Annual Conference 

Defining the National Interest

Thank you to the attendees who participated in the ”Defining the National Interest” conference held on November 4-5, 2004 at the Lord Elgin Hotel in Ottawa.

“Defining the National Interest” focused on Canada’s international interests. The conference format included panel discussions on Canada’s economic, security and political interests led by academics, representatives from NGOs, policy makers and business elites as well as working group sessions. The focus of the conference was the result of the national public opinion poll “Visions of Canadian Foreign Policy” conducted by Dominion Institute and CDFAI in conjunction with the conference.

The Conference was sponsored by: The Centre for Security and Defence Studies at Carleton University; the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute; the Department of Political Studies and the Centre for International Relations at Queen’s University; and l’Institut québécois des hautes études internationales at Université Laval; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: Canada Institute; and the Dominion Institute.

CDFAI gratefully acknowledges the contributions of everyone who helped make the Defining the National Interest conference a success!

CDAI-CDFAI Graduate Student Symposium, held in collaboration with the Centre for International Relations and Defence Management Program at Queen’s University, the Institute for Research and Public Policy (IRPP), and the War Studies Programme at the Royal Military College was the most successful symposium to date.

The two-day symposium held at the Royal Military College, October 29-30, 2004 featured  two days of presentations on security and defence issues. This year’s symposium featured 35 presenters (more than 55 abstracts submitted) from nine Security and Defence Studies Forum (SDF) centres represented: Dalhousie University, Université Laval, Université de Montréal, McGill University, Université du Québec à Montréal, Queen’s University, University of Manitoba, University of Calgary (Centre for Military of Strategic Studies (CMSS)), and the Royal Military College. There were more than 100 people in attendance.

The symposium also featured two keynote speakers: Major General Lewis MacKenzie (Ret’d) and Dr. David Bercuson who spoke of the future direction of Canadian defence policy.

CDFAI believes it provided a forum for PhD and MA students to share their thoughts on broad security and defence issues with colleagues, academia, and policy makers from government, while having the opportunity to listen to experts in the field.

To further the mandate of the SDF program, and building on the strengths drawn from the annual SDF conferences of the past, the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies hosted a conference on November 25-27, 2004 to bring the 12 Centres together at the University of Calgary for a two day intensive conference to share relevant ideas and research, educating and strengthening our understanding of Canadian security and defence issues.

Entitled “Defence and Security Studies In Canada” this conference provided a forum for debate and discussion of Canadian security and defence issues. CMSS believes that bringing together experts and students from SDF Centres across Canada has significant impact upon both the academic community and the nation in raising awareness on Canadian defence and security issues.

The Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) was pleased to support the event. The institute believes it will significantly increase communication among the SDF institutions, an aim they strongly support.

Ross Munro Award

On November 19, 2004 the Conference of Defence Associations (CDA), in concert with the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute awarded Sharon Hobson the 2004 Ross Munro Media Award.

Ms Hobson has consistently demonstrated the finest qualities of a journalist who specializes in defence issues. The quality of her reporting, her knowledge of the subject matter and fairness of her accounts set a standard by which her colleagues may be measured.

Sharon Hobson has been the Canadian correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly for the past 18 years, and seven years ago became the Canadian correspondent for Jane’s Navy International, and Jane’s Defence Upgrades. In 1996, she began writing for Jane’s International Defence Review. She has written a monthly column on the navy for Canadian Sailings, and has written features for the Financial Post and Canadian Defence Quarterly. Ms Hobson co-authored, with Rear-Admiral Dusty Miller, The Persian Excursion, a book on the Canadian navy in the Persian Gulf War.

Ross Laird Ellis Memorial Lecture in Military and Strategic Studies

On May 10, 2005 the Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute will co-sponsor the Ross Laird Ellis Lecture in conjunction with the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies. The lecture series is named after Ross Laird Ellis, a militiaman who rose through the ranks to become the Commanding Officer of the Calgary Highlanders in the course of the Battle of the Scheldt Estuary in World War II. Open to the general public and University of Calgary faculty and students, the purpose of the Ross Laird Ellis Lecture is to provide Canadians with access to relevant and reliable information on Canadian defence and foreign policy.

Steven Silver, Writer/Director of The Last Just Man will be this year’s lecturer. This feature documentary tells the story of General Romeo Dallaire, the UN Force Commander during the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The film has won three Geminis and over 12 international awards including Audience Awards at The Double Take, Hot Docs and Hampton’s film festivals and the Gold Plaque at the Chicago International Television Competition.

The Ellis Lecture will be held in the Burlington Theatre at the Glenbow Museum.

Peacebuilding: Do We Know How?

by Gordon Smith

Weak states, failing states, failed states, post-conflict reconstruction of states – have you noticed how much more frequently such fundamental problems of governance in other parts of the world are cited? There has always been a problem with governments that were unable to deal with humanitarian or environmental crises. Haiti is a recurring example. There is nothing new about governments that cannot protect their citizens’ human security. The breakdown in Somalia goes on. It is not clear that we are having more of these cases, but there is an increasing sense in public opinion that something has to be done.

Then there are the crises that are actually caused by governments’ actions or deliberate inaction (e.g. Darfur). A distinguished commission, with Canadian sponsorship, produced a report entitled The Responsibility to Protect. Their argument rather neatly turned around the question of the “right to intervene” into a responsibility of governments to protect their citizens. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has commended the report and urged that further work be done on the outstanding questions the Commission was unable to resolve – above all on the international authority required for intervention when states are unwilling or unable to protect their citizens.

What has changed in the last few years are other reasons why those of us living in comfort and security in countries such as Canada must take an interest in these cases of impending or actual state breakdown. In the past, many Canadians were moved by images and stories of despair to argue we should do something to help. This has commendably motivated a large number of NGOs to act and led to CIDA providing substantial resources for relief. Now, however, these states are seen as fertile ground for terrorists to train, recruit or just hide. The prospect, indeed likelihood, that terrorists will lay their hands on or fabricate nuclear, but also biological, weapons, and then use them, makes these states a source of real threat.

While the threat is perceived as being primarily directed at the United States, it is significantly broader. The threat is not only to the developed West but also to developing countries (e.g. Indonesia).

Commentators on the US National Security Strategy President Bush produced in 2002 focused on the case for pre-emptive and preventive war, and the authority the US declared it had to launch either without any form of international consent. Actually this doctrine is nothing new, although it was stated in a particularly unequivocal manner. Much more surprising was the statement that the biggest threat to our southern neighbour came not from other states seeking to challenge the US military, but from terrorists operating from failed states.

It makes sense that more should be done, including by Canada, to improve governance including building democracy around the world. The United Nations Development Program has been reoriented to give governance a much higher priority. It is widely accepted that without good governance, there will be no development. The Nobel prize winning Amartya Sen makes a direct link between democracy and development. Farid Zakaria argues that rules based liberal systems are essential for democracy and development. It seems that Prime Minister Martin would like to emphasize these themes with a transformation of Canadian development assistance.

But what should actually be done? Is there one model or a number of models? Or is every case different? What can we learn from experience? What is most important in reversing the process of failure, and where does one start after a state has already failed? Wanting to do good, to make a difference, is laudable but will not assuredly lead to the desired results. There is only just starting to be a literature of research to build on. Frank Fukuyama has just published a very sobering analysis of how difficult peacebuilding is; he emphasizes institutions cannot be exported and that political culture is critical. Jim Dobbins of RAND has edited an excellent book on the US experience from Germany and Japan in the post WWII era to the current day. More needs to be done. First, it would be constructive to pull together the Canadian experience.

Second, we do know some things. Security is a sine qua non. Without security there will not be democracy or development. There are a number of dimensions to security, including military and police. The demand for police training is huge; the numbers of policemen willing to serve abroad is high. Yet most international missions have difficulty achieving their numerical goals because of a lack of money. A major part of the reason for the lack of money is that it is difficult to count police training and assistance as development assistance under OECD rules. This needs to be changed.

Third, police are only one part of the criminal justice system, the effective functioning of which is of critical importance. This means an early priority must go in to judicial training and corrections training. Here too there are problems with the rules about what can be counted as development. Everybody, of course, wants to be able to maximize what they report they are doing for development.

Fourth, there are also important lessons to be learned as to when elections should be called. It is clear elections can be too early, and they can be too late. Criteria can be developed to guide this decision. It seems clear that it is generally better to call local elections – which can be fought on issues –before general elections – which can underline splits on ethnic or other divisive grounds. The point is, we need more research, more drawing on past experience.

Finally there is the issue of values. We are quick to condemn American exceptionalism, with its belief that God has given the US a unique role in the world to spread democracy, freedom and the benefits of the market economy. But we sometimes fall into a similar trap by saying the world needs more Canadas, that we should project our distinct values abroad. There are, of course, universal rights (as agreed in the UN context) and most would argue values which flow from them. Ensuring these are upheld is one thing. Persuading others that we have unique virtues they should adopt is quite another.

Canadian Contributions to Regime Change and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan

by Jean-Sebastien Rioux

Canada has been involved in military operations in Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea since the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the United States and the invocation of Article V collective defence stipulation of the North Atlantic Charter (stating that an attack on one member is an attack on all members), and the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368 on 12 September 2001 condemning the attacks. Moreover, the Chrétien government sent the greatest contingent of troops and materiel overseas since the Korean War (1950-53) during a one-year period when Canada commanded the Kabul-based International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) from July 2003 to July 2004. Finally, Afghanistan was, until the Iraq war in 2003, Canada’s greatest single-country foreign aid commitment in history – a commitment of almost $400 million to date.

Canada’s commitment to regime change in Afghanistan began as a contribution to the “War on Terror” that began after September 11th 2001. While the Chrétien government was often criticised for having been slow to aid the United States, some elements of the Canadian government did respond swiftly to the 9-11 attacks: for example, the Commander of HMCS Iroquois immediately took his ship to a blocking position off the coast of Halifax should other hostile aircraft attempt to penetrate North American airspace, and Canadian commanders at NORAD were the first to order fighter aircraft into positions over US airspace. After President G.W. Bush launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7th, 2001, Canada sent the HMCS Halifax to the Arabian Sea; she was soon joined by the Iroquois, the Charlottetown and its support ship and helicopters. While Canada did not officially send any ground forces during combat operations inside Afghanistan, that naval task force supported and protected American sea and amphibious forces during the short war to overthrow the Taliban regime, which fell in late November 2001.

In December 2001, Canada was one of 61 donor nations to participate in the Bohn Conference for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The conference’s main goals were to decide on actions to be taken to secure and rebuild Afghanistan. The participating nations agreed to several important steps: first, to invite Hamid Karzai and others to establish an interim administration for six months, until a Loya Girga – or traditional gathering – could name a transitional administration. Next, a timetable for the adoption of a Constitution was set – to be written by a second Loya Girga gathering. Third, donor states were encouraged to participate in the Afghan Reconstruction Fund – which Canada did, pledging an astonishing amount of over $300 million dollars, making Afghanistan our largest aid recipient by far at the time. Finally, it was agreed that an International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), under British command, would impose a security umbrella in and around Kabul so the Afghan interim administration could begin functioning. It is important to note that the United Nations Security Council adopted resolutions supporting all these decisions and tasks.

The ground operations in Afghanistan, however, were not finished as American troops, stationed mostly in the South and East, “hunted down” remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters. The first Canadian ground combat troops arrived in Afghanistan following the Bohn Conference, not to participate in the multinational assistance force in Kabul, but rather to take part in the US’ Enduring Freedom actions around Kandahar and in the mountains near Tora Bora. The elite JTF2 commandos reportedly joined the American forces in Kandahar by December 2001 ; they were later pictured bringing back prisoners in January 2002. A few months later, soldiers from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) suffered four deaths resulting from a gross error by an American pilot; Canadian snipers also helped Americans during the vast Operation Anaconda in the spring of 2002. Canadians were not used to seeing their troops in combat like this, and once the six month deployment was up, the soldiers returned home and were not replaced.

After the return of the 3PPCLI in August 2002, Canada retained a presence in Afghanistan via its foreign aid and the opening of its first Embassy in Kabul. This interlude, as it happens, was just that, because in early 2003 several events conspire to bring Canadian troops back to Afghanistan. First, the United States was on the verge of invading Iraq and Prime Minister Chrétien had resolved to stay out of that conflict; moreover, as our European allies had always been in the lead and in command of ISAF, Canada was asked to participate. The Prime Minister decided – apparently against the advice of his military staff – to commit over 4000 troops and a mission commander for a twelve month period, provided that the responsibility for ISAF be transferred from the current multinational structure to a full-fledged NATO-led mission. This decision, however, did not come without some political costs for the Chrétien government; for example, Major-General Cameron Ross, who was the director of the International Security Policy branch at National Defence Headquarters, resigned in protest.

Nevertheless, the first Canadian contingent to return to Afghanistan in the summer of 2003 consisted of 1,900 troops from the Royal Canadian Regiment, making Canada the largest single contributor to ISAF, with Canadian Major-General Andrew Leslie coming in as second in command of the NATO force. After their six month tour, the soldiers from the RCR were replaced, in late January 2004, by a battle group from Valcartier, Québec, organized around the 3rd battalion of the “Vandoos” (3R22R) and with Canadian Lieutenant-General Rick Hiller in command of ISAF. Canada’s one-year tour as mission leader went very well, as this author would note on a field visit during June 2004, as the international community was busy securing and rebuilding Afghanistan, but also concerned with running Afghanistan’s first democratic elections.

What are the prospects for peace and security in Afghanistan? For the first time, the Canadian government initiated a “3-D” policy for Afghanistan, where “Defence” (Canadian soldiers); “Diplomacy” (Foreign Affairs Canada) and “Development” (the Canadian International Development Agency – CIDA) attempt an integrated approach on the ground in Afghanistan – and now, elsewhere. This author has observed a strong willingness for these actors to work together in Afghanistan, but Canada had the upper-hand at that time as it commanded ISAF and thus had the “muscle” to work with the other departments. As far as the Afghan people are concerned, the overwhelming consensus of the officers and soldiers I spoke with was that the feeling was very positive compared to other places they had served. The fact that the presidential elections were held last October without a single violent incident may augur well for the future of this war-torn and war-weary country.

Photo Caption: The author, in green on the right, at a chance meeting with Laval University studentCpl. Jérémy Boivin who is  serving in Afghanistan as a reservist.
 Photo credit: Paul Turcotte of CIDA.

Some Thoughts on the Nature of Modern Terrorism and Asymmetrical Warfare Funding

by Tami Amanda Jacoby

In the latter half of the Twentieth Century, terrorism has proliferated throughout the world in such diverse locations as Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, Argentina, Colombia and Germany. Terrorists have increasingly adopted religious and/or scriptural sources to legitimize suicide operations, the ultimate sacrifice directed against infidels, which by their very nature involves the death of the perpetrator-turned-martyr. Modern terrorist networks such as Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, the Tamil Tigers, the Hizbollah (Party of God) and the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Palestine, have developed strategies that penetrate social formations and prevent the target audience from sheltering itself from their devastating embrace. What are the implications of this type of terrorism for protection systems and future fault lines for conflict in the contemporary era?

In an era of global telecommunications, mass movement of peoples, religious revivalism, growth of non-state actors and a growing abyss between the haves and have-nots, the Westphalian state system is in crisis. This crisis is particularly acute in the area of national security. “No longer are there definable battlefields or fronts. Indeed, the distinction between civilian and military ceases to exist” The deterioration and reorganization of traditional fault lines for conflict breaks with centuries of European war fighting dominated by the Napoleonic tradition, i.e., offensive combat and a decisive battle against the enemy’s professional standing army (the blitzkrieg attack) with weapons designed to project force from a distance.

By contrast, modern warfare no longer squares off conventional field forces on the battlefield. Instead, states are pitted in opposition to anonymous belligerents, out of uniform, who merge into urban masses and use unconventional tactics and weapons to target innocent civilians in homes, coffee shops, centers of religious worship, on public transportation and on the street.

Not only are the parameters for conflict more ambiguous, the actors waging war have changed. Guerilla movements, rival clans, oppressed ethnic groups, traffickers, computer hackers, terrorists and other extremist groups, some with rather nebulous goals, have exported their conflicts to western regions while retaining ties with their home country through networks and communications. In the shelter of expatriate communities, belligerents are indiscernible as they conduct their routine lives in the host country while using democratic rights and freedoms as a cover for accommodation, planning, fundraising, and recruitment for their activities. Western industrialized democracies have neither the wherewithal nor the intelligence to defeat these sophisticated networks permanently no matter how heavily stocked the state’s military industrial complex may be. Air and naval power using high precision munitions are useless in highly populated urban areas where combatants and non-combatants occupy the same space.

In fact, asymmetrical warfare proves that power can serve as a liability rather than an asset as it magnifies the glaring inequities of the global system and illuminates sites for retribution. “If power implies victory, then weak actors should almost never win against stronger opponents, especially when the gap in relative power is very large”. Yet asymmetrical warfare has demonstrated that the weak win wars.

Vital interests such as weapons storage facilities, banks, stock markets, information systems, computer hardware, transportation systems, water and food supplies and so on, are sites of concentrated power and serve as easily identifiable targets. The World Trade Center represented the epitome of modern industrial society and the immense riches of the western world. The psychological impact of the vulnerability of such a commanding structure to attack has led to major angst and trepidations in otherwise tranquil societies.

Counterterrorist campaigns have been instituted in the world’s leading industrial democracies. Canada responded to 9/11 with military measures (Operation Apollo) and a comprehensive antiterrorism plan, the Anti-terrorism Act (Bill C-36) of October 15, 2001. The Anti-terrorism Act broadened the definition of terrorist activity to include subsidiary and supportive activities that have traditionally occurred in Canada such as fundraising/money-laundering, providing safe haven, procuring weapons, and educating for the purposes of recruitment to carry out terrorist activity. Bill C-36 offered a package of sweeping legislative measures, which “takes aim at terrorist organizations and strengthens investigation, prosecution and prevention of terrorist activities at home and abroad”. Special measures have been given to the RCMP (Royal Canadian Mounted Police) such as preventative arrest, which authorizes the apprehension of suspects under the category of a “security certificate”.

The dilemma for counterterrorism in liberal democracies is the need to simultaneously protect society from terrorism while guarding the democratic process and rule of law. Terrorists seek to destabilize their targets and provoke them to overreact. To combat terrorism, liberal democracies have vacillated between hard-line approaches using emergency powers and armed force, versus more moderate approaches involving diplomacy, intelligence, and the legal system.

During counter-terrorism campaigns, states impinge more heavily on citizens and require them to surrender a degree of their freedoms in order to provide leverage in surveying and apprehending suspects using a range of secretive methods. This involves a greater role for punitive agencies outside the military-industrial complex such as law enforcement, the criminal justice system, and intelligence services. The deliberate suspension or limitation of civil liberty on the grounds of expediency may result in the long-term erosion of civil liberties. Critics have pointed out that the use of “security certificates” has undermined access of suspected terrorists to a fair hearing if they cannot challenge the evidence against them or face their accusers. Ultimately, modern terrorism and asymmetrical warfare necessitate fundamental rethinking of the constraints and opportunities of global security. Perhaps more importantly, it requires a new understanding of the relationship between terrorism and democracy, as liberal democratic countries teeter on the precarious path between the punitive and democratic elements of counterterrorist policy.