Photo by: Corporal Aaron Gravel, Canadian Forces Combat Camera

BRIEFING NOTE

by Dr. Olena Kryzhanivska

August 2026

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Table of Contents

• Summary
• Context
• Counter-UAS in Canada
• Counter-UAS in EU
• Further Considerations for Canada
• About the Author
• Canadian Global Affairs Institute

Summary

• The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates how the saturation of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and rapid battlefield adaptation are accelerating the development of counter-UAS capabilities. No single counter-drone technology can address the full spectrum of threats; effective defence requires a layered system combining detection, identification, tracking, and mitigation.
• Canada’s domestic counter-UAS requirements place particular emphasis on capabilities that can neutralize drones while minimizing collateral risks to civilians, infrastructure, and friendly forces. Priority areas include electronic warfare, direct energy systems, net-based interception, and non-explosive kinetic interceptors.
• Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy places increased emphasis on expanding Canada’s international defence partnerships, with particular attention to the EU. This creates opportunities for deeper Canada-EU cooperation in counter-UAS development, testing, training, and procurement, particularly as European countries rapidly expand their own capabilities in response to the changing security environment.

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Context

• The armed conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated the increasing importance of counter-UAS capabilities as drones become ubiquitous across the battlefield and are employed for reconnaissance, targeting, logistics, electronic warfare, and strike missions.
• In peacetime, adversarial state and non-state actors can employ drones for intelligence gathering, surveillance, sabotage, smuggling, interference with critical infrastructure, and other forms of hostile or illicit activity.
• Counter-drone measures can broadly be divided into kinetic and non-kinetic approaches. Kinetic systems physically disable or destroy drones using projectiles, interceptor drones, nets, or other effectors. While effective for immediate neutralization, some kinetic approaches create risks from falling debris or collateral damage, particularly in populated environments.
• Non-kinetic systems use electronic or electromagnetic effects, including radio-frequency (RF) jamming, GNSS interference or spoofing, and other forms of electronic disruption. Such systems can provide lower-collateral options, although their effectiveness depends on the communications and navigation architecture of the target drone, and they must operate within applicable regulatory constraints.
• Modern warfare demonstrates that there is no universal counter-UAS solution. The appropriate mix of capabilities depends on the threat, operating environment, protected asset, acceptable collateral effects, and whether the systems are intended for military, civilian, or hybrid environments.

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Counter-UAS in Canada

• Canada’s domestic security requirements place particular emphasis on low-collateral counter-UAS effectors.
• Potential threats in the Canadian context include the use of drones for intelligence gathering, surveillance, sabotage, smuggling, or other illicit activities in areas where conventional kinetic weapons may be unsuitable.
• Several capability areas are particularly relevant to Canadian requirements and offer potential opportunities for cooperation with European companies:
  • net-based interception systems;
  • directed-energy systems, including lasers and high-power microwave technologies;
  • electronic warfare capabilities;
  • and non-explosive kinetic interceptors.
• These technologies should not be considered interchangeable. Their suitability depends on several factors, including the required function; whether detection, tracking, identification, or mitigation; the technology employed; whether the system is fixed, mobile, handheld, or UAS-based; and the operational environment in which it is expected to operate.
• Counter-UAS requirements also differ for CAF units deployed overseas. Canadian units operating under Operation REASSURANCE in Latvia, close to Russia and Belarus, must prepare for a broader spectrum of threats associated with contemporary warfare.
• Since 2024, Canada has been expanding the air defence and counter-UAS capabilities available to CAF personnel deployed under Operation REASSURANCE. The government is investing $227.5 million in Saab’s RBS 70 NG short-range air-defence system, which is capable of engaging aircraft, helicopters, and both small and larger UAS.
• Canada is also investing $46 million in counter-drone systems designed to detect, identify, track, and defeat hostile Class 1 UAS. The package includes sensors, command-and-control systems, non-kinetic effectors, training, and in-service support, thereby strengthening the protection of Canada-led NATO forces on the eastern flank.
• On July 23, 2026, the Government of Canada announced the Defence Drone Initiative (DDI), a cross-government program intended to accelerate the development, testing, and fielding of uncrewed and autonomous systems for the CAF and the Canadian Coast Guard. One of the initiative’s six initial use cases focuses on low-cost, low-collateral counter-drone interceptors.
• Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (IDEaS) holds Sandbox challenges focused on counter-UAS technologies. In 2026, participating government agencies are seeking systems capable of detecting and/or defeating micro and mini UAS, with an emphasis on solutions that can be integrated into broader military command-and-control architectures. While IDEaS gives preference to technologies developed in Canada, it also seeks the most effective solutions regardless of origin.

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Counter-UAS in EU

• The European Union faces a different threat environment than Canada. Eastern European countries bordering Ukraine are already experiencing spillover effects from the war, with Russian drones entering their territory either deliberately or after being diverted by electronic warfare. Other European countries are also facing a growing number of hybrid incidents involving drones near airports, industrial sites, defence facilities, and other critical infrastructure.
• At the EU level, counter-UAS has become an increasingly prominent defence and security priority. Two important policy frameworks are the European Commission’s Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030, introduced in October 2025, and the Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security, adopted in February 2026.
• The Defence Readiness Roadmap 2030 seeks to strengthen Europe’s ability to respond rapidly to military and hybrid threats and identifies counter-UAS as one of its major capability priorities. The initiative builds on broader efforts to improve the protection of Europe’s eastern flank and critical infrastructure.
• Earlier proposals for a European “drone wall” were initially associated primarily with border surveillance and efforts to address smuggling, irregular migration, and hybrid threats along the borders with Russia and Belarus. As concerns about unauthorized drone incursions into European airspace increased, the concept evolved toward a broader requirement for integrated surveillance and counter-UAS capabilities along NATO and EU borders.
• The February 2026 Action Plan on Drone and Counter Drone Security moves further toward an integrated, whole-of-government approach to drone threats. Among its principal priorities are:
  • increased EU financial support for drone and counter-drone capabilities through mechanisms including the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and Security Action for Europe (SAFE);
  • support for the rapid industrialization of drone and counter-drone technologies for defence purposes;
  • development of a Drone Alliance Initiative with Ukraine to strengthen an innovative and resilient industrial ecosystem;
  • and expanded exchanges and training involving Ukraine and EU member states, including drone pilots, engineers, and maintenance specialists.
• Canada became the first non-European country to participate in SAFE, which is an EU financial instrument that “finances urgent and large-scale investments in the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), with the aim of boosting production capacity, ensuring the timely availability of defence equipment, and addressing existing capability gaps.”
• Instruments like this can create potential opportunities for Canadian companies and government institutions to cooperate with European partners in areas including counter-UAS testing, interoperability, industrial scaling, supply chain resilience, and operational learning from Ukraine.
• The first business agreement between a Canadian company and a Croatian company to build Canadian sovereign capabilities in drones, AI, and counter-UAS systems was signed in June 2026. It represents an example of Canada–EU industrial cooperation in the counter-UAS sector.

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Further Considerations for Canada

• Counter-UAS should be approached as a layered capability rather than a single solution. Detection, identification, tracking, and mitigation functions should be integrated, while multiple effectors are required to address different types of drones and operational environments.
• Canada-EU cooperation has significant potential, as growing investment in counter-UAS capabilities creates opportunities for joint testing, technology development, interoperability initiatives, and procurement.
• Canada and the EU therefore should establish a dedicated counter-UAS cooperation track focused on capabilities relevant to both domestic security and forward deployed forces. Priority areas could include net-based interception systems, directed energy weapons, electronic warfare, and non-explosive kinetic interceptors.
• Such cooperation should link Canadian operational requirements with Europe’s expanding counter-drone initiatives and Ukraine’s battlefield tested innovation ecosystem. Joint testing, training, and industrial partnerships should prioritize low-collateral solutions for urban and critical infrastructure environments, while also supporting layered counter-UAS defences for forces deployed on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Baltic region.
• Ukraine should remain an important source of operational lessons. The objective should not be to replicate Ukrainian counter-UAS solutions directly but to understand how systems perform against rapidly evolving threats and adapt those lessons to Canadian domestic and expeditionary requirements.

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About the Author

Olena Kryzhanivska is a COVE Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, where she focuses on defence innovations in Canada. She holds a PhD in Political Science from Gazi University (Türkiye). Olena has provided expert analysis to the Norwegian Embassy in Türkiye, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, and the NATO Association of Canada. As an independent researcher for more than two years, she authors the weekly newsletter Ukraine’s Arms Monitor, which covers weapons transfers, defence production, and drone warfare in the context of the Russia–Ukraine war.

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Canadian Global Affairs Institute

The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests. 

The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security. 

In all its activities the Institute is a charitable, non-partisan, non-advocacy organization that provides a platform for a variety of viewpoints. It is supported financially by the contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Institute publications and programs are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Institute staff, fellows, directors, advisors or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to, or collaborate with, the Institute.

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