Photo by: Leading Seaman Valerie LeClair, MARPAC Imaging Services
August 2026
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- The Evolving Air and Missile Defence Environment
- Canada's Intersecting IAMD and Indo-Pacific Interests
- Comparative IAMD Strengths of Canada, Japan and South Korea
- Conclusion
- Policy Recommendations
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the lethality and destructive potential of modern military systems such as ballistic missiles, hypersonic weapons and uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) against urban populations and infrastructure. In particular, Russian air and missile attacks are a leading cause of civilian casualties in Ukraine, many of which have occurred in cities such as the capital, Kyiv, well beyond the front lines. Advances in technology have rapidly enabled aggressive states to strike deep into an opponent’s territory with greater speed and precision. This threat has been exacerbated by the widespread proliferation of robotic systems such as one-way attack drones. Major urban centres and critical infrastructure, including power plants are now threatened not only by expensive long-range missiles but also by large numbers of comparatively inexpensive drones. This poses a considerable challenge for countries such as Canada, who not only have to invest in their integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) capabilities but also ensure the capacity to protect cities and infrastructure across vast geographic areas.
For Canada, the release of Our North, Strong and Free (ONSAF) in 2024 raised the potential for further investments in IAMD, particularly under the banner of NORAD modernization. However, ONSAF narrows its focus mostly towards certain types of air attack threats such as hypersonic missiles and drones rather than ballistic missile defence (BMD). More recently, Canada has also expressed interest in participating in the U.S. “Golden Dome” continental defence imitative which lays out a vision of an integrated, multilayered IAMD architecture for North America.
Yet Canada's air and missile defence interests and requirements likely extend beyond the defence of North America. Canada's Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies the region as increasingly consequential to Canadian security and economic prosperity and commits the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to a more sustained regional presence. This creates an opportunity for Canada to pursue IAMD cooperation with new partners in the Indo-Pacific. Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are prime candidates as they both face acute missile threats and have already invested in their own sophisticated IAMD capabilities and related systems.
This article argues that Canada should find ways to deepen IAMD cooperation with Japan and the ROK. Such cooperation would simultaneously advance several Canadian foreign and defence policy objectives. It would strengthen Canada’s contributions to both continental and Indo-Pacific security while also helping to diversify its defence industrial partnerships with important regional actors and potentially creating new opportunities for Canadian industry. The article begins with an overview of recent trends in IAMD, followed by an assessment of the Indo-Pacific strategic environment. It then examines potentially complementary IAMD capabilities and related industrial strengths across Canada, Japan and the ROK before concluding with a series of policy recommendations.
The Evolving Air and Missile Defence Environment
During the Cold War, the greatest aerospace defence concern was centered on the threat of intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles alongside waves of Soviet bombers flying in from the Arctic. However, the Russian war against Ukraine and its subsequent campaign of conventional mass air attacks using missiles and drones has generated a wealth of data to help analyze modern IAMD requirements. Rather than rely on a single weapons system, Russia has employed a wide range of munitions against Ukrainian targets. These have included Iskander-M short-range ballistic missiles; Kh-47M2 Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missiles; Kh-101 and Kh-59/69 air-launched cruise missiles; sea-launched Kalibr cruise missiles; and Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles. The Russians have also been using North Korean ballistic missiles to strike key Ukrainian defence infrastructure, including steel production plants.
The Russian military has also relied heavily on the use of comparatively inexpensive one-way attack drones, most prominently the Iranian manufactured Shahed system, as well as a diverse variety of other systems, including smaller decoy drones designed to distract Ukrainian sensors and draw away interceptor fire. Essentially, the Russian air campaign has involved a mix of exquisite and expensive missiles for strike missions alongside massed drone attacks intended saturate and overwhelm the Ukrainian air defence systems.
In response to the Russian air onslaught, Ukraine has built a layered air defence network mixing their legacy Soviet-era military equipment with modernized Western systems, fighter aircraft, electronic warfare assets and other types of shorter ranged defences such as self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. One of the most prominent are Patriot missile systems, which have been essential to shooting down Russian ballistic missiles. However, the sheer volume of Russian attacks has placed considerable strain on Ukrainian stocks of missile interceptors, which has led to increased civilian causalities. These shortages have forced Ukraine to seek alternative methods, and to rapidly expand their own defence industrial capacity to manufacture them at a scale that can meet operational demands.
The 2026 U.S. and Israeli military operations against Iran have also reinforced several of the lessons learned regarding IAMD from Ukraine. Iran has responded with a combination of ballistic and cruise missiles, along with uncrewed systems, to strike against regional targets. While the majority of these threats have been successfully intercepted, the attacks have nonetheless demonstrated that even advanced military forces such as those of the United States and Israel cannot guarantee complete protection against air and missile threats. Iran successfully struck several U.S. military facilities in the Middle East, causing casualties and damaging infrastructure, highlighting gaps in the ability of existing U.S. air and missile defences to provide comprehensive protection.
Existing missile defence systems such as the Arrow-2 and Arrow-3, Iron Dome and Patriot, supplemented by fighter aircraft and warships have successfully downed a large number of hostile Iranian systems. However, a pattern emerging from the strikes suggests that traditional missile defence systems are not always well suited to countering the mass scale and geographic scope of Iranian drone attacks, particularly the use of Shahed drones. Moreover, many successful counter-drone efforts have been heavily software dependent, relying on the rapid integration of sensors, data, and command and control systems.
The Indo-Pacific is another region where the threat posed missiles and drones presents a considerable strategic challenge for Canada and its allies. China maintains a large and sophisticated arsenal of domestically produced systems, that is supported by a massive domestic industrial manufacturing capacity which allows it to scale production when needed. The Chinese military posses a mixed group of ballistic and anti-ship missiles, which includes the DF-21D and longer-range DF-26 alongside systems like the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile, providing China with capabilities designed to threaten naval forces operating across the region. China has also prioritized uncrewed systems production within its defence industrial base and is actively developing drone swarm technologies designed to overwhelm air defence systems.
At the same time, many of these systems, along with other munitions such as longer-range cruise missiles carried by Chinese bombers, can strike land based targets, including Japanese territory. China’s defence industrial base has also considerably increased its missile production capacity, including doubling the number of state-owned firms that are involved in producing missile components since 2013 when Xi Jinping assumed the presidency.
However, the more immediate security concern in the Indo-Pacific arguably comes from North Korean air and missile capabilities, which can strike ROK, Japan, and even U.S. territory. North Korean has developed a variety of short and medium range ballistic missiles, while also developing longer range systems and other types of munitions. In particular, Japan’s Ministry of Defense has highlighted the development of North Korea’s low-flying missiles as one of the significant threats to Japanese territory, stating that “North Korea has continuously pursued missile development at an extremely rapid pace, launching ballistic missiles that fly with irregular trajectories”. North Korea has also undertaken six nuclear weapons tests in recent years and is likely developing the ability to field nuclear-armed cruise missiles. In August 2026 North Korea fired 10 ballistic missiles across the sea near the ROK, in direct defiance of UN Security Council resolutions. The ROK government estimates that the North Koreans may possess up to 120 nuclear weapons. Moreover, North Korean military forces are currently supporting Russian military operations in Ukraine, gaining firsthand experience observing and supporting air attack operations.
Canada's Intersecting IAMD and Indo-Pacific Interests
Canada’s approach to IAMD has undergone a significant shift in recent years. ONSAF explicitly commits Canada to “making further contributions to the integrated air and missile defence of Canada and North America,” while importantly recognizing that a “more robust approach to integrated air and missile defence will have significant benefits across all theatres in which Canada operates.” These statements suggest an awareness of the global character of the emerging threat from air and missile attacks and indicates that IAMD capabilities will hold direct relevancy for Canada’s broader alliance commitments.
Canada’s leading scholar on missile defence, James Fergusson, has noted the country’s complicated history with BMD. Canada traditionally maintained an official policy of non-participation in BMD efforts, which has constrained any IAMD investments. More recently, however, Defence Minister David McGuinty has officially removed formal restrictions on Canada’s participation in IAMD operations. Canada also remains committed to investing in NORAD modernization, which includes a partnership with key Indo-Pacific ally Australia on an Arctic Over-the-Horizon Radar system; as well as the acquisition of new platforms such as airborne early warning aircraft that are highly relevant to IAMD efforts. Together, these recent developments suggest Canada’s will continue to accelerate building of IAMD capabilities for the Canadian military.
Canada’s evolving strategic engagement across the Indo-Pacific has considerable relevance to its growing investments in continental defence. In particular, the new Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies both Japan and the ROK as key regional partners and pledges to expand its defence cooperation with both states. For example, the strategy points to existing initiatives such as Operation North Pacific Guard which addresses illegal fishing, and Operation NEON which focuses on enforcing sanctions against North Korea and supporting denuclearization efforts as core foundations for further engagement. It also highlights cyber operations as a particular area of interest for future investments. Beyond defence matters, the strategy also outlines opportunities for Canada to, “strengthen our supply chains through new and existing trade and investment agreements” in the region, providing an important economic and industrial dimension to Canada’s expanding regional engagement.
Effective IAMD likely requires the close coordination of different partners, as developing a modern architecture requires a diverse set of technologies, as well as the industrial capacity to produce and sustain those systems. IAMD involves far more than just the physical interceptors that will destroy any hostile missile or other aerospace threats. Instead, it requires a true ‘system of systems’ that integrates new sensos, space-based assets, digitalized command and control networks with artificial intelligence (AI) for data processing and management, secure cloud networks to transmit sensitive data, electronic warfare capabilities, along with a variety of physical effectors. Coalition orientated IAMD is already common, for example, NATO maintains a robust IAMD policy, which facilitates sharing of relevant resources and provides a shared framework for protecting critical targets. Essentially, the U.S. is one of the few countries that can likely build and operate a unliteral IAMD architecture. Middle powers such as Canada will therefore need to work closely with willing partners to develop and sustain comparable capabilities.
Japan and the ROK are particularly attractive partners in this respect, as all three countries have shared security concerns in the Indo-Pacific, particularly regarding the threat posed by North Korean missiles. Canada, Japan, and the ROK also have longstanding defence relationships with the United States and are used to coalition military operations. However, recent tensions with the Trump Administration may drive them towards strategic diversification, especially on matters relating to defence industrial cooperation. Interestingly, Canada’s Defence Industrial Strategy’s (DIS) Build-Partner-Buy framework provides a potentially useful guide for enhancing cooperation. While the DIS prioritizes sovereign control of technology, it also recognizes that some defence capabilities should likely be developed collaboratively with trusted allies, while in other cases, acquiring proven foreign systems represents the most efficient option.
Comparative IAMD Strengths of Canada, Japan and South Korea
Japan maintains one of the most robust and sophisticated IAMD architectures in the region, and continues to invest heavily in its development, as outlined in its recent Defence White Papers. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces possess a fleet of eight Aegis-equipped destroyers armed with the SM-3 family of exo-atmospheric interceptors, which provide a key layer of Japan’s BMD. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force operates Patriot PAC-3 batteries that provides a second layer of coverage of their mainland territory. These platforms and systems are connected to a variety of sensors and airborne early warning assets and coordinated through the Aerospace Defense Ground Environment. The prominence of the Aegis and Patriot systems reflects its close relationship with the U.S., which has played a major role in shaping Japanese defence policy and procurement decisions.
Japan’s Self-Defence Forces are currently undertaking a wider transformation of their missile defence posture, to shift beyond a predominantly BMD focused approach towards an IAMD architecture capable of addressing a variety of aerospace threats. This transformation will include the acquisition of new capabilities to counter hypersonic glide vehicles and smaller uncrewed systems, as the Ministry of Defence has acknowledged that “existing missile defense system will not be sufficient to fully counter these [new] threats on its own.” Japan is also preparing to integrate more cloud networks into its IAMD architecture. While domestic industry, such as Mitsubishi Electric also plan to expand their defence portfolios, including through increased involvement in surface-to-air missile systems and the development of new radar and surveillance capabilities
The ROK has also developed a layered air and missile defence architecture, which was response to the threat of North Korean ballistic and cruise missiles. While historically dependent on cooperation with the U.S. military for its aerospace defence needs, the ROK has subsequently shifted attention towards domestically developed systems. The Korean Air and Missile Defence system adopts a multi-layered approach involving a mix of long, medium and short range interceptor systems. U.S. developed systems such as the Patriot and THAAD remain a key component of this layering. However, the ROK is heavily investing in domestically produced systems such as the Cheongung-II interceptor, which is designed to destroy hostile missiles and aircraft. The L-Sam missile provides an additional higher-altitude layer, allowing for interception before other systems like the Patriot are even in range. The ROK’s Defense Acquisition and Program Administration (DAPA) is also pursuing the development of the more capable L-SAM II, alongside a new Low-Altitude Missile Defence system.
The ROK Navy is increasingly seeking to replace U.S.-produced air-defence munitions with domestically developed alternatives. The new KDDX guided-missile destroyers are expected to be the first vessels equipped with locally produced long-range Ship-to-Air Missile II. The missile is subsequently expected to be integrated across other ROK Navy surface combatants, reducing reliance on U.S. supplied systems while strengthening domestic missile-production capacity. ROK industry remains significantly involved in IAMD capabilities development. For example, Hanwha Aerospace produces next generation missile interceptors, while Hanwha Systems develops new radar and systems for those interceptors. Taken together, these factors indicate that the ROK has a strong domestic industrial capacity to support the deployment of new IAMD capabilities.
At present, Canada possesses considerably less mature IAMD capabilities than Japan and the ROK and would likely need to approach any partnership from a different starting point. Unlike these Indo-Pacific states, Canada posses only limited ground-based air and missile defence capabilities. However, it has accumulated decades of practical experience operating within an integrated continental aerospace defence architecture through NORAD, where Canadian personnel have worked closely alongside their U.S. counterparts within a binational command responsible for the defence of North American. Canada has committed to investing heavily in NORAD modernization, including the acquisition of modernized digital command and control systems, the development of cloud networks, and the introduction of a new generation of sensors. Most recently, the Canadian Defence Team has signaled the intent to acquire a supply of low-cost drone interceptors as it continues to invest in various counter-uncrewed systems capabilities.
Canada does, however, have several potential strengths it could bring to any future IAMD partnership. For example, Canada possess a well established Artificial Intelligence research ecosystem which includes major industry entities such as Cohere, alongside a network of academic research labs. These various organizations possess complimentary strengths in areas such as AI training, deep learning, machine learning, and related fields. The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces AI strategy commits the Canadian Defence Team to a transformation intended to make the military ‘AI enabled’ by 2030. AI has considerable potential application for IAMD, particularly in processing and analysing vast volumes of sensor data and accelerating the command and control cycle in fast-paced operational environments. Canada can also leverage its geographic familiarity with the Arctic, and its growing military presence in the region as another area of strength, given the High North’s importance for detecting and tracking missile trajectories through early warning systems.
Conclusion
Modernizing IAMD capabilities is a strategic necessity that must remain a priority for Canada and its allies. Geography is no longer a security guarantee, as rapid technological advances increasingly allow kinetic threats to reach Canadian territory. Canada therefore requires IAMD capabilities to protect its infrastructure and urban centres, while maintaining credible conventional deterrence. At the same time, Canada must continue to reassess and diversify its defence partnerships. While NORAD and NATO will continue to play major roles in Canadian security policy, Canada should still seek out new relationships with likeminded partners that can help protect its international interests. To that end, the ROK and Japan emerge as two of the most promising candidates. All three countries have a shared interest in helping one another given their mutual security concerns and complementary interests across the Indo-Pacific.
What must follow are tangible policy measures that can be realistically implemented in the short and medium term, which can establish a foundation for deepening cooperation in the future. A trilateral approach to IAMD would allow Canada, Japan, and the ROK to share technological and industrial costs while improving interoperability and strengthening their respective contributions to regional and continental defence. For Canada in particular, this would provide an opportunity to leverage its NORAD modernization experiences and defence industrial strengths in AI and other emerging technologies to become a more capable and consequential partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Policy Recommendations
Explore avenues for the co-development of systems through formalized joint research and development projects. Other initiatives such as AUKUS Pillar II and the UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Air Programme demonstrate how other countries are pursuing cooperative approaches to emerging technologies, from which Canada could draw important lessons and best practices. Such efforts could be built around the development of a new generation of interceptors, command and control technologies, or sensors, but ideally would also leverage Canadian industrial strengths such as AI.
Hold regular trilateral military exercises based around IAMD scenarios. These could initially take the form of tabletop exercise which are comparatively inexpensive and easier to organize, and if successful, could develop into regular joint field exercises. This would enable junior and mid-level officers, who are likely to spend the next several decades in military service, to gain valuable early-career experience working alongside their Indo-Pacific counterparts. Over time, these relationships could build the institutional familiarity and trust necessary to shape the integration of joint IAMD matters for years to come.
Global Affairs Canada and other relevant government organizations should coordinate with counterparts in the ROK and Japan to establish trade events focused on IAMD related technologies. These events would facilitate ‘business to business’ engagement among potential suppliers and partners. Such interactions could help identify complementary industrial capabilities, establish supply chain relationships and ultimately generate opportunities for future co-development arrangements.
About the Author
Dr. Alexander Salt has a PhD from the University of Calgary’s Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies and an MA in Political Studies from the University of Manitoba. His dissertation explores to what extent has the battlefield experience of the U.S. military influenced post-war organizational innovation. His research has been awarded the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada’s Joseph-Armand Bombardier Doctoral Award, as well as a General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Memorial Dissertation Fellowship. He has published research relating to international security and defence policy with Strategic Studies Quarterly, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, and The Canadian Network for Research on Terrorism, Security, and Society. Previously, he was a Visiting Political Science Instructor with Macalester College and has also held positions with the Centre for Defence and Security Studies, as well as the Consulate General of Canada in Dallas, Texas, and the Consulate General of Canada in Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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