Image credit: Adrian Wyld/The Canadian Press
by David Carment, Danika Brown, and Dani Belo
December 2024
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- A Complex Grey Zone Security Environment
- Conflict Transportation
- Canada’s Diaspora Politics
- Recommendations
- About the Authors
- Canadian Global Affairs Institute
Introduction
This paper draws on a larger study submitted by the authors to the Foreign Interference Commission - Foreign Interference in a Geopolitical Context: Transnational Linkages, Diaspora Mobilisation and Grey Zone Conflict.
As a middle power, Canada faces significant challenges in navigating heightened security concerns, being pulled between powerful global actors. Its close economic and political ties with the U.S. brings both benefits and vulnerabilities, often subjecting Canada to external pressures, such as sanctions or policy alignment demands. Simultaneously, Canada must contend with covert foreign interference from other, mostly authoritarian global players, who seek to manipulate its institutions and undermine democracy. This position forces Canada to balance its dependence on the U.S. while defending against broader international threats, complicating its efforts to maintain sovereignty and protect its national interests.
According to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), foreign interference includes attempts by state or non-state actors to covertly manipulate, intimidate, or corrupt Canadian entities in ways that benefit foreign interests. These actions can target individuals, organizations, or the government, both inside and outside of Canada's borders, and are designed to influence democratic processes or political agendas.
In response, Canadian policymakers must navigate a world where such interference is a constant possibility, balancing the interests of continentalism with the need to protect sovereignty and democracy from foreign influence and interference on a global scale.
The distinction between “legitimate” foreign influence and “illegitimate” foreign interference is a crucial yet complex one. Legitimate foreign influence occurs when a country attempts to sway another nation’s decisions through open, transparent means — such as diplomatic dialogue, formal agreements, or public lobbying. While these actions may still positively or negatively affect different groups within the target country, they are considered part of routine international relations. However, as noted, transparency in these efforts can be debated, and influence may still lack full openness.
Illegitimate foreign interference, on the other hand, is characterized by its covert nature, making it inherently dangerous. Interference occurs when foreign actors use deceptive tactics, such as manipulating information or engaging in activities meant to hide their involvement or intentions, with the goal of influencing political processes, public opinion, or specific groups. This distinction is crucial for Canada, where interference often targets its political institutions or citizens in ways that harm the nation's sovereignty.
Canada now finds itself in a challenging position, navigating the “grey zone” between legitimate influence and covert interference, where foreign actors, both allies and adversaries, may use legal or diplomatic channels for deceptive purposes. In this space, it becomes difficult to discern where influence ends and interference begins. For example, lobbying, a legitimate process that operates under clear guidelines and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, can be contrasted with interference, where foreign states conceal their involvement, direction, or funding.
This covert action of deliberately obscuring transparency is a hallmark feature of foreign interference. In response, Canadian policymakers must remain vigilant, ensuring that they can differentiate between benign influence and harmful interference to protect national security and maintain sovereignty. These complex mechanisms of influence and interference must both be addressed in the broader context of the global grey zone security environment.
A Complex Grey Zone Security Environment
Grey zone conflicts and threats therein have come to dominate the contemporary international and national security space. Grey zone tools and tactics, often involving non-state diaspora groups, are deliberately adopted due to being below the threshold of traditional warfare, thus creating uncertainty in how to respond. Mazarr (2015) and Belo (2019) note that grey zone threats are characterized by non-military tactics such as cyber operations, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion to achieve strategic objectives without triggering an overt military response. As state actors increasingly rely on these methods to exert influence, grey zone conflicts are becoming more common, reflecting the evolving nature of global power competition. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and China's activities in the South China Sea are prime examples, where both countries have used a combination of political warfare, cyber-attacks, and manipulation of international norms to further their goals without escalating into full-scale war. This strategic ambiguity allows states to challenge adversaries while avoiding the risks associated with traditional military conflict.
Diaspora groups are increasingly recognized as vulnerable to manipulation by states seeking to expand their influence beyond their borders. Foreign regimes can exploit ethnic and cultural ties to foster loyalty among diaspora members, using them as conduits for promoting their foreign policy objectives. This manipulation often involves covert tactics, such as disseminating state-sponsored disinformation, funding ethnic organizations, or pressuring individuals to act as informal representatives of the home government.
Studies have shown that diaspora communities can be targeted through cultural or religious institutions, media outlets, or even coercive measures like threats against family members in the homeland. Such activities not only undermine the political autonomy of diaspora groups, they can also destabilize the host country by fostering divisions or manipulating public opinion.
In countries like Canada, which hosts large diaspora populations, these tactics are of particular concern as foreign states - both ally and adversary - may attempt to exert undue influence on domestic politics through these communities. Addressing the manipulation of diaspora groups requires a nuanced understanding of transnational ties and the ways in which adversaries and allies may exploit them to project soft power or interfere in democratic processes.
Conflict Transportation
Conflict transportation refers to the process by which conflicts, even low-intensity ones like criminal activities, are "imported" into new territories, particularly in diaspora settings. This phenomenon involves the transmission of conflict-related actors, ideas, values, and narratives from a home country to a diaspora community abroad. The roots of these transported conflicts can stem from a range of factors, including historical rivalries linked to colonialism, homeland nationalism, and the actions (or inactions) of host countries toward diaspora communities.
Diaspora communities often maintain strong ties to their home countries, and these connections can drive the process of conflict transportation. As studies have shown, the reluctance or inability of host countries to fully integrate diaspora members into society can result in these communities re-investing in their homelands, particularly when conflicts erupt or persist. This re-engagement may take the form of both political actions and discursive violence, such as verbal or symbolic acts aimed at furthering their homeland's causes in the new setting.
In Western democracies such as Canada and the U.S., diaspora groups have played a significant role in conflict transportation by transmitting homeland conflicts into their host societies. For example, the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. has actively lobbied for American political recognition of the Armenian genocide, a deeply rooted historical grievance tied to homeland nationalism. Similarly, the Kurdish diaspora in Canada has been involved in advocating for Kurdish autonomy and independence, mobilizing support through protests, fundraising, and lobbying Canadian politicians. These actions not only extend the homeland conflict into new territories but also introduce host societies to complex geopolitical issues, often placing pressure on domestic policy. In many cases, these diaspora groups leverage their access to political platforms, freedom of speech, and digital tools in their host countries to further their causes.
Diasporas that promote conflict in their homeland through financial and discursive support, lobbying and propaganda are engaged in nonviolent - but politically - charged activities. When such actions destabilize both Canada and the homeland the threshold between influence and interference is crossed.
In Canada, the issue is further complicated by government policies that can inadvertently exacerbate conflict transportation. Favouritism shown by politicians and cabinet members toward certain diaspora groups - evident through initiatives that allocate substantial resources and political favours to some groups while overlooking others - can heighten tensions between communities. These preferential policies have played out in shifts in Canada’s relationships with countries like Russia, Israel, China, and India, where governments have leveraged diaspora political agendas to advance their interests domestically. Such shifts risk opening Canada to foreign exploitation, as external actors may seek to manipulate diaspora groups to disrupt internal affairs.
Historically, Canadian governments understood that the country's security depended on policies that served the interests of many diverse groups, rather than a select few. However, recent administrations, both Liberal and Conservative, have supported more narrowly defined ethnic nationalism in overseas conflicts, favouring some diaspora communities over others. This can lead to disputes from other countries being brought into Canadian politics, further complicating Canada’s internal affairs and potentially undermining social cohesion. Thus, diaspora politics in Canada, when not managed inclusively, risk intensifying the process of conflict transportation, creating domestic tensions while allowing foreign states to exploit divisions.
Canada’s Diaspora Politics
Canada's diaspora agendas, influenced by the actions and requests of its allies, are often shaped by external pressures, even when these decisions may have negative consequences for the country’s domestic well-being. A key example is Canada's engagement in social media campaigns that mirror narratives from Europe and the U.S. which has, at times, exposed implicit biases. These biases have been exploited by adversaries like Russia.
For instance, during the Freedom Convoy protests, Russia allegedly used a Kremlin-backed propaganda outlet to amplify coverage of the event. This outlet reportedly produced a large volume of content, including interviews with protest participants. Despite its origin, the Russian network’s coverage was widely circulated among Freedom Convoy supporters, helping to bolster sympathy for the movement. Russia's objective in this instance, as suggested by experts, was not to influence a specific electoral outcome but rather to sow chaos and distrust. The FBI’s Foreign Influence Task Force has noted that Russia’s current strategy focuses on generating confusion by blurring the line between fact and misinformation, further eroding public trust in traditional media.
Another prominent example of Russian influence tactics was its involvement in promoting ”Wexit,” a secessionist movement in Alberta. While Western alienation has deep historical roots, Russia allegedly used its media networks, such as Sputnik, to amplify fringe voices and make the movement appear more widely supported than it truly is. This manipulation could undermine democratic processes if Canada’s response is to restrict freedom of expression, which could backfire by weakening civil liberties.
Russia’s social media manipulation extends to aligning with far-right movements in Canada, often attacking vulnerable minorities, including Muslims and LGBTQ+ communities. This strategy, highlighted by Dr. Ahmed Al-Rawi, serves a dual purpose: it fuels divisive rhetoric within Canadian society while also pushing moderates to oppose Russia’s actions, thus garnering support for Canada's involvement in supporting Ukraine and sanctioning Russia. This tactic feeds into broader narratives in Canada, where geopolitical conflicts, such as the war in Ukraine, become intertwined with domestic political agendas.
Canada's current proxy conflict with Russia, driven by the largest arms push since the Second World War, has only heightened these tensions. The Kremlin's manipulation of Canadian social media space is a direct consequence of this geopolitical rivalry. As Canada continues to align its foreign and domestic policies with the U.S., Ottawa must contend with the risks posed by external actors seeking to destabilize its democratic institutions through the exploitation of social and political divisions. In the Canadian context, this divisiveness is exacerbated by ongoing efforts in Canada to silence and discredit those who dispute the value of aid to Ukraine, those who want better engagement with China and those who oppose Israel’s war on Gaza.
These efforts include: large-scale social media analyses, where those critical of Canadian or Western policies are often labelled as "Putin’s useful idiots" or linked to uncritical conservatism, painting them as gullible or dangerous; surveys and polls that attempt to connect individual political beliefs, such as skepticism toward the war efforts, with ideological positions deemed outside of the mainstream, further marginalizing those who challenge the dominant narrative; and anonymous attacks on social media, often ad hominem in nature, targeting individuals who promote peaceful negotiations, aiming to silence debate and marginalize alternative viewpoints.
Ultimately these strategies seek to limit public discourse and create a climate where legitimate criticism of Canada's foreign policy is stifled. The personalized attacks are not unique to Russia and China; they have also appeared in discussions surrounding the war on Gaza, indicating a broader trend in Western propaganda efforts aimed at controlling the narrative in the "grey zone" of modern conflict.
This deliberate narrowing of debate has wider implications for Canada’s foreign policy, especially concerning its delinking from China. It is widely accepted that U.S. influence has played a major role in shaping Canada’s shift away from China, with American pressure driving the narrative. Whether the U.S. has directly interfered in Canadian decision-making is harder to prove, but the pro-U.S. agenda dominates within Canada’s defence and security community, which tends to align closely with U.S. geopolitical priorities.
This broader alignment with U.S. foreign policy raises concerns about Canada’s independence in its diplomatic strategies. The lack of space for nuanced public debate about these issues suggests that external pressures, coupled with propaganda tactics, continue to limit the country's ability to form a more balanced, independent foreign policy.
Recommendations
Lobbying and ethnic constituency strategies used by governments, especially in countries like Canada, can undermine national unity. Politicians who cater to specific groups for electoral gain risk creating unequal access and weakening democratic processes. Transparency and accountability in foreign influence are essential to ensure fairness and prevent powerful foreign entities from distorting national policies.
In an era where trust in mainstream media is waning, alternative media and digital democracy platforms are emerging as critical tools for fostering public engagement and transparency in governance. For instance, Polis, a public opinion platform, allows individuals to share their views on contested issues and uses statistical summarization to provide insight into the collective desires of a population.
Further, the Paris Budget Participatif, an interactive platform initiated by former Paris mayor Anne Hidalgo, allowed citizens to vote on how five per cent of the city’s budget should be allocated. This direct democratic participation model was implemented between 2014 and 2020, demonstrating how digital tools can enhance civic involvement and governmental transparency.
These platforms represent a shift towards deepened political participation and improved transparency, allowing citizens to engage more directly in the political process. Canada could explore expanding or supporting similar platforms, creating more inclusive avenues for participation and ensuring that exiled voices are amplified in a secure and open manner.
The Democratizing Foreign Policy Program at the Quincy Institute, has extensively examined foreign influence, focusing on countries like Ukraine, Israel, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates. This program shows how foreign actors utilize lobbying and influence operations to gain favour in Washington, often through legal channels under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), but sometimes through covert or illegal actions.
Cases where firms like Boston Consulting Group and McKinsey & Company failed to register under FARA while working for Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF), make this illegal foreign interference. Indeed the U.S. has a double standard in its treatment of foreign interference; while Russia and China face constant scrutiny, countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE often receive little backlash despite engaging in similar practices.
In a more recent case, Israel allegedly conducted an influence operation during the war in Gaza, using fake social media profiles to spread pro-Israel content and critique Palestinian rights groups. While 128 U.S. Congress members were reportedly targeted, the U.S. government has yet to investigate the operation. This selective response to influence operations suggests U.S. favouritism toward certain allies, allowing them to interfere without consequences.
When it comes to tracking foreign influence or interference activities, Canada lacks similar tools and measures that other countries have developed and implemented. For instance, in the U.S., several foreign influence tracking tools have been created, such as the now non-inactive Foreign Influence Database, which compiled information on foreign agents registered under FARA. A current U.S. tracker tool that uses similar methods is the Open Secrets’ Foreign Lobby Watch, which monitors lobbying activities and foreign influence in the U.S. These tools provide transparency by documenting the financial connections between foreign governments, diaspora actors and U.S. policymakers.
The U.S. benefits from FARA, which requires foreign agents to declare their affiliations, making it easier to track foreign influence especially diaspora groups. Canada, by contrast, has no equivalent registry, even when other countries are developing them. For example, Australia has adopted the Foreign Influence Transparency Scheme (FITS), and the UK is also planning a similar registry.
Foreign interference in Canada and the U.S. is often hard to detect and prosecute, with many cases going unnoticed. This is also true in the European Union. The EU has responded with initiatives like EUvsDisinfo, which tracks disinformation and promotes media literacy. However, this system is not without flaws, as it can be seen as a form of censorship and raises concerns about ordinary citizens being involved in countering hybrid threats from foreign actors.
It is evident that Canada is severely behind its likeminded allies in the areas of creating transparency mechanisms to better account for foreign interference and influence. With development of the proper tools to detect, monitor and respond to foreign influence threats, Canada can better protect its vulnerable diaspora populations and better navigate the grey zone security environment.
About the Authors
Dani Belo is a teacher and scholar of international relations specializing in conflict management and security. He is currently an Assistant Professor of International Relations and leads the Global Policy Horizons Research Lab at Webster University in St. Louis, USA. Dr. Belo is also a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs in Ottawa, Canada. His research focuses on grey-zone and hybrid conflicts, transatlantic security, grand strategy, NATO–Russia relations, ethnic conflicts, and the post-Soviet region. Belo also worked as a policy analyst for the Government of Canada. His research on unconventional conflicts was featured at the U.S Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, the Royal Military College of Canada, University of Pennsylvania Law School Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, Columbia University’s Harriman Institute, and the European Commission. Dani led international research projects in Poland and Estonia, focusing on inter-ethnic relations and security. Several of his publications and presentations were used to inform international policy development at the U.S. State Department and Global Affairs Canada in relation to the conflict in Ukraine. Dr. Belo has authored and co-authored numerous peer-reviewed articles, chapters, and policy papers focused on unconventional security threats, NATO, conflict management, ethnic-based conflicts, the conflict in Ukraine, and Russian foreign policy.
Danika Brown received her undergraduate degree from the University of Ottawa and is currently a M.A. student at Carleton University's Norman Paterson's School of International Affairs. She is currently working as a Student at Defence Research Development Canada. Her research interests include fragile states, foreign policy development and the information environment.
David Carment is a professor at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs. He is series editor for Palgrave’s Canada and International Affairs, editor of Canadian Foreign Policy Journal and Fellow of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. His research focuses on Canadian foreign policy, conflict analysis, mediation and negotiation, fragile states and diaspora politics. He has held Fellows at the Hoover Institution and Harvard's Belfer Center. He is the author, editor or co-editor of 21 books and has authored or co-authored over 90 peer reviewed journal articles and book chapters. His most recent books focus on diaspora cooperation, corruption in Canada, branding Canadian foreign policy and state fragility. In 2017, Carment was a visiting scholar at the World Institute for Development Economics Research, Finland and in 2015 a Fellow at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research, Germany.
Canadian Global Affairs Institute
The Canadian Global Affairs Institute focuses on the entire range of Canada’s international relations in all its forms including trade investment and international capacity building. Successor to the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI, which was established in 2001), the Institute works to inform Canadians about the importance of having a respected and influential voice in those parts of the globe where Canada has significant interests due to trade and investment, origins of Canada’s population, geographic security (and especially security of North America in conjunction with the United States), social development, or the peace and freedom of allied nations. The Institute aims to demonstrate to Canadians the importance of comprehensive foreign, defence and trade policies which both express our values and represent our interests.
The Institute was created to bridge the gap between what Canadians need to know about Canadian international activities and what they do know. Historically Canadians have tended to look abroad out of a search for markets because Canada depends heavily on foreign trade. In the modern post-Cold War world, however, global security and stability have become the bedrocks of global commerce and the free movement of people, goods and ideas across international boundaries. Canada has striven to open the world since the 1930s and was a driving factor behind the adoption of the main structures which underpin globalization such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and emerging free trade networks connecting dozens of international economies. The Canadian Global Affairs Institute recognizes Canada’s contribution to a globalized world and aims to inform Canadians about Canada’s role in that process and the connection between globalization and security.
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