Image credit: Wikimedia Commons
by Julie Kim
October 2024
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
- Why Russia and North Korea are seeking closer ties
- Implications for Indo-Pacific security
- ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation
- Outlook and implications for ROK-Canada defence cooperation
- End Notes
- About the Author
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
On June 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang and held a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. The last time Putin made a visit to the country was 24 years ago in July 2000 when he met with Kim Jong Il, the father of North Korea’s current leader, and signed a Joint Declaration. This time, the two leaders upgraded their relations by signing a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” (CSP) treaty.1
Following the CSP treaty, Russia and North Korea are engaging more openly. In late July, Putin offered humanitarian aid to help North Korea cope with damages from massive floods, which destroyed more than 4,000 homes in North Korea’s border regions near China.2 Russia also sent a shipment of more than 400 goats to North Korea, which was intended to provide dairy products for North Korean children.3 The two countries are also deepening their military ties and increasing the exchange of high-level delegations. Recently, Kim Jong Sik, a sanctioned North Korean official responsible for the ballistic missile development program, attended a Russian defence exhibition in Moscow that took place between August 12 and 14.4 Additionally, on September 14, Russia’s Security Council Secretary Sergei Shoigu travelled to Pyongyang for talks with Kim Jong Un.5 While there is no concrete evidence that Russia is directly assisting North Korea in developing ballistic missiles, satellites, or other weapons, the increasing military cooperation between the two countries raises significant concerns for South Korea and its allies.
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
The contents of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership suggest that the two sides are attempting to build the basis for long-term and multi-faceted relations across military, economic, and political cooperation. For instance, the two sides pledged to work towards “global strategic stability” and the “establishment of a new fair and equal international order” (Article 2), increase the trade volume and create favorable conditions for economic cooperation (Article 8), and to expand cooperation in the science and technology fields, including space, artificial intelligence, and IT (Article 10).
The new treaty also includes a mutual defence clause, which provides North Korea with additional protection against potential external threats from its enemies, such as South Korea and the U.S.6 According to Article 4 of the CSP, in case either country is “put in a state of war,” the other side shall “provide military and other assistance with all means in its possession without delay.” This text closely resembles Article 1 of the 1961 Treaty7 between the Soviet Union and DPRK, signed during the Cold War.8 The scope and meaning of this clause is not exactly clear. However, the fact that the treaty formalized the possibility of Russian military involvement in the Korean Peninsula is highly symbolic and a cause for concern for many countries.
Why Russia and North Korea are seeking closer ties
As both countries face international isolation and multiple sanctions – Russia over its invasion of Ukraine and North Korea over its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program – Russia and North Korea have many reasons to strengthen their partnership.
Russia has increasingly relied upon North Korea for munitions. The war in Ukraine is a war of attrition, where Russia and Ukraine try to outgun each other and exchange heavy fire daily. This means that North Korean supplies, regardless of their quality, helps Russia maintain an edge over Ukraine and prolong its war. There is already ample evidence that North Korea has provided Russia with ballistic missiles and artillery shells, despite both Moscow and Pyongyang denying having done so.9 On September 17, 2024, Stars and Stripes reported that in a confirmation hearing for the Army general nominated to command U.S. forces in South Korea, Senator Mark Kelly of Arizona said that North Korea has sent more than 16,000 containers of munitions to Russia.10 As a result, on May 16, 2024, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Russia-based individuals and entities connected to weapon transfers between North Korea and Russia.11 The CSP treaty has now formalized the arrangement that allows Russia’s continued access to North Korea’s cheap and abundant weapons and munitions.
For North Korea, Russia’s purchases of its weapons provide the regime with valuable payments including cash and food, both of which are crucial for the survival of the Kim regime. It also provides North Korea with a rare opportunity to test its weapons in battlefield conditions, which is particularly concerning for South Korea. Furthermore, the U.S. and its allies are deeply concerned about the potential for transfer of advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or ballistic missile-related technology from Russia to North Korea in return for providing weaponry. This would deteriorate stability in the Indo-Pacific and further threaten global security.
Implications for Indo-Pacific security
Seoul and Moscow drift further apart
Following the Putin-Kim Summit, South Korea and its allies expressed deep concerns. In particular, relations between Russia and South Korea have deteriorated significantly over the past few years, beginning with South Korea’s participation in sanctions against Russia for its war in Ukraine.12 Shortly after the summit, South Korean National Security Adviser Chang Ho-jin announced that South Korea would consider supplying weapons to Ukraine, to which Putin responded by saying that would be “a big mistake”.13 Additionally, on June 25, during a speech commemorating the 74th anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War, ROK President Yoon Suk Yeol stated that the new North Korea-Russia treaty was a “blatant violation” of United Nations Security Council Resolutions and an “anachronistic act.”14 As such, any decision by South Korea to provide lethal weapons directly to Ukraine and/or by Russia to provide WMD or ballistic missile-related technology to North Korea would drive South Korea and Russia even further apart.
A Russia-China-DPRK triangle
As Russia and North Korea strengthen their ties, China’s involvement and influence will be crucial in shaping the regional dynamics. Russia and North Korea are China’s closest strategic partners and long-time allies. Despite the likelihood of increased economic cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang, China cannot be replaced in its critical role in both countries’ economies. For instance, according to statistics from the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), China typically accounts for over 95 per cent of North Korea’s external trade, reaching 98 per cent in 2023.15 China will also want to ensure that it remains the paramount foreign influence on North Korea’s foreign policies.
The evolving partnership between Russia and North Korea is unlikely to isolate China; instead, it could facilitate trilateral cooperation in pursuit of shared strategic interests. In this case, a Russia-China-DPRK triangle would pose a serious security threat to South Korea and Japan and have significant implications for Indo-Pacific stability. These three countries share a common adversary, namely the U.S. and its allies. However, each country is distinct from the others, and the nature of their adversarial relationships varies significantly – from the war in Ukraine to trade war and struggle for dominance in the Indo-Pacific, and to threats on the Korean Peninsula.16
At the same time, China will want to keep its options open and “preserve some manoeuvrability” to maintain good relationships and robust economic ties with South Korea, Japan, and the U.S.17 For this reason, it is highly unlikely that China will engage in an open and formal alliance or partnership with Russia and North Korea. Another key point to consider is how tolerant China is of the military technology that Russia may provide to North Korea.18 China is concerned that North Korea could take military actions that would destabilize the region, and has been very careful about appearing as part of a China-Russia-DPRK axis.19 Therefore, the CSP, especially its mutual defence clause, creates more headaches for Beijing20 than advantages, as it raises the risk of confrontation in the Indo-Pacific region and could trigger the U.S. and its allies to bolster their military presence.
ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral security cooperation
In August 2023, the leaders of the United States, South Korea, and Japan held a trilateral summit at Camp David, where they announced plans to deepen their security partnership. This includes enhancing strategic coordination between the U.S.-ROK and U.S.-Japan alliances and launching an annual Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue.21 The new Russia-DPRK treaty will likely accelerate the three allies’ efforts to strengthen their security cooperation.
A few days after the Putin-Kim Summit, South Korea, the United States, and Japan issued a Joint Statement condemning the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea, warning of its negative impact on Indo-Pacific and global security. The senior officials of the three countries underlined that the advancement of the DPRK-Russia partnership should be of grave concern in the interest of “maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, upholding the global non-proliferation regime, and supporting the people of Ukraine as they defend their freedom and independence against Russia’s brutal aggression.”22
Furthermore, starting in 2024, the three countries agreed to hold a trilateral multi-domain military exercise called Freedom Edge. This exercise aims to enhance trilateral interoperability and will focus on areas such as cooperative ballistic missile defence, anti-submarine warfare, search and rescue, and defensive cyber training.23 The inaugural exercise took place between June 27 and 29, a week after Putin’s visit to Pyongyang. Additionally, on July 28, 2024, the defence leaders from the three countries held a Trilateral Ministerial Meeting in Japan, where they signed the Memorandum of Cooperation on the Trilateral Security Cooperation Framework. This framework aims to institutionalize their security cooperation, including senior-level policy consultations, information sharing, and trilateral exercises.24
Outlook and implications for ROK-Canada defence cooperation
The deepening relationship between Russia and North Korea poses a significant threat to global security, particularly for South Korea. As a result, South Korea will likely turn to its allies to enhance security partnerships. It will continue to strengthen trilateral security cooperation with the U.S. and Japan, while also seeking greater collaboration with NATO, as security concerns in the Indo-Pacific and Europe become increasingly interconnected.25 South Korea is involved with NATO through the Indo-Pacific Partners (IP4), which also includes Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. At the NATO Summit held on July 9-11, 2024, the IP4 countries issued a Joint Statement condemning the growing military cooperation between Russia and North Korea.26
Canada also has a direct interest in security on the Korean Peninsula and in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Since the Korean War (1950-1953), during which more than 26,000 Canadians served, Canada has maintained a continuous presence in the United Nations Command (UNC) and has modestly expanded its role, including serving a second term as Deputy Commander. Building on this longstanding commitment, Canada released its new Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS)27 in 2022. The updated defence strategy, Our North, Strong and Free,28 further identifies the Indo-Pacific as a key strategic region for Canada’s future prosperity and stability. The Russia-DPRK CSP is, therefore, a threat to Canada’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
As security threats in the Indo-Pacific continue to grow, Canada’s military presence in the region is increasing. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are deployed to strengthen military cooperation with allies under Operation HORIZON29 and to participate in multinational efforts to enforce UN sanctions against North Korea under Operation NEON.30 Additionally, Canada participates in Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC),31 the world’s largest biennial maritime exercise,32 and Exercise PACIFIC VANGUARD33 alongside the ROK, Japan, and the U.S.
As long-time allies, South Korea and Canada elevated their relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in September 2022. Since then, the two countries have expressed mutual interest in further strengthening defence cooperation, held joint meetings on material cooperation, and signed several Memorandum of Understanding (MOUs) on defence industry collaboration.34 In September 2024, Canada’s Minister of National Defence, Bill Blair, visited South Korea.35 During his visit, Minister Blair met with South Korea’s Minister of National Defense, Kim Yong-Hyun, and expressed concerns over North Korea’s military threats, ballistic missile launches, and nuclear weapons development. He also addressed the deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia.36 In response, Minister Blair reaffirmed Canada’s commitment to maintaining security on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific. This visit provided an opportunity for Canada to position itself as a valuable partner to its Indo-Pacific allies and strengthen security cooperation with South Korea.
Canada needs to take more concrete steps to accelerate ROK-Canada defence cooperation to respond to the growing security threats in the Indo-Pacific. For example, Canada and South Korea could enhance interoperability in areas such as ballistic missile defence, anti-submarine warfare, and cyber security to better prepare for potential threats. Additionally, expanding intelligence and information sharing would help counter cyber security threats from North Korea and Russia. Furthermore, the two countries could expand defence industry collaboration and pursue joint development projects on AI and other emerging technologies in the defence sector. Through these collaborative efforts, Canada and South Korea can bolster their defence capabilities and contribute to Indo-Pacific regional stability.
End Notes
1 KCNA, “DPRK-Russia Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,” June 20, 2024. http://kcna.kp/en/article/q/6a4ae9a744af8ecdfa6678c5f1eda29c.kcmsf.
2 Ifang Bremer, “Putin offers flood aid to North Korea, but Kim Jong Un says no thanks for now,” NK News, August 5, 2024. https://www.nknews.org/2024/08/putin-offers-flood-aid-to-north-korea-but-kim-jong-un-says-no-thanks-for-now/.
3 Soo-yeon Kim, “(LEAD) Russia sends hundreds of goats to N. Korea amid deepening bilateral ties,” Yonhap News Agency, August 13, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240813005451315?section=search.
4 Soo-yeon Kim, “Sanctioned N. Korean official handling missile programs attends arms exhibition in Moscow: report,” Yonhap News Agency, August 13, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240813001100315?section=search.
5 Joyce Lee, “North Korea’s Kim meets Russia’s Shoigu, vows more cooperation, KCNA says,” Reuters, September 13, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-koreas-kim-jong-un-meets-russias-shoigu-kcna-says-2024-09-13/.
6 Rachel Minyoung Lee, “Takeaways From the Kim-Putin Summit: Cooperation and Conflict for Russia and North Korea,” 38 North, June 21, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2024/06/takeaways-from-the-kim-putin-summit/.
7 Article 1: Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.
8 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, “Treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance,” signed at Moscow, on 6 July 1961. https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20420/volume-420-I-6045-English.pdf.
9 Jean Mackenzie, “North Korean weapons are killing Ukrainians. The implications are far bigger,” BBC, May 4, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68933778.
10 Corey Dickstein, “Army general nominated to lead US forces in Korea concerned about what Russia is giving North Korea in exchange for munitions,” Stars and Stripes, September 17, 2024. https://www.stripes.com/branches/army/2024-09-17/army-general-korea-russia-pact-senate-15210507.html.
11 Matthew Miller, “Imposing Sanctions in Response to DPRK-Russia Weapon Deals,” US Department of State Press Statement, May 16, 2024. https://www.state.gov/imposing-sanctions-in-response-to-dprk-russia-weapon-deals/.
12 Ellen Kim, “Seoul-Moscow Relations on a Dangerous Slippery Slope,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), February 22, 2024. https://www.csis.org/analysis/seoul-moscow-relations-dangerous-slippery-slope.
13 Eun-jung Kim, “S. Korea’s level of arms supply to Ukraine hinges on Russia's actions: presidential office,” Yonhap News Agency, June 21, 2024. https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240621006000315.
14 The Korea Times, “Yoon denounces defense treaty between N. Korea, Russia as ‘anachronistic’,” June 25, 2024. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/07/113_377350.html.
15 Statistics Korea, Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), https://kosis.kr/bukhan/ (website available only in Korean).
16 I am grateful to James Trottier for his insightful comments on this part.
17 Vina Nadjibulla and Erin Williams, “Russia-North Korea Security Pact Fuses Northeast Asian and European Security,” Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada Insights, June 26, 2024. https://www.asiapacific.ca/publication/russia-north-korea-security-pact-2024.
18 I am grateful to Marius Grinius for his insightful comments on this part.
19 David Pierson and Choe Sang-Hun, “Russia and North Korea’s Defense Pact Is a New Headache for China,” The New York Times, June 20, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/20/world/asia/china-russia-north-korea.html?smid=url-share.
20 Ibid.
21 The White House, “The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States,” August 18, 2023. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.
22 Republic of Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement by Senior Officials of the United States, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan on DPRK-Russia Cooperation,” June 24, 2024. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5676/view.do?seq=322605&page=1.
23 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Public Affairs, “TRILATERAL STATEMENT: First Execution of Multi-Domain Japan – ROK – U.S. Exercise FREEDOM EDGE,” June 27, 2024. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3819042/trilateral-statement-first-execution-of-multi-domain-japan-rok-us-exercise-free/.
24 U.S. Department of Defense, “Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement,” July 27, 2024. https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/.
25 Jenny Town, “Takeaways From the Kim-Putin Summit: Russia and North Korea Upgrade Relations,” 38 North, June 21, 2024. https://www.38north.org/2024/06/takeaways-from-the-kim-putin-summit/.
26 Republic of Korea Office of the President, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of New Zealand, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia,” July 11, 2024. https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/fm9l2gRT.
27 Global Affairs Canada, Canada’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/indo-pacific-indo-pacifique/index.aspx?lang=eng.
28 Department of National Defence, Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada’s Defence. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/corporate/reports-publications/north-strong-free-2024.html.
29 Department of National Defence, Operation HORIZON. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-horizon.html.
30 Department of National Defence, Operation NEON. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/military-operations/current-operations/operation-neon.html.
31 U.S. Navy, RIMPAC. https://www.cpf.navy.mil/RIMPAC/.
32 In 2024, the ROK navy served as Deputy Commander for the first time.
33 U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, “U.S., Allied Forces Join for Exercise Pacific Vanguard 2024,” August 26, 2024. https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3885524/.
34 For more detailed information on these developments, refer to the briefing note, “Minister Blair’s Visit to the ROK: The Next Steps in Canada-Korea Defence Relations,” available on the CGAI website: https://www.cgai.ca/minister_blairs_visit_to_the_rok_the_next_steps_in_canada_korea_defence_relations.
35 Department of National Defence, “Minister Blair to travel to the Republic of Korea and Japan,” September 6, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/09/minister-blair-to-travel-to-the-republic-of-korea-and-japan.html.
36 Department of National Defence, “Minister Blair meets with the Republic of Korea’s Minister of National Defense, Kim Yong-Hyun,” September 11, 2024. https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/news/2024/09/minister-blair-meets-with-the-republic-of-koreas-minister-of-national-defense-kim-yong-hyun.html.
About the Author
Dr. Julie (Jung-eun) Kim is a Post-Doctoral Fellow leading the Korea Program at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) and a Country Expert on North Korea for the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). She received a PhD in Political Science from Heidelberg University as a German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) scholar. Her dissertation explores the social control system and autocratic regime stability in North Korea. She has a Master of Arts in North Korean Studies and a Bachelor of Arts in German Language and Literature from Ewha Womans University.
Julie has previously worked as a Research Intern at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and a Global Asia Fellow at the East Asia Foundation. She has published various articles and a book chapter, including in the Journal of East Asian Studies, BTI Country Report – North Korea, and Global Asia. Her research interests include authoritarian regimes, geopolitics with a regional focus on the Korean Peninsula, and Canada-Korea defence cooperation.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
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