate there is potential for up to 10,000 MW of new nuclear generation.

Canada’s Nuclear Energy Strategy, released in June 2026, signals clear intent to convert those strengths into market share: at least four new international markets for CANDU technology by 2040; engagement with up to 10 new nuclear entrant countries over the next 15 years; and Canadian supply-chain participation in at least five non-CANDU reactor or SMR projects by 2040.

This paper argues that Canada has a unique opportunity to become a leading exporter of nuclear technology, fuel services and expertise, but realizing that opportunity will require a coordinated national export strategy that aligns financing, regulation, diplomacy, workforce development and industry. The technology, talent and supply chain all exist. What is missing is the structure connecting them into coordinated action before international competitors seize the opportunity first.

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The Strategic Case for Nuclear

The resurgence of nuclear energy is not solely a climate story. It is an energy-security story, a local economic development story, and increasingly the defining infrastructure story of the Artificial Intelligence (AI) era.

The clearest energy-security natural experiment is in Europe. France, which kept building its nuclear fleet through the 1970s and 1980s, entered the 2022 energy crisis with roughly 70% of its electricity from nuclear and limited exposure to the gas-price shock that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Germany, having shut its last three reactors in April 2023, had spent the prior decade deepening its reliance on Russian gas, an exposure that became a strategic liability. Canada’s Nuclear Energy Strategy outlines a micro-reactor program aimed partly at powering remote Arctic and northern communities, reflecting the same logic: nuclear energy is increasingly aligned with defence and sovereignty strategies, not just climate ones.

The economic case is equally compelling. A grid-scale reactor typically operates for 60 to 80 years including refurbishment, meaning a single project decision locks in multiple generations of local jobs. Constellation Energy’s roughly $1.6 billion restart of Three Mile Island Unit 1, under a 20-year power purchase agreement with Microsoft, is projected to add $16 billion to Pennsylvania’s GDP.

Perhaps the most visible driver right now is AI. Global data-centre electricity demand is expected to reach roughly 565 terawatt-hours by the end of this year, comparable to the combined annual demand of Spain and Australia, and nearly one-fifth of the world’s entire nuclear output. The compute build-out driving the AI race consumes electricity on the scale of a mid-sized industrial economy, and that demand does not pause for peak-load hours or windless days. It needs reliable, always-on baseload power. Energy-price volatility from conflict in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz has sharpened that need further, pushing oil prices higher and reminding markets why capacity factors matter. Nuclear plants routinely run above 90%.

President Donald Trump’s signal that AI and data-centre operators would effectively have to bring their own power to the grid captured the pressure driving hyperscalers into direct power purchase and equity relationships with reactor developers.

Headlines include:

• Meta has committed to up to 6.6 GW of nuclear capacity. 
• Google’s arrangement with Kairos Power is the world’s first corporate agreement for multiple deployments of a single advanced reactor design. 
• Amazon’s relationship with X-energy includes a $500 million (USD) investment. X-energy went public in April 2026, raising roughly $1.02 billion (USD) at a $9.1 billion valuation, the largest public listing by an advanced nuclear company. 

Allied governments are also advancing. The Sapporo 5, consisting of Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, have collectively mobilized more than US$5.6 billion to expand allied uranium conversion, enrichment capacity and strengthen nuclear fuel supply chains. The critical question is no longer whether demand exists, but whether capital can be mobilized through financing tools, guarantees and long-term offtakes to bring projects to market. 

This investment cycle is becoming an export race, and Canada is positioned at the intersection, seeking both domestic investment and international contracts. This reflects a broader shift toward treating nuclear fuel security as a strategic industrial priority. Yet, existing trade architecture, including the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), was not designed around nuclear fuel-cycle resilience, creating an opportunity in future reviews to explore nuclear-specific cooperation, including streamlined treatment for nuclear goods, regulatory coordination and greater alignment of export-control processes.

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Canada’s Current Position

Canada already has many of the required instruments: Export Development Canada’s (EDC) financing and political risk insurance; the Canada Account for transactions deemed in the national interest but beyond conventional EDC risk appetite; Canada Commercial Corporation’s (CCC) government-to-government contracting capabilities; and provincial support mechanisms that can help de-risk domestic reference projects. The gap is not creating new tools; it is sequencing them into a coherent export strategy.

Canada’s competitors do not operate this way. Korea’s KEPCO, France’s EDF and Russia’s Rosatom all integrate technology, diplomacy, financing and advocacy into a single export strategy. Financing is most effective when it is built into Canada’s broader strategic commitments from the outset, including NATO obligations, trusted-supplier status and partnerships with Poland and Romania. Canada already has an active nuclear cooperation agreement with Poland, longstanding CANDU ties with Romania, and maintains an existing nuclear cooperation framework with South Korea through the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC).

The cost of continued fragmentation is not hypothetical. With four separate Canadian actors advocating in one market in the same year, the most likely outcome is not failure but something more damaging: Canada repeatedly presenting itself as a credible partner while competitors with unified negotiating structures secure the contracts Canada was better positioned to deliver. 

South Korea’s own KEPCO-KHNP split resulted in years of internal friction before it began to threaten the country’s nuclear export prospects. Canada’s fragmentation is arguably worse; extending not only across departments and Crown corporations but also across two orders of government. Although this has not yet been tested by a loss in a major competition, it is increasingly likely to be as international competition intensifies.

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A Framework for Canada’s Nuclear Export Strategy: Four Pillars, One Coordinating Structure

Canada’s nuclear export opportunity rests on four pillars: exportable technology; a deployable workforce; a sovereign fuel supply; and a supply chain capable of delivering at scale. A gap in any one of these pillars becomes a gap in Canada’s offer to a foreign buyer. A compelling technology offering paired with an uncertain fuel supply introduces a risk that buyers will price heavily, while a skilled workforce without a mobility framework is expertise that remains at home. Together, these four pillars constitute Canada’s exportable offer. The coordinating structure is what turns that offer into a completed transaction.

Technology, workforce, uranium and supply chains are not separate policy files, they are one interconnected system that federal and provincial governments should coordinate, not merely fund. Reactors and fuel-cycle facilities are federally regulated and federally financed through instruments like Investment Tax Credits (ITCs), most directly the Clean Technology ITC, a refundable credit covering up to 30% of capital costs on eligible property including small modular reactors, and the Clean Electricity ITC, which covers nuclear fission generation without the capacity or component restrictions attached to the Clean Technology ITC, and EDC, whose two-year, $5 billion Trade Impact Program offers exporters trade credit insurance, export guarantees and foreign exchange guarantees. 

Electricity systems, permitting for many project components and utility ownership are provincial responsibilities, meaning both federal and regional governments all have a legitimate claim to leading pieces of this file. The coordination structure proposed below must explicitly assign one federal lead for the export relationship while preserving the operational role of the provincial utilities, otherwise the same fragmentation that frustrates foreign buyers today simply reappears as federal-provincial friction instead of interdepartmental friction.

Canada’s exportable assets consist of two ownership models with CANDU and Westinghouse. CANDU, Canada’s domestically developed reactor technology is owned by AECL, a federal Crown corporation, and exclusively licensed to Atkins Realis, a global engineering firm, which acquired the commercial reactor division in 2011 and now markets CANDU internationally, including the new CANDU MONARK design and a first US licensing bid. Under this model, Canada keeps the Intellectual Property (IP) and the government sets export priorities without owning delivery risk. Canada also has a stake in Westinghouse, one of the world’s largest nuclear technology companies, through Cameco and Brookfield’s 2023 US$7.9 billion acquisition.  However, the AP1000, Westinghouse’s flagship reactor design, remains US technology, governed by the 10 CFR Part 810 / Atomic Energy Act Section 123 framework, meaning any sale is subject to US export control law rather than Canadian export policy alone. This matters commercially: Canadian companies can participate in AP1000 projects and benefit from Westinghouse’s global pipeline, but Canada does not control the export terms the way it does with CANDU.

Whichever reactor a buyer chooses, AP1000 or MONARK, the project will require fuel-cycle infrastructure to support it. For CANDU that means heavy water production; for AP1000 and most other reactor designs, it means access to enriched uranium. Canada has capabilities relevant to both, but they are not yet fully developed or coordinated into a single export offer, which is precisely the gap the strategy proposed here is designed to close.

Canada has identified its strongest technology export segment deliberately. CANDU’s natural-uranium advantage matters most to a specific buyer profile: new-to-nuclear states without existing enrichment access or the diplomatic appetite to depend on someone else’s supply. More than 30 countries are actively pursuing their first nuclear builds, and Canada’s fuel-cycle independence is a genuine differentiator for exactly this audience. That is a real and growing segment, but it is not the whole market. Most reactors currently under construction worldwide, including nearly all Chinese, Korean and Western new builds, run on enriched fuel. Canada’s export pitch works best when it is targeted at the newcomer segment specifically, rather than marketed as a universal advantage.

But technology is only the opening of the conversation. A buyer who chooses a Canadian reactor needs to know whether Canada can staff the build, secure the fuel and deliver the components. That is where the next three pillars either close the sale or reopen the risk.

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The Human Factor

Business continuity depends on workforce resiliency just as much as it depends on capital, and Canada’s nuclear workforce is approaching a structural inflection point that the export strategy cannot afford to treat as a domestic human resources (HR) problem.

The Canadian Nuclear Association (CAN) projects shortages beginning around 2030, with 20-31% of the current workforce reaching retirement age. The University Network of Excellence in Nuclear Engineering (UNENE) already runs a Master’s and Diploma program across five Ontario universities and is building a micro-credentials program of stackable, exportable credit. Ontario Tech and Humber Polytechnic have formed the Canadian Clean Energy Workforce Consortium in direct response.

Credential recognition is a foundational under-appreciated bottleneck. Engineering licensure in Canada is granted province-by-province, and mutual recognition agreements with foreign bodies are inconsistent, often requiring recertification that can take months, for Canadians going abroad and foreign engineers moving to Canada. Nuclear-specific mutual recognition agreements, starting with the UK given the existing OPG-UK Atomic
Energy Authority (AEA) relationship, would let people move as fast as capital.

The same logic extends to tradespeople, not just engineers, since projects will require far more trades labour than engineering labour. A nuclear-specific immigration stream, including trades and provisions letting workers bring families rather than face repeated short postings, paired with a roster of Canadian workers pre-cleared for deployment abroad, would let training obligations be met by sending people, not just curricula.

A workforce that cannot be deployed internationally is a competitive liability, not just an operational one, and a buyer who cannot see a credible Canadian staffing plan will reprice the technology offer accordingly. That repricing gets sharper still if fuel security is also uncertain, which is where the third pillar becomes critical.

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Uranium and Fuel Services

Canada’s uranium advantage, centred in Saskatchewan’s Athabasca Basin, extends beyond the scale of its resources and production to the regulatory processes governing how new mines are approved. Yet in practice, mine development and reactor construction timelines are planned and regulated independently, treated as separate infrastructure decisions rather than sequenced components of the same supply chain, when the fuel-cycle logic connecting them demands they be treated together. Major Canadian uranium projects can spend close to a decade in impact assessment and licensing processes alone. Denison’s Wheeler River project took roughly seven years from the commencement of the federal environmental assessment in 2019 to receiving a CNSC site preparation and construction licence in 2026.

Canada can reduce timelines by treating mine permitting as infrastructure connected to reactor construction schedules, sequencing environmental assessment milestones against known plant fuel-load dates rather than processing each independently – a prioritization fix, not a process redesign.

Canada also holds a first-mover advantage in fusion fuel that deserves far more prominence in the export strategy than it currently receives. Canada is the only country with genuine commercial-scale experience producing, handling and storing tritium at volume, a byproduct of CANDU heavy water, with OPG holding the only commercial-scale production on the planet. In September 2025, OPG signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UK Atomic Energy Authority to supply tritium for the UK’s STEP fusion program, and Canada’s fusion initiative, UNITY-2 at Chalk River, is in a genuine first-mover position that almost no competitor can touch. This is not a future opportunity. It is a current one, and it should be named explicitly in Canada’s export offer.

Sovereign fuel supply is what makes Canada’s technology offer genuinely independent. A buyer who chooses Canada is not trading one dependency for another. But a credible fuel supply means nothing if the supply chain cannot manufacture and deliver what the project actually requires. That is the fourth pillar, and the one most invisible to foreign buyers without a coordinated export structure to surface it.

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Supply Chain

The Organization of Canadian Nuclear Industries (OCNI), the sector’s supplier association, supports over 250 members, spanning the full depth of the chain from precision machine shops and fabricators, to engineering and construction firms, universities and Indigenous business partners. Canada’s nuclear supply chain runs from Saskatchewan-mined uranium through to conversion and fuel fabrication.

It also extends past power generation. CANDU reactors supply roughly half the world’s cobalt-60, used to sterilize medical devices and treat cancer. The McMaster Nuclear Reactor produces roughly half the world’s iodine-125, used to treat prostate cancer; and growing neutron-beam research programs can support materials science for energy and health applications alike. 

A supply chain of this depth and breadth is a genuine competitive advantage, but only if a foreign buyer can see it, engage it and trust that it will show up as a unified offer. That is precisely what the coordinating structure proposed in the next section is designed to deliver. The four pillars are only as strong as the structure connecting them, and that structure is what Canada is currently missing.

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Execution: Canada's Opportunity to be Export-Savvy

This is a story of opportunity. The technology, talent and supply chain all exist. What is missing is the structure connecting them into coordinated action before the competition wins first. 

Canada needs a single export coordination body, something like the unified Team Korea structure South Korea adopted in 2026, with authority to convene all relevant parties including mining partners. This is needed since mine-to-reactor timelines cannot be sequenced properly without mining in the room from the start. The mandate is to pre-qualify markets, pre-package financing and present one unified Team Canada.

The value of unification is not hypothetical. Over the past 18 months, Canada made four separate visits to Poland on overlapping nuclear files: Natural Resources Minister Tim Hodgson traveled to Warsaw to advocate for CANDU; Saskatchewan ran its own trade mission, signing its own MOU via Cameco with Poland’s Mazovian Voivodeship; Ontario ran a distinct trade mission to Poland and Estonia; and a federal Parliamentary Secretary made a defence-export visit that also touched on nuclear cooperation. Four Canadian actors, one file, one country, one year – this is exactly the fragmentation that this structure would fix. One lead negotiator, backed by the technical, financing and diplomatic pieces already assembled, turns the conversation with a buyer into signed deals.

Success here should be publicly measurable, not just declared. A simple scorecard could track the number of priority markets with pre-cleared financing terms, the number of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements initiated before, not after, a live bid, and the days elapsed between a market being named a priority and the coordinating body’s first joint engagement. Such a scorecard would let anyone, including foreign buyers, see whether coordination is actually happening or just being promised again. Right now, no such mechanism exists, which means the coordination problem this paper describes could persist for years without ever being visibly measured as a failure. 

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Policy Changes: Driving the Export Opportunity

1. Resolve export licensing before bids, not during them. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements and CNSC/Global Affairs sign-off currently happen country by country, rather than being systematically sequenced against the Nuclear Energy Strategy’s priority markets. If Poland is a named priority, the bilateral agreement, export control clearances and CNSC pre-licensing engagement should begin the moment Poland is named, not after a Canadian vendor is already advocating in a live procurement. Aligning federal licensing timelines with provincial utility readiness is a scheduling fix, achievable through a standing federal-provincial working group rather than new legislation.
2. Choose Canada’s Fuel-Cycle Path. Heavy water is arguably the more logical near-term public investment, since it is already being scoped and it serves Canada’s own CANDU build-out regardless of export outcomes. Enrichment makes more sense as a trade partnership than a domestic build, given the capital intensity and the head start of competitors. The capital case for either resembles what draws Cameco toward the full offering: its 2023 acquisition of Westinghouse alongside its strategic backing of Global Laser Enrichment’s enrichment work with the US Department of Energy (DOE), spanning reactor technology and fuel-cycle infrastructure as a long-duration, contracted-revenue asset class that increasingly reads as infrastructure investment rather than mining alone.
3. Give EDC a nuclear-specific mandate and point the CCC at it too. EDC’s existing tools were never built with nuclear specifically in mind. A workable mandate would mean EDC offering equity co-investment, not just debt, the way EDF has taken direct equity stakes in reactor exports to China and the UK rather than relying on loan guarantees alone, with the CCC’s government-to-government contracting mandate extended explicitly to nuclear so buyers see one sovereign-backed Canadian offer. That is the scale Canada is now up against. In June 2026, the US DOE committed US$17.5 billion in loans to accelerate 10 Westinghouse AP1000 reactors, on top of an earlier US$80 billion Commerce Department deal.
4. Standardize supplier and worker qualifications together. A certified worker should be export-ready without recertifying from scratch, and this should extend beyond engineers to trades, paired with mobility provisions that let workers take families with them rather than face repeated short rotations. CUSMA’s professional-mobility list already includes ‘engineer’ among its 63 eligible occupations, unchanged since NAFTA in 1994, but does not cover trades, including welders and pipe fitters, which would need to be added as a new category, not assumed already covered.
5. Use existing trade and security relationships as a multiplier. Canada’s 15 free trade agreements and Five Eyes/NATO relationships are underused as export infrastructure. NATO’s DIANA program, with its dual-use tech accelerator, names ‘energy and propulsion’ among its challenge areas, worth exploring for Generation IV micro-reactor and fuel-cycle technologies with defence applications, including the DND-led Arctic micro-reactor feasibility program. A genuine trusted-supplier framework with allies would mean recognition of licensing decisions, shared end-user vetting and pre-cleared technology transfer lists. This would make the difference between a multi-year bilateral negotiation and a timeline of a matter of months.

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Financing: Risk, Social License and Stacking Instruments

The Nuclear Energy Strategy has committed to a Nuclear Export Financing and Commercial Framework. It would take Canada’s financing tools and turn them into one pre-cleared package a foreign buyer sees on day one of a bid, not assembled deal-by-deal under deadline pressure.

The raw material already exists. The Clean Electricity ITC covers up to 15% of eligible assets including large reactors and SMRs. The Clean Technology Manufacturing ITC covers 30% of supply-chain manufacturing. The Canada Growth Fund can deploy equity, debt and contracts for difference. It is also worth comparing to the UK’s Regulated Asset Base model, which drew Canadian pension fund investment by letting investors earn a return during construction rather than waiting for the plant to generate revenue. Canada does not yet have a comparable vehicle, though the Canada Growth Fund’s mandate could extend to build one.

Ontario’s nuclear financing reflects two distinct models. OPG, as a Crown corporation, finances projects like the Darlington SMR through its own balance sheet with provincial backing. Bruce Power, which is privately owned, relies on long-term contracts with the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) for revenue certainty, the model underpinning its refurbishment program and the $300 million pre-development agreement currently advancing Bruce C toward construction readiness. Any export-facing framework must be flexible enough to integrate with distinct provincial structures and stages of readiness without overriding them. Saskatchewan and New Brunswick are building their own SMR programs, and any export-facing framework has to plug into these provincial structures without overriding them.

Beyond Ontario, provinces at different stages of the nuclear journey are advancing their own programs. New Brunswick, with an established reactor fleet, is pursuing broader nuclear development as a natural extension of existing infrastructure and expertise. Whether a province is established in nuclear or earlier in its journey, any export-facing framework must be flexible enough to integrate with distinct provincial structures and stages of readiness without overriding them.

Social license is part of the financing story, not separate from it. In June 2026, the Williams Treaties First Nations became equity partners in OPG’s Darlington SMR through a $700 million investment backed by the largest Indigenous loan guarantee ever issued. Independent polling near Bruce Power found 86% local support for refurbishing the existing plant, yet national polling shows comfort with a nearby reactor drops sharply with proximity even where broad support is high. That gap between national support and site-specific comfort is where projects get delayed and it is a financing risk buyers underwrite just as much as cost overruns.

Translating these financing instruments and social license precedents into a coherent export offer requires the Nuclear Export Financing and Commercial Framework to do four things specifically.

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The Nuclear Export Financing and Commercial Framework: Four Requirements

1. Publish a standing menu of which instrument covers which project phase, ITCs for capital cost, CGF for construction-phase equity or debt, provincial mechanisms for revenue certainty, so a buyer is not told ‘it depends’ mid-negotiation.
2. Pre-clear financing terms with priority markets like Poland before a competition opens, the way diplomatic sequencing already happens on the technology side.
3. Publish a standard evidentiary package on Indigenous and community consent, built off the Darlington precedent, that a buyer’s own financiers can rely on rather than starting again from scratch.
4. Set a public target date. The strategy currently only commits to an April 2027 draft policy.  A target date is needed so the framework is not still ‘in design’ by the time the next competitive bid comes due.

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Looking Ahead

The Canada Investment Summit, 14-15 September 2026, should be viewed as a deadline, not a starting point. Before it, Canada needs an investable nuclear asset map organized by risk tier, illustrating where government guarantees and Indigenous equity already de-risk the entry point, and where private capital is being asked to price what is left. That clarity is ultimately what Canada has to offer. Investors do not need every risk removed, they just need to know who is holding which piece. 

Put a number on the delay. With more than 30 countries pursuing first-time nuclear builds and Canada targeting entry into just a handful of those markets by 2040, each additional year without a unified negotiating structure is not neutral, it is a bet that none of those decisions get made in the interim. Given that priority markets like Poland are already running live procurements, that bet is already being placed, whether it has been acknowledged as one or not. 

After the summit, promotion must become execution; one coordination mechanism spanning federal and provincial governments and industry, financing and licensing aligned to priority markets, and conversations with allies moving from cooperation to signed transactions. The real measure of success will not be who shows up, it will be whether, a year on, Canada can point to at least one investment agreement and one export deal financed through Canada’s own toolkit. That is what turns Canada from a country with nuclear ambitions into a country the world can actually buy from.

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About the Author

Michelle Leslie is an energy advisor and policy strategist working at the intersection of government, global capital markets, and public-private partnerships, with experience presenting to the NEA and participating in IAEA forums.

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Canadian Global Affairs Institute

The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. 

The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. 

In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.

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