Photo by: Private Felix Chagnon
by Michael Cabral
September 2026
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Value of Spectrum
- Competition in the Electromagnetic Environment
- The Socio-Economic Considerations
- The International Considerations
- The Military Considerations
- Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
Today, the electromagnetic spectrum (‘spectrum’) underpins nearly all modern technology, enabling everything from Wi-Fi and smartphones to satellites and radars. However, because spectrum is a finite resource, growing global connectivity has made it increasingly scarce. Consequently, Canada, bound by the laws of physics, is facing growing pressure to supply sufficient spectrum to meet all expanding social, economic, and military demands. This scarcity is leading new commercial users to increasingly compete for access not only among themselves but also with existing operators, including the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Such competition poses a significant policy challenge for the Government of Canada (GoC) and its allies, especially at higher frequencies, where accommodating new users in bands traditionally reserved for government and military use carries national security risks. In response to these risks, key Five Eyes allies, including the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), and Australia, have all released strategy or policy documents outlining the challenges posed by spectrum competition and their approaches to managing it. By comparison, similar Canadian documents have focused predominantly on the socio-economic impacts of spectrum competition, leaving the security implications underexamined.
With future spectrum allocations for communications systems set to potentially interfere with systems vital to Canada’s defence, it is increasingly important to address this knowledge gap in spectrum competition. To that end, this article outlines the strategic importance of spectrum and argues that the GoC must prioritize enhancing its institutional knowledge on the value of spectrum to protect and advance Canada’s national interests in the electromagnetic environment. To support this argument, this article is divided into three sections. The first explains how spectrum is classified and how the laws of physics influence the uses of spectrum-dependent technologies at different ranges. The second section outlines the critical socio-economic, international, and military considerations necessary for shaping Canadian policy responses to escalating spectrum competition. The final section presents policy recommendations aimed at enhancing Canada’s institutional knowledge on the value of spectrum and ensuring Canadian and allied interests are met in the electromagnetic environment.
The Value of Spectrum
To understand the policy challenges posed by spectrum competition, it is necessary to briefly explain how spectrum is classified and how the laws of physics influence the capabilities of spectrum-dependent technologies at different ranges. Spectrum is characterized according to frequency and is measured in hertz. The frequency of a signal at which one wave passes a fixed point in one second is one hertz; 1,000 hertz is a kilohertz (kHz), 1,000 kHz is a megahertz (MHz), and 1,000 MHz is a gigahertz (GHz). The entire classification of electromagnetic waves is known as the electromagnetic spectrum, with the frequencies ranging from 3 kHz to 400 GHz being known as the radio frequency spectrum. For this article, ‘higher frequency’ bands refer to the ranges commonly known as the mid-band (1 – 10 GHz) and the low high-band (10 – 40 GHz), and identified by the letter designations of L-band (1 – 2 GHz), S-band (2 – 4 GHz), C-band (4 – 8 GHz), X-band (8 – 12 GHz), Ku-band (12 – 18 GHz), K-band (18 – 27 GHz), and Ka-band (27 – 40 GHz).
These higher frequency bands are vital because they balance the constraints imposed by the laws of physics. That is, all else being equal, as frequency increases, radars gain greater resolution and communications systems gain greater capacity, but both sacrifice range and reliability. For instance, the CP-140 Aurora’s AN/APS-508 radar operates in the X-band, which has a relatively wide range of frequencies available and the ability to obtain narrow beamwidths with relatively smaller antennas. These characteristics make the aircraft useful for missions requiring high-resolution applications such as submarine periscope detection. That said, rain can sometimes be a serious factor reducing the performance of X-band systems; thus, for the mission of all-weather theatre air and missile defence, Canada’s future River-class destroyer is expected to rely instead on its S-band AN/SPY-7 radar. The main benefits here are that the S-band has sufficient resolution to classify and track the full range of modern airborne and missile threats, while also offering greater range and resistance to attenuation than an X-band radar.
Similarly, physics-induced trade-offs influence the capabilities and uses of communications systems. For instance, fifth-generation telecommunications networks (5G) require a combination of low-, mid-, and high-band frequencies to provide coverage and capacity in all areas and support the full range of use cases. However, as consumer and commercial network capacity demands have dramatically escalated, telecommunications providers are increasingly seeking more access to frequencies in the S-, C-, and X-bands to support the full deployment of 5G and the emergence of sixth-generation networks (6G), as these bands offer the ideal balance among capacity, range, and attenuation resistance. Accommodating these demands will be challenging, as 5G has the potential to interfere with systems operating within or adjacent to its frequency bands. This limited ability to coexist is one of the primary drivers of spectrum competition and will only intensify with time. Therefore, to better understand the stakes involved, this article now turns to the key considerations necessary for developing Canada’s political responses.
Competition in the Electromagnetic Environment
In Canada, Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) is responsible for minimizing interference by allocating specific services across different frequency bands and implementing rules and regulations that enable multiple services to share the same bands. However, as new users seek greater access to higher frequency bands, ISED will be increasingly strained to supply sufficient spectrum to meet all demands. Complicating this policy challenge further is the fact that spectrum crosses international borders, meaning ISED’s spectrum allocation decisions are heavily influenced by decisions made by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and at World Radiocommunication Conferences. While the ITU and World Radiocommunication Conferences are intended to minimize interference and enable global interoperability for communication systems, the rapid digitization of nearly all aspects of human life has meant that control and influence over spectrum decisions carry significant geopolitical benefits. As such, both the US and the People’s Republic of China have placed greater emphasis on influencing the regulations, standards, and rules governing terrestrial and non-terrestrial spectrum usage. These factors combined demand a holistic understanding of both the domestic and international considerations concerning spectrum competition. To that end, this section highlights the key socio-economic, international, and military considerations necessary for developing Canadian policy responses.
The Socio-Economic Considerations
As technology has advanced, next-generation equipment has required ever-increasing capacity to function. Whether for streaming live content, integrating artificial intelligence into business settings, or enabling fully automated vehicles, access to systems operating at higher frequencies is fundamental. As such, allocating sufficient higher-frequency spectrum for terrestrial - Wi-Fi, International Mobile Telecommunication (IMT) – and non-terrestrial – satellites, high-altitude platform stations, and unmanned systems/drones – systems will be foundational for Canada to bridge the digital divide, drive the fourth industrial revolution, and ensure Canada’s economic security. However, given the scarcity of spectrum resources, both terrestrial and non-terrestrial communication system providers are increasingly competing with one another for access.
For terrestrial systems, more spectrum has been needed to support the deployment of both IMT and Wi-Fi; consequently, competition between providers has continued behind the scenes. For instance, in 2021, ISED sought comment on the allocation of spectrum for next-generation Wi-Fi in the 6 GHz range. Despite the opposition from IMT operators, ISED allocated the entire band to Wi-Fi rather than ‘split the difference’ as Europe and India had done. A key consideration here is that Wi-Fi operates on licence-exempt spectrum, meaning that, subject to certain regulations, it can coexist with incumbent systems in those bands to a greater extent than IMT. That said, because they do not operate on dedicated spectrum, Wi-Fi networks are prone to unpredictable interference, latency fluctuations, and scalability constraints, which potentially make Wi-Fi unsuitable for mission-critical industrial applications. Moreover, as a consequence of this decision in the 6 GHz band, ISED and IMT operators will need to look elsewhere for additional spectrum, which experts predict will be needed to support the full deployment of next-generation telecommunications networks.
Spectrum scarcity is similarly driving competition among non-terrestrial communication system providers. In particular, the rapid proliferation of low Earth orbit satellites has resulted in operators increasingly competing with incumbent geostationary and non-geostationary satellite operators for access. The main challenge is that satellite bands are shared internationally, meaning that while Canadian satellite operators obtain a spectrum-use license from ISED, they compete for access with all international satellite operators. As such, with a world-leading new low Earth orbit constellation and many Arctic and remote communities reliant on non-terrestrial systems for connectivity, international regulations, standards, and rules governing satellites will significantly influence Canada’s future. In particular, with 80% of the next World Radiocommunication Conference’s agenda items concerning low Earth orbit technologies, understanding the impact of international considerations on Canada’s space ambitions has become vital.
The International Considerations
As the global economy increasingly digitizes, competition between the US and PRC over the regulations, standards, and rules governing terrestrial and non-terrestrial spectrum use has intensified. For terrestrial systems, one of the main drivers of competition is the divergence in market share between US and PRC hardware providers. That is, Huawei dominates the 5G hardware market – representing a larger market share (33% in 2024) than Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia combined – while Cisco and HPE Aruba dominate the enterprise Wi-Fi equipment market – combining for 55% compared to Huawei’s 9%. As such, the US and PRC are increasingly competing to shape countries' use of the 6 GHz band, with the PRC advocating an IMT-first approach and the US advocating a Wi-Fi-first approach. Given the difficulty of coexistence among terrestrial systems, both the US and the PRC are keen to get more countries to sign on to their preferred approach to enlarge their market share while limiting that of their competitors.
Competition has similarly intensified for non-terrestrial spectrum usage. Currently, the US has a commanding lead in low Earth orbit technologies, with SpaceX operating roughly 60% of the 10,000 active satellites in 2024 and more planned for the future. The US is keen to maintain this advantage due to the range of industrial benefits and the potential of these technologies to serve as an alternative route to market in countries that already have established PRC-enabled terrestrial infrastructure. That said, the PRC, as well as Russia and Iran, are keen to erode US advantages in low Earth orbit advantages and capabilities. For instance, in December 2025, to avoid being crowded out of space, the PRC submitted filings for satellite constellations totalling roughly 203,000; meanwhile, Russia and Iran have advanced controversial agenda items for the next World Radiocommunications Conference, such as Resolution 14, which proposes regulatory measures to limit satellite operations to those that are nationally authorized. Overall, the decisions made at the next World Radiocommunication Conference will have a direct impact on the US low Earth orbit industry’s ability to scale up, lower costs, and innovate, and therefore will be a key priority for them moving forward.
For Canada, two major consequences emerge from escalating US-PRC spectrum competition. First, a PRC-aligned outcome in the 6 GHz band would result in a greater market share for Huawei while locking out US Wi-Fi producers. Given that Canada largely imports its IMT and Wi-Fi equipment, this outcome would increase prices paid by Canadians for US Wi-Fi equipment while also increasing Huawei’s market access, potentially laying the groundwork for a future in which Canada’s trusted IMT equipment suppliers cannot compete in the market. In such a scenario, Canada would potentially have to reverse its ban on PRC hardware in its telecommunications networks and grant the PRC access to its future digital nervous system. As PRC law requires companies like Huawei to support national intelligence work, such a scenario would pose unacceptable risks to Canada’s critical infrastructure, intellectual property, and Canadians' information security. Second, continued efforts by the PRC, Russia, and Iran to restrict low Earth orbit technologies would not only impact services provided in Canada by US low Earth orbit constellations but may also negatively affect Telesat’s future Lightspeed network. As such, it is essential for the GoC to better understand how the ITU impacts low Earth orbit technologies and outline where it can cooperate with the US to ensure mutually beneficial outcomes.
The Military Considerations
For Canadian and allied military forces, electromagnetic dominance is a fundamental component of modern military operations. Access to spectrum not only underpins every kind of command, control and communications, but it is also a prerequisite for sensing, precision navigation and timing, and enables the delivery of both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. As such, spectrum superiority is a leading indicator and a fundamental component in enabling allied forces to achieve superiority in the air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace domains. Therefore, it is fundamental that the GoC understand that in the face of escalating global strategic competition, the CAF will likely require more, not less, access to spectrum to fulfill its mission.
Due to the secrecy surrounding electromagnetic warfare, sometimes referred to by its parent term, electronic warfare, it is difficult to predict the CAF's full spectrum needs using only open-source information. That said, with the information that is available, it is clear that access to spectrum is fundamental to both continental defence and Canada’s Arctic operations. For continental defence, the propagation characteristics of the S- and X-band make them necessary for detecting and tracking the full range of threats to the North American continent, including aircraft, submarines, drones, and missiles. Accordingly, a number of future CAF systems, including the River-class destroyer, P-8A Poseidon, and the GlobalEye airborne early warning and control aircraft rely on access to these bands to deter, detect, and defeat threats to the continent. Furthermore, for Arctic operations, CAF vessels patrolling the archipelago rely on radio navigation beacons in the S- and X-bands for safe navigation, while satellites operating in the C-, X-, and Ka-bands provide critical domain awareness and facilitate communications, connectivity, and command and control. Therefore, both Canada’s ability to contribute to continental deterrence through the North American Aerospace Defence Command and its ability to engage in existing and future Arctic operations are directly affected by the CAF’s access to higher frequency bands.
However, the CAF’s access to these bands is increasingly at risk due to the escalating demands of communications systems, particularly telecommunications networks. The crucial consideration here is that 5G/6G have a synergistic relationship with emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, Internet of Things, and edge computing. Therefore, some reallocation of the higher frequencies currently held by the CAF will be necessary to ensure Canada’s economic security and competitiveness. However, this reallocation must be carefully balanced and include the consideration that any relocation of services or reduction in the bandwidth provided to the CAF would not only degrade the performance of spectrum-dependent systems but would also reduce the number of systems that can operate in a geographic area and the resiliency of those systems against enemy countermeasures and electronic attack. The US approach is instructive for these purposes: the One Big Beautiful Bill instructed the Federal Communications Commission to auction 300 MHz of C-band spectrum within two years, identify an additional 500 MHz of higher-frequency spectrum for allocation, and exclude some frequencies in the S-band and X-band from consideration for auctions until 2034. Overall, given the escalating threats to Canada across economic and military vectors, it is increasingly vital that the GoC provide ISED with updated guidance to allocate sufficient spectrum to advance Canada’s economic security and competitiveness, while balancing the CAF's spectrum needs to ensure their effectiveness.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendation
As spectrum competition intensifies, the GoC must strengthen its institutional knowledge on the value of spectrum to protect and advance Canada’s national interest in the electromagnetic environment. While ISED has effectively managed spectrum access to date, Canada’s existing Spectrum Policy Framework has not been meaningfully revisited since 2007 and was not written with the threat environment Canada now faces in mind. Moreover, once coexistence between systems is determined to be infeasible, questions concerning which spectrum allocations ultimately serve Canada's national interests become political rather than technical. In other words, in the face of escalating economic and military threats, it is the responsibility of Canada’s political leadership to weigh the trade-offs, determine the national interest, and provide updated guidance to inform ISED’s future spectrum allocation decisions. Therefore, this article recommends that the GoC begin this process by convening, through the Standing Committees on Industry and Technology and National Defence, public and private meetings on the value of spectrum. The purpose of these meetings would be threefold: to prepare Canada for the upcoming 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference, to update Canada’s spectrum policies, and to enhance the Canada-US bilateral relationship.
In particular, a 2026 schedule for these meetings would be timely, as it would complement ongoing preparatory efforts – the Canadian Preparatory Committee, Intra-American Telecommunication Commission (CITEL) meetings, and various ITU study groups – and spotlight the stakes, risks, and potential opportunities for Canada. Accordingly, the Committees should follow the US Senate’s lead and begin by hearing from former Canadian delegates to the World Radiocommunication Conference, as well as current members of the Canadian Preparatory Committee, to better understand the range of agenda and non-agenda items under consideration, as well as Canada’s prospective positions. Additionally, given the concerns raised by US Senate witnesses about the security risks associated with the conference being hosted in Shanghai, the Committee should also receive private testimony from the Communications Security Establishment on measures to reduce the risk of foreign surveillance or interference negatively affecting the Canadian delegation.
To assess the challenges posed by growing spectrum competition, identify shortcomings in Canadian policy, and consider potential reforms, the Committee should then hear from public servants, industry and academic experts. Public servant witnesses should include ISED spectrum management officials, DND federal spectrum management section heads, and representatives from GoC departments and agencies that heavily utilize spectrum, such as the Canadian Space Agency. Industry and academic experts should include communications equipment manufacturers, national and international terrestrial and non-terrestrial network operators, and researchers who have examined spectrum competition and can provide insights into how allied countries are managing the challenge. A key objective here should be to determine whether Canada needs a stand-alone national strategy for spectrum, similar to that of the US, or whether an updated GoC policy framework, similar to the approach taken by the UK, is sufficient to manage escalating competition in higher frequency bands.
Finally, these committee meetings would serve as an opportunity to enhance the Canada-US bilateral relationship by demonstrating to the US on the value of maintaining a positive relationship with Canada. In this case, there is a growing bipartisan consensus in the US that countering the PRC’s influence at the ITU and reestablishing US dominance in the electromagnetic environment are crucial to ensuring the country’s national security. Reflecting this view, over the past six years, the US has released several documents concerning spectrum, including the US electromagnetic spectrum superiority strategy, a national spectrum strategy, an S-band spectrum-sharing feasibility assessment, and an executive order on ‘Winning the 6G race’. The US has also supported the re-election of Doreen Bogdan-Martin as Secretary-General of the ITU and convening a US Senate hearing on preparing the country for the 2027 World Radiocommunication Conference. Therefore, recognizing this area as a priority for the US, the Committees should invite testimony from US representatives to share their approach to managing spectrum competition, clarify their priorities for the upcoming World Radiocommunication Conference, and identify areas where Canada can assist them in achieving their objectives. In particular, as noted by ISED’s Interim Update to the Spectrum Outlook, widening differences between Canada and the US band plans have led to increasing interference and coordination challenges along the border. As such, these meetings could serve as an additional forum to harmonize band plans, enhance cross-border coordination, and ensure allied spectrum dominance on the continent and abroad.
The key consideration is that, as emphasized by US Senate witnesses, the consensus-based structure of the ITU and World Radiocommunication Conferences means that the US will depend on support from allies and partners, particularly in Region 2 (the Americas and Greenland), to achieve its objectives. However, given the widespread imposition of tariffs and real and perceived military threats to countries on the continent, the US faces the possibility that some Region 2 governments may be unable or unwilling to support the US’s position. In this context, Canada could be uniquely positioned to emphasize to Region 2 partners that, despite recent tensions in the Canada-US relationship, it remains in the region’s interest to cooperate to ensure that no single country dominates the ITU or World Radiocommunication Conferences. In this way, Canada can ensure both national and allied interests can be met, while also demonstrating its value as a capable yet sovereign US ally.
About the Author
Michael Cabral holds a dual Master’s degree in Public Administration and Global Affairs from the London School of Economics and the Munk School of Global Affairs. His research examines strategic competition below the threshold of armed conflict and its implications for Canada, focusing on geoeconomics, Arctic domain awareness, and integrated air and missile defence.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
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