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Some thoughts about soldiers’ complaints and the Ombudsman

Security and North-American Relationships

by Reid Morden

The three countries of North America are struggling with the question of whether it is desirable, or possible, to take two sets of multilayered arrangements with substantial histories and find enough points of commonality to build a true trilateral North American community.

There are differing views. Should NAFTA be the vehicle for launching labour, social, and other initiatives as part of a trilateral building process?  Should we “clutter” Canada’s vital bilateral relationship with the United States with the massive complexity of Mexico-US affairs?”1

Whatever the differing views on the broader issue, North American security issues are almost ubiquitous whenever there is talk about closer coordination and cooperation.  Why?  One need look no further than the statement by the leaders of the three countries in Waco, Texas, in the spring of this year.  There, the three leaders declared that “Our (Security and Prosperity) Partnership will ……….. increase the security, prosperity, and quality of life of our citizens.  This work will be based on the principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary…..”2

Complementary?  Not likely. To borrow a phrase from Paul Cellucci, the former US ambassador to Canada, security, post 9/11, trumps trade.  Dr. Frank Harvey at Dalhousie University puts it a little differently: “The economics of security (the negative economic impact of security failures) will invariably trump the security of economics (the positive impact of sound economic policies) for at least two reasons: “First, any terrorist attack on U.S. soil will inevitably have a major, immediate and uniformly negative impact on the American (and international) economy anyway.  Second, in a security-conscious society faced with the challenge of perfection in the war on terror, the loss of 3,000 lives will invariably be perceived by the American public as a far more significant tragedy than the loss of 300,000 jobs.  Conversely, the potential to save 3,000 lives will be perceived as far more important than the potential to create 300,000 new jobs.”3

What is Dr. Harvey getting at? The 2004 Auditor General’s report on Canada’s contributions to security after 9/11 summarized Canadian priorities in terms of a profound sense of “economic insecurity” resulting from “heightened border security” and the “shutdown of civil air transport”.4   In short, while the Americans are very worried about another attack, the strategic calculations in Canada remain focused on preventing or mitigating the economic consequences of America’s response.  This is understandable given our economic dependence on the U.S. -- 43% of our wealth; 87% of our trade; the 35,000 trucks and 500,000 individuals cross the border every day. Billions of dollars tied to Canada-U.S. trade were lost as a direct consequence of 9/11, and despite the obvious economic benefits to both countries of keeping the border open, there is no reason to expect a different outcome after the next attacks.5

Obviously, multilateral approaches to gathering and coordinating intelligence on terrorist activities and recruitment efforts, or tracking terrorist fund raising and other financial activities, are likely to be more efficient and cost effective than trying to do these things alone.

Except that intelligence organisms, wherever they may be housed (intelligence agencies, police forces, immigration services) are not prone to share. In fact they are highly allergic to sharing even with the occupant of the next office, never mind----foreigners.  When they do share, it is the result of broadly perceived and accepted national interest and years in the build up of mutual trust and confidence.  This is a reality between Canada and the US. It is not a reality between Canada and Mexico. It is a partial reality between the US and Mexico, driven by drugs, crime, and immigration factors.

Leaving this cavil aside, the leaders missed an opportunity in Waco to look at the continent as a single entity, a single perimeter, in all aspects of which each of the three countries has an individual and collective interest.  The idea of a perimeter causes a neuralgic reaction among many politicians in Canada.  They fear that giving content to the concept will lead to the “harmonization” of laws with others (read USA) on the continent, thereby inevitably leading to a loss of sovereignty.  That is utter nonsense and John Manley, Pedro Aspé and Governor Weld, in their report of the Independent Task Force on the future of North America, have addressed this head on.6

Dr. Janice Stein of the University of Toronto describes where terrorist networks work most effectively:

“Often with life-cycles of decades, networks of terror thrive on the openness, flexibility and diversity of post-industrial society, crossing borders almost as easily as do goods and services, knowledge and cultures.  They have global reach, particularly when they can operate within the fabric of the most open and multicultural societies, and through post-industrial organizational forms.”7

How well that could describe Canadian society today!

Simply as the next door neighbour and traditional close ally of the United States, the principal target of the terrorist’s wrath, Canada and Canadians have become targets.

In the past, Canada has always been able to say that if there was a terrorist presence or activity here, it was because some small elements of an immigrant community had imported their homeland strife. Now, however, Canada’s very foreign policy leads us into areas of ideological and religious conflict where violence, more often than not, is seen as a means of resolution. In short, our own policies and actions may well motivate those who disagree with us to retaliate on Canadian soil.

Closer to home, nothing is more important than our overall relationship with the United States. Thus, in the intelligence and security community, nothing could be more important than its ability to manage the border. The chance arrest of would-be bomber, Ahmed Ressam, at the BC/Washington border just before the millennium still resonates among many American politicians and media as evidence of a porous, and therefore dangerous, border.  While their criticisms may not be well founded, they continue to have an important impact on Americans. Canada is not “a Club Med for terrorists” but there remains a very serious job of re-building trust and confidence with the American administration, the American Congress and American public opinion.

In Canada this essentially starts with the RCMP and the CSIS. They must, at all costs, deepen and strengthen their internal cooperation, and their exterior links.  Adequate funding to play a truly cooperative and effective role is a sine qua non. Equally neither Canadian governments nor Canadian citizens should be tolerant of any continuation of earlier turf wars and the obvious lack of trust and cooperation.

In his autobiography, Louis Freeh, former Director of the FBI, reflects on the fragility of public trust in government institutions8.  This is relevant in today’s Canada. Leaders of both the RCMP and CSIS have a role to play in explaining their role and functions to Canadians at large. Even more important, it is vital for Canada’s political leadership to be at the forefront of public education and public debate.  They must not wait for a tragedy, as with the bombings in London this past summer, to concede that there may be a problem.

In sum, the terrorist issue is going to be with us for a long time. Like it or not Canada is involved.  Involved as a matter of self interest in keeping our southern border open.  Involved because an activist foreign policy, which few Canadians would wish to change, carries with it real risk in this volatile and dangerous century. Most important, open debate is crucial so that Canadians can better draw the line between essential security needs and their rights and freedoms.

Endnotes

1 Jean Daudelin, The Tri-Lateral Mirage: The Tale of Two North Americas, Carleton University, May, 2003
2 Joint  Statement of Presidents Bush and Vincente Fox and Prime Minister Martin, Waco, Texas, March 23, 2005
3 Frank Harvey, Canada and the New American Empire, Implications for Security Policy, Conference held jointly by University of Victoria and CBC Newsworld, November, 2004 [4] Report of the Auditor General (2004). National  Security in Canada: the 2001 Anti-terrorism initiative…(pg 3)
5 Frank Harvey, ibid
6 Chairmen’s Statement, Independent Task Force on the Future of North America, ibid., Recommendation 2
7 J. Gross Stein, “Network Wars” in R. J. Daniels, P. Macklem & K. Roach (eds.), The Security of Freedom, Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill, University of Toronto Press, 2001, p. 75;
8 Louis J. Freeh, My FBI: Bringing Down the Mafia, Investigating Bill Clinton, and Fighting       the War on Terror, St. Martin’s Press, 2005

Just the Facts, Ma’am: Measuring Canadian Multilateralism And Listening to Our Global Conscience

by Frank Harvey

The International Policy Statement (IPS) was not the only major document to be released by the Canadian Government in 2005. Shortly after the IPS hit the streets Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew released the inaugural Annual Report of Canada’s contribution to the Global Partnership Program Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GPP).1

Since proposing the program in 2002 at the G8 meeting in Kananaskis, Alberta, the Canadian government has consistently highlighted the Global Partnership as a key foreign policy priority, for a very good reason – the program deals with “one of the most serious security threats facing our world today.”2 The report goes on to point out that the GPP constitutes “a new generation of funded mechanisms that deliver policy through direct project implementation….Together, they respond to the priorities set out in Canada’s International Policy Statement issued in April 2005 and offer a vibrant reminder that Canada has an important role to play in international affairs.” In others words, the GPP encompasses a prime example of the specific programs, projects and actual funding priorities that put the words of the IPS into practice. As Pettigrew (2005: 1) correctly points in his introductory remarks, “making such a commitment is one thing; making good on it is another,” and he invites all Canadians “to read this report and take pride in how we are meeting our international responsibilities.”3 

I accept the invitation and offer the following report card on Canada’s performance. I will leave it to others to decide how proud Canadians should be. 

Comparing Multilateral Commitments
The DFAIT report provides an excellent overview of the many WMD challenges in the Former Soviet Union, a list of GPP programmes designed to address the threat, a summary of the specific projects in which Canada is involved, and a budget that explains where the funds have gone. But the document is decidedly (and ironically) state-centric in its reporting -- there are almost no comparative statistics to help place Canada’s contribution in a ‘multilateral’ context. If Canadian officials are seriously committed to making (and highlighting) important multilateral contributions, then a comparative framework is really the only one that should be used.

Figure 1 compares country pledges, commitments and spending since 2002 (all funds are in Canadian currency).4 From the point of view of measuring real investments (as distinct from promises), pledges are not as relevant as commitments, and commitments, in turn, are less relevant than actual spending. Arguably the most relevant measure of a state’s priorities emerges from Figure 2 -- the proportion of a country’s ‘commitment’ that remains ‘unspent’. France and Italy deserve special mention here for spending nothing on GPP programs during the three year reporting period – 100% of committed funds remain unspent. However, among G8 members who have expressed at least some serious interest in dealing with the global threat of proliferation, Canada ranks third, behind France and Italy, in its failure to spend a large portion of the money committed to GPP projects -- 76% of committed funds remain unspent. A third place finish in this category is particularly noteworthy in view of the repeated references to the GPP in the International Policy Statement, in Canada’s National Security Policy, and in almost every major speech by a Canadian official on the issue of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament since 2002.

Why has it been so difficult for Canada to find and fund projects worthy of any portion of the remaining $276,049,600 the government committed to help deal with “one of the most serious security threats facing our world today”? Ottawa’s reluctance to live up to its multilateral commitments is even more puzzling considering the fact that other GPP participants managed in the same period to find and fund projects totalling $3,724,771,737 -- roughly 13.5 times the amount Canada is having a hard time spending (Figure 3).

Excuses?
Comparing multilateral commitments this way also helps to strip away the excuses Canadian officials might offer to explain the numbers. Clearly, funding GPP projects in the Former Soviet Union is not an easy task. As Flournoy (2005) explains, liability disputes over legal responsibilities in the event of accidents are complex and time-consuming, and access procedures allowing foreign personnel to bypass security measures when entering FSU weapons facilities are not always straightforward.v But every country engaged in GPP activities faces identical challenges – there is no reason why Canadian officials would be any less capable than others of working through these legal and security impediments. Piggyback on existing projects and related agreements is the most common approach states are using today to overcome the hurdles.vi Canada, for example, has already signed two significant MOUs with the United Kingdom to piggyback on their GPP projects, so there is no obvious reason why Canada couldn’t spend more this way. Blaming the slow pace of Canadian spending on higher standards for financial accounting or other Treasury Board requirements is equally suspect as an excuse – the appropriations process in the United States is perhaps the most onerous among G8 members, yet the United States accounts for 72% of all GPP spending to date.7

With these facts in mind, the following excerpts from the International Policy Statement can now be placed in their proper context:

“There is no contradiction between Canada doing well and Canada doing good. Canada benefits directly when the world is more secure…. If we are to take our responsibilities seriously to ourselves and the Canadian generations to follow, then we must take our responsibilities to the global community seriously as well, not only with noble sentiment and rhetoric-we must also earn and perhaps re-earn our way. This will take effort and it will take dedication.” (Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2005).8

“[A]s Canadians we must be active beyond our borders to protect and promote our values and our interests -- security in the face of terrorism and the increasing threat of nuclear proliferation….We must ultimately be committed to playing a lead role in specific initiatives and, on occasion, to resolving to go it alone. We have the means to help, and so we will. We must.” (Prime Minister Paul Martin, 2005).9
“Canada can make a difference, if it continues to invest in its international role and pulls its weight….Future generations will use these tests to determine whether Canada’s global potential has been fulfilled. The responsibility to act now is ours.” (Overview, International Policy Statement, page 5).

The Prime Minister and other senior government officials have an even more important “responsibility to be honest,” as Kim Nossal concludes in his excellent contribution to the 2005 CDFAI report on Canada’s International Policy Statement.x If Canada has such a hard time meeting commitments to a policy initiative it considers a priority, one has to wonder how well the government is doing with other ‘important’ policy initiatives (Kyoto benchmarks, foreign aid, AIDS in Africa, our Responsibility to Protect the people of Darfur, etc.). 

Perhaps the most relevant numbers to emerge from a comparative assessment of GPP contributions is the fact that American investments account for 72% of all spending to date, compared with 25.7% from everyone else, and 2.3% from Canada (Figure 4). Despite having a GDP that is only 11 times larger than Canada’s, the U.S. has spent almost 31 times more on GPP initiatives. Germany’s GDP is about 2.3 times Canada’s yet it has spent almost 4 times as much. Conversely, Canada’s GDP is about 5.6 times that of Norway’s but Ottawa has spent only about 1.8 times more on GPP projects. 

Canadian officials repeatedly claim to be among the world’s staunchest defenders of multilateralism, but they obviously have something very important to learn from the world’s most criticised unilateralist about how to make meaningful and honest contributions to multilateral security.

Figure 1
GPP Pledge-Commitment-Spending Trends
($ millions CDA)

Figure 2
Multilateral Credibility Gap:
Percentage of GPP Country  Commitment Unspent

 Figure 3:
Multilateral Credibility Gap:
Canadian Unspent vs. GPP Spending Opportunities
($ CDA)

 
Figure 4:
Multilateral Burden Sharing
Portion of Total GPP Spending to Date (%) 

Endnotes

1 The Global Partnership Program: Securing the Future. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade -- www.globalpartnership.gc.ca.
2 Ibid, p. 1.
3 Ibid.
4 Pledge, commitment and spending figures have been compiled from three sources: (1) the Post-2005 G8 Gleneagles GPWP Annual Report (Consolidated Report Data Annex A) -http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile
/PostG8_Gleneagles_
GPWGAnnualReportAnnex2005.pdf; (2) Strengthening the Global Partnership Factsheet -- http://www.sgpproject.org/Donor%20Factsheets/
Index.html; and for Canadian figures (3) DFAIT’s 2005 GPP Annual Report -- www.globalpartnership.gc.ca.
5 Michèle A. Flournoy (2005) Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation -- United States House of Representatives “The G-8 Global Partnership: Successes and Shortcomings,” June 30, 2005. Flournoy is a Senior Adviser for International Security -- www.csis.org
6 Ibid. See also Austin Carson (2005) “Piggybacking Global Partnership Pledges: Lessons Learned.” SGP Issue Brief # 2, Center for Strategic and International Studies -- http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/
SGPIssueBrief/ Carson_Jan2005.pdf
7 For an excellent overview of the complexities of the U.S. appropriations process for GPP funding, see Jane Vaynman (2003) “U.S. Funding for the Global Partnership: The Legislative Decision-Making Process.” Center for Strategic and International Studies --http://www.sgpproject.org/resources/
guides/ us_guide.html
8 Foreword by Prime Minister Paul Martin, International Policy Statement.
9Ibid.
10 Kim Nossal (2005) In The National Interest. CDFAI Report http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/InTheCanadianInterestE.pdf